FOREIGN AFFAIRS

WITHDRAWN
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Date:
ACADEMY LIBRARY, FL 2874
USAFA TX 78235

Fall 1991 *$6.95 a copy*

Selective Global Commitment ***Zbigniew Brzezinski***

A Vision for Israel at Peace	*Ze'ev B. Begin*
Damascus and Peace?	*Daniel Pipes*
After the Gulf War	*Alvin Z. Rubinstein*
Desert Storm and Deterrence	*William J. Perry*
Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf	*McGeorge Bundy*

Nuclear Weapons After the Cold War
Carl Kaysen, Robert S. McNamara, George W. Rathjens

Back to Vietnam *Keith Richburg*
North American Free Trade *M. Delal Baer*

Intelligence for a New World Order
Stansfield Turner

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A fuming smokestack is the perfect symbol of our national dilemma. On one hand, it means the jobs and products we need. On the other, it means pollution. ❧ Some think having one without the other will take a miracle. We think it will take natural gas. ❧ Because gas, the cleanest of all fossil fuels, can reduce emissions across the board. You name it— CO, CO_2, NO_x, SO_2, particulates—and natural gas combustion produces none or substantially less. ❧ But gas is more than clean. It's extremely efficient as well. So even fewer pollutants are created since less fuel is expended to do a job. ❧ Which also reduces costs. And that's another argument favoring gas. It makes the fight against pollution more affordable. ❧ And, since nature blessed North America with vast stores of gas, it's a fight we can definitely win. With energy security and a better trade balance as a bonus. ❧ Natural gas. It's not the only answer. Just the best one we have right now.



© 1991 American Gas Associa

FOREIGN AFFAIRS (ISSN 00157120). Fall 1991. Vol. 70, No. 4. Published five times annually (February, April, June, September, December) at 58 East 68th Street, New York, N. Y. 10021. Subscriptions U.S. $32.00—Outside U.S. $39.00 per year. Second Class Postage paid at New York, N. Y. and at additional mailing offices. Postmaster, send address changes to Foreign Affairs, Neodata, P.O. Box 53678, Boulder, CO 80322.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

FALL 1991

Selective Global Commitment . . . . . *Zbigniew Brzezinski* 1
The Likud Vision for Israel at Peace . . . *Ze'ev B. Begin* 21
Is Damascus Ready for Peace? . . . . . *Daniel Pipes* 36
New World Order or Hollow Victory?
Alvin Z. Rubinstein 53
Desert Storm and Deterrence . . . . . *William J. Perry* 66
Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf . . . . . *McGeorge Bundy* 83
Nuclear Weapons After the Cold War
Carl Kaysen, Robert S. McNamara, George W. Rathjens 95
Back to Vietnam . . . . . *Keith Richburg* 111
North American Free Trade . . . . . *M. Delal Baer* 132
Intelligence for a New World Order . . *Stansfield Turner* 150
Recent Books on International Relations 167
Source Material 192

Foreign Affairs is published five times annually
by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
Vol. 70, No. 4 © 1991

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

WILLIAM G. HYLAND
Editor

PETER GROSE
Executive Editor

WARREN GETLER
Associate Editor

LUCY EDWARDS DESPARD
Book Editor

PATRICIA LEE DORFF
Assistant Editor

KIRK KRAEUTLER
Assistant Editor

ROSEMARY HARTMAN
Assistant to the Editor

AMY ROWE
Staff Assistant

LISA ANN BUONO
Assistant to the Executive Editor

DAVID KELLOGG
Publishing Director

EILEEN R. GILBERTSON
Circulation Manager

JOANNE ENCARNACÍON
Promotion Coordinator

WM. PAUL UNDERWOOD
Advertising Manager

GLORIA AGUILAR
Assistant to the Publishing Director

PETER KAUFMAN
Circulation Assistant

CHRISTOPHER WEYANT
Advertising Coordinator

Editorial Advisory Board

A. DOAK BARNETT
JAMES H. BILLINGTON
HARVEY BROOKS
HENRY GRUNWALD
PHILIP C. HABIB
JAMES HOGE
CARL KAYSEN
HARRY C. MCPHERSON, JR.
WILLIAM M. ROTH
FRITZ STERN

The articles in Foreign Affairs *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* Foreign Affairs *can do more to inform American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any article, signed or unsigned, which appears in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

Foreign Affairs is published five times annually by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Editorial Offices: 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10021.

Manuscript submissions: The Editors will consider all manuscripts received, but assume no responsibility regarding them. Materials will be returned only when accompanied by appropriate postage.

Subscriptions: Price for U.S. subscriptions, $32.00 per year; foreign, $39.00. Rates for air speed delivery are available upon request. To subscribe, write *Foreign Affairs,* P.O. Box 53678, Boulder, CO 80322-3678. To resolve subscription problems, call (800) 365-1554. Replacement copies are available to subscribers at no charge until the next issue is published. Thereafter, back issues are $9.00 each. GST number 127686483.

Advertising: For rates and schedules, contact the Advertising Office, (212) 734-0400. *Foreign Affairs* is a member of The Leadership Network, c/o Salesconcepts, (212) 941-8172. *Foreign Affairs* is a member of the Audit Bureau of Circulations.

Reprints and permissions: Write *Foreign Affairs,* Reader Services, 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10021.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Zbigniew Brzezinski

SELECTIVE GLOBAL COMMITMENT

There is a pervasive sense that the world is on the threshold of a new era. The dilemmas, passions and especially utopias of the recent past have suddenly become irrelevant. Yet before a new world order is proudly proclaimed and majestically inaugurated, some serious geostrategic rethinking is necessary, lest global disorder comes to dominate the onset of the post-Cold War era.

The end of the Cold War marks this century's third grand transformation of the organizing structure and motivating spirit of global politics. The first two great transformations did not enhance international security. The question now is, will the third?

The catalyst for the third transformation is the success of the West and, specifically, the United States in the outcome of the Cold War. Much therefore depends on the geostrategic implications drawn from the conclusion of that era, especially by America and those nations that were its principal partners in that prolonged engagement.

II

The first transformation was generated by the collapse of Europe's balance of power and thus its decisive position in the world. That balance was sustained by several European-centered but global empires. Dominant worldwide and conservative in spirit, the European system—in existence since 1815—eventually came undone because it was able neither to assimilate the rise of German national power nor contain the centrifugal forces of rising chauvinism. The first "world" war was in reality the last European war fought by globally significant European powers.

That war gave rise to an abortive attempt to reorganize

Zbigniew Brzezinski was National Security Adviser to President Jimmy Carter, 1977–81. He is now Counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and a professor of American Foreign Policy at The Johns Hopkins University. This article is adapted from an address to the 1991 annual conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies held in Zurich.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Europe and thus, indirectly, the international system as a whole on the basis of a new principle: the supreme primacy of the nation-state, with nationalism fueling political emotions. The attainment—or enhancement—of national independence became the sacred goal of politics, and the protection—or expansion—of national frontiers was viewed as the key measure of success.

The result was massive failure. That new European order was too precarious to survive for long. With the territorial imperative igniting interstate conflicts and with weak nation-states dotting the map of the new Europe, it was only a question of time before a new eruption occurred. Germany was again the precipitator, though not entirely the root cause, of the resulting explosion.

The Second World War, in reality the first truly global war, completed Europe's historical suicide. In the course of that war Europe ceased to be the effective center of world politics and became instead the critical theater of a global competition waged by two powerful extra-European states. Both realized that geostrategic control over Europe would be tantamount to eventual control of Eurasia, and that control of Eurasia would yield global preponderance. Accordingly, throughout the resulting Cold War, Europe was for each of them the central stake.

World politics were again transformed, but for the first time in almost half a millennium they were no longer decisively affected by either the competition or the decisions of the principal European powers. Europe, instead of being the subject, now became the object of global contest.

The competition of the two superpowers was fueled not only by traditional nationalism but by a powerful new ingredient: ideology. This doctrinal imperative infused an unprecedented degree of intellectual self-righteousness into the conflict. The struggle between America and Russia thus quickly acquired a Manichaean character, with two colliding concepts, not only of social organization but ultimately even of the nature of the human being itself. Each superpower saw itself as the carrier of universalist values, and the opponent as the embodiment of evil.

This century's second great transformation of world politics—like the first—also failed to enhance genuine international security. The 45-year-long conflict between the two superpowers entailed, first of all, enormous risks. With ideo-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

logical hostility intensifying their arms race, and with their arms possessing for the first time a lethal capacity on a globally devastating scale, the superpower rivalry was enormously costly in economic terms and potentially devastating beyond comprehension.

Ultimately the United States was successful, first, in deterring the Soviet Union from dominating Eurasia and, second, in discrediting its ideology and exhausting its economy. Belated efforts by the Soviet leadership to set in motion a process of domestic renewal created openings for intensified challenges to its control of vassal states. These challenges were fed by both nationalist resentments and an ideologically significant perception of the failure of the Soviet-style socioeconomic system to match the performance of the American-sponsored recovery of the western and eastern extremities of Eurasia. The crisis of power in the Kremlin and the sense of the historical failure of communism eventually caused the Soviet empire to disintegrate.

The Cold War thus ended without a hot war. In so doing it generated fundamental changes in two critical dimensions of world affairs: the geostrategic and the philosophical. In Eurasia Soviet power shrunk back not only to its 1940 frontiers, but it is now being challenged even within the Soviet Union. Indeed, the future survival of the Soviet system itself is now in doubt. Moreover a united Germany is now in NATO, noncommunist east European governments are craving membership not only in the European Community (EC) but in NATO as well, while a politically independent China is making steady progress in its pragmatic economic modernization. Geostrategically, far from subjugating Eurasia, the Soviet Union is now on the defensive within it.

The philosophical tenor of our time is now dominated by Western concepts of democracy and the free market. This is not to say that such concepts are being successfully implemented in the postcommunist states, but to assert that they represent today's prevailing wisdom. The competing notions of Marxism, not to speak of its Leninist-Stalinist offshoot, once so intellectually dominant, are generally discredited.

III

The end of the Cold War—and particularly its rather one-sided geostrategic and philosophical outcomes—has direct consequences for this century's third grand transformation of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

world politics.[1] The first transformation can be said to have been fueled by nationalist aspirations within a Europe no longer capable of dominating the world but still capable of disrupting it. The second involved an ideologically intensified global contest between two non-European superpowers. The structure and the spirit of the third are increasingly being shaped under the political and philosophical influence of the West's successful Cold War coalition.

In the course of the Cold War that coalition acquired a comprehensive institutional character, embracing not only America and western Europe but increasingly Japan as well. Considerations of security, a shared interest in economic growth based on global free trade, a commitment to democratic policymaking, and the impact of modern communications drove that coalition toward institutionalized cooperation. As a result its internal relations came to manifest a pattern of conduct motivated by what might be described broadly (if somewhat clumsily) as functionally pragmatic transnationalism.

Important residues, both of nationalism and ideology, undoubtedly continue to surface in the conduct of affairs even within the coalition, and much more so in the world at large. But these impulses tend to be constrained by at least two pragmatic considerations: maximizing collective security and promoting an open international trading system. The quest for collective security stems from the realization of the vulnerability of even the major powers to weaponry of mass destruction as well as from the prohibitive cost of modern weaponry. At the same time the wealth of nations is increasingly a function of their capacity to trade without external restraints. Traditional nationalist notions of military self-sufficiency and economic autarky are thereby being rendered obsolete.

The revolution in behavior among the most advanced countries is reinforced not only by the growing interaction and personal familiarity among their governing elites, but also by a profound alteration in public values. For the average citizen the imperatives of consumption are now more important than those of territory or ideology. Neither the desire for complete national independence nor ideological self-righteousness are

[1]The author wishes to acknowledge arguments developed along these lines by others, notably Samuel P. Huntington, "America's Changing Strategic Interests," *Survival*, January/February 1991; and Paul H. Nitze, "America: An Honest Broker," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1990.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the overriding motivations shaping the coalition's public opinion.

It is difficult to find an average German who is politically driven by the passion to repossess Alsace-Lorraine, a Frenchman dreaming of a reconstituted empire or even an American desperately fearful of worldwide communist takeover. As a result, functional pragmatism as well as transnational institution-building generally tend to dominate policymaking in the democratic West.

In the process the successful Western coalition—symbolized by the Group of Seven leading industrialized nations—is beginning to transform international politics into a more organic global process. This process tends to blur the distinction between domestic and foreign priorities. It also enhances the importance of internal economic and political well-being in determining the conduct and relative international importance of individual states. With nuclear weapons inhibiting the recourse to war among the leading powers, global politics are becoming in some ways similar to American urban centers: a mixture of interdependence and inequality, with violence concentrated in the poorer segments of society. Today, on a global scale, war has become a luxury that only poor nations can afford.

While morally unpalatable this reality nonetheless does somewhat enhance global security. So does the spread of democracy. This fact has even been recognized by once-hostile Moscow. As the thoughtful and iconoclastic minister of foreign affairs of the Russian republic, Andrei Kozyrev, has observed: "The main thing is that the Western countries are pluralistic democracies. Their governments are under the control of legal public institutions, and this practically rules out the pursuance of an aggressive foreign policy. In the system of Western states . . . the problem of war has essentially been removed."[2]

IV

Threats to international security have traditionally been defined in terms of state-to-state relations. That was especially the case in an age in which the nation-state was the principal

[2]Kozyrev also boldly asserts that in contrast the totalitarian systems—among which he includes the Leninist-Stalinist—are inherently aggressive, automatically viewing any democratic system as a "mortal enemy." A. Kozyrev, "Building a Bridge—Along or Across a River: The Parameters of Our Security," *New Times*, Moscow, Oct. 23-29, 1990.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

vessel of decisive political action. But in the emerging age of organic global politics, it is just as likely that major threats could originate from within states, either through civil conflicts or because of the increased technological sophistication of terrorist acts.

The character of the security challenges now facing the global community was dramatically defined by EC Commission President Jacques Delors in his important March 1991 address to the International Institute for Strategic Studies: "All around us, naked ambition, lust for power, national uprisings and underdevelopment are combining to create potentially dangerous situations, containing the seeds of destabilization and conflict, aggravated by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."

This general description could be amplified by a long list of specific problems, some due to the end of the Cold War, some long-lasting regional conflicts or legacies of imperialism, others likely to arise because of the emergence of new regional powers, and still others inherent in the inequality and poverty of the human condition—exacerbated by the population explosion. But all will be made potentially more lethal because of the inevitable further diffusion of weapons of mass destruction.

Accordingly, in determining when and how to address such problems the international community may have to be guided less by traditional notions of sovereignty (i.e., is one state violating the sovereignty of another?) and more by the scope of the threat itself. In other words, there may develop situations in which external intervention in the seemingly internal affairs of a state—as in Yugoslavia yesterday and perhaps elsewhere tomorrow—may be necessary and justified by the potential consequences of activities that are otherwise of internal character and that do not, of themselves, involve interstate collision.

In these complex and dynamic circumstances, much depends on whether pragmatic transnationalism becomes not only the defining but also the enduring substance of this century's third transformation of global politics. A great deal thus hinges on the eventual resolution of four large structural dilemmas—each central to international security and a consequence of the Cold War's end.

First, how will Europe define itself? Will it be a truly European Europe with a supranational basis, emphasizing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

deeper cooperation before wider participation; or will it be a Europe of closely cooperating states, perhaps wider before deeper? Which is more likely to enhance global security, and which should America favor?

Second, how will the Soviet Union be transformed? Is its preservation in a reformed mode—for the sake of "stability"—desirable from the standpoint of international security; or is its progressive but fundamental transformation ultimately the safest path toward enhanced international security?

Third, how will the Pacific region organize itself? Should the United States remain decisively involved in the security arrangements of that region, or should Japan be encouraged to assume a preeminent role consistent with its economic power; if so, how will this impact on regional security and, notably, on China's likely posture?

Finally, how will the Middle East be pacified? Can the United States, now so deeply absorbed in the Middle East's complex problems, afford not to promote energetically a framework of security and accommodation; or are the region's problems so intractable that the wiser course dictates a policy of cautious diplomacy? Which is preferable from the standpoint of international security and America's capacity to contribute to it?

The answers to these questions will go a long way either in defining a system capable of containing and mitigating future threats to global security or in yielding to a condition of intensifying global disorder. Each area involves a series of critical and complex policy dilemmas. The positive development of each case—or at least three of the four—would represent a major contribution to the emergence of politically and economically stabilizing zones of international cooperation. This would enhance in an ink-blot fashion the scope of international security and reduce to tolerable levels the inevitable presence on the world scene of some degree of violence and conflict.

V

The distribution of global power is being significantly altered by the acceleration of Europe's unification. The end of the division of Germany—clearly the most significant geopolitical change produced by the Cold War's end—has had the somewhat unexpected effect of actually spurring west Europeans (save for the British) to adopt a more ambitious timetable for not only economic but also political and, eventually,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

military integration. The Germans themselves wisely took the lead in this acceleration, strongly supported by the French. Their hope is that by the end of the decade, western Europe will emerge as an increasingly single-minded and purposeful international player.

The precise form and scope of this new global participant will probably remain unclear for some time. Difficult debates regarding internal organization and external boundaries are likely to dominate Europe's outlook for much of the decade. Both the American input to this European debate and the impact of the Soviet Union's crisis are bound to complicate the process of Europe's self-definition and self-assertion. These constraints may affect Europe's capacity to impact directly on the state of international security.

Two major visions of Europe's future are currently colliding, and America will at some point have to make a clear choice. One vision was again eloquently articulated by Jacques Delors. In his same March 1991 address, he posed this central question: "What destiny are we proposing to the people of Europe? What destiny and what ambition?"

His answer was clearcut. It should be an integrated Europe, "a community based on the union of peoples and the association of nation-states pursuing common objectives and developing a European identity." Such a Europe should therefore have its own defense policy, a policy that would represent "the second pillar of the Atlantic alliance" with the United States. The European Community would thus be the political as well as economic framework for the expression of a European identity that is comprehensive and increasingly organic.

The alternative vision was forcefully defined by former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in her March 8, 1991, speech to the Heritage Foundation in Washington. She warned: "If a European superstate were to be forged, it would almost certainly develop interests and attitudes at variance with those of America. We would thereby move from a stable international order with the United States in the lead to a more dangerous world of new competing power blocs. This would be in no one's interest, least of all America's."

She expressed an explicit preference for "a Europe of nation-states, a Europe that is open as soon as possible to participation of those European states currently outside of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

European Community, notably the democratizing states of postcommunist east Europe."

Inherent in these competing visions are two outstanding, sensitive security issues: What is the scope of the West's security perimeter in Europe; what is the proper American role in European security?

As eastern Europe democratizes itself, at first in the more promising Polish-Czechoslovak-Hungarian triangle, NATO's security perimeter is already implicitly beginning to include these countries. The West's attitude is thus reminiscent of its informal Cold War concerns for the security and independence of such democratic but neutral states as Finland and Sweden. Though neither was included in any formal alliance, both the West and the Soviet Union understood that a Soviet invasion of these democratic states, especially if resisted by them, would not leave the West indifferent. That posture in itself constituted some degree of deterrence.

As the European security perimeter moves eastward, and west European integration forward, further dynamics in favor of political and military integration are likely to be generated. Europe will certainly need political cohesion and a joint security policy to deal with its potential ethnic and regional problems. It may even choose to adopt a European equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine and, in that regard, the energetic response of the EC to the Yugoslav crisis represents an important and positive precedent.

Such a development would be consistent with the American desire for a genuinely pluralistic and self-governing world. A Europe with a defined military and political identity would certainly continue to have an interest in a strategic alliance with the United States. That alliance would guarantee against any potential revival of the Soviet military threat and serve as the basis for joint responses—if joint interests are involved—to out-of-theater threats as well.

It is, therefore, historically unwise for America to oppose greater European military integration, especially through linkage of the EC and the West European Union (WEU). Economic unity cannot be insulated from eventual political-military unity. Official U.S. insistence on preserving NATO as the central military decision-making forum smacks too much of an American preference for a Europe that, in the final analysis and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

contrary to American rhetoric, still remains a Europe of nation-states.

There is another negative aspect to the troubling inconsistency between the American desire that Europe be more active, not only in safeguarding itself but also in assuming out-of-theater roles, and the American insistence that the EC refrain from becoming the mechanism for defining Europe's security policy. This is that it ignores the historically significant reality that a more united Europe would be also a Europe more capable of absorbing and assimilating Germany. That would make unlikely any potential German-Russian maneuvers that in turn could revive old European insecurities. One cannot dismiss the possibility, however remote today, that in a fluid Europe and messy Soviet Union both Berlin and Moscow could again someday be tempted.

VI

A more self-reliant and reliable Europe, in which America maintains only limited ground forces but which it backs with its strategic deterrent, would be also less vulnerable to the negative spillover effects—both social and political—of the deepening Soviet crisis. The implosion of the Soviet Union is almost certain to continue. A long-term decomposition of the Soviet political and economic system is under way. The national crisis in the Soviet Union introduces a particularly emotional complication, making it all the more difficult to construct an all-union framework conducive to political compromise and congenial to rapid economic recovery. A protracted period of uncertainty is likely as the Soviet Union is transformed—both through evolution and periodic turbulence—into something eventually quite different.

During this period of change the Soviet geopolitical relationship with eastern Europe may be quite unstable, with fears and anxieties on both sides. The east Europeans fear both Soviet power and Soviet weakness. They know that not all Soviet leaders have become reconciled to the geopolitical loss of eastern Europe. They are concerned that the continuing security vacuum in the region could again at some point be filled by Soviet power. They follow carefully Soviet internal debates about policy toward the region, and they are not reassured by all that they read.

Two basic lines of thought have emerged in Moscow regarding eastern Europe. Some commentators urge a foreign policy

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

consistent with the "new thinking" that is said to characterize Mikhail Gorbachev, viewing eastern Europe—and especially Poland—"as the doorstep to the West. . . . Moscow must avoid using force and seek compromises as it does in Washington, Bonn and Paris."[3] In the same vein, another expert asserted that "there is much that is attractive in the Soviet-Finnish model of bilateral relations" and urged that it be applied constructively in regard to eastern Europe.[4]

More frequent, however, have been charges that "Soviet policy in East Europe is operating without a precise strategic concept, without a clear definition of aims." This, it is said, is not only facilitating the spread of Western influence but even permitting the new east European leaders to engage in activities aimed at "the U.S.S.R.'s socialist perspective and existence as an integral state." The east European states are seen as drifting toward closer ties with NATO, with potentially serious consequences for Soviet security. The Polish-Czechoslovak-Hungarian consultations are perceived as a renewal of the old *cordon sanitaire*, leading to the ominous conclusion that "we must make every effort to neutralize or at least weaken the anti-Soviet tendencies in these countries."[5]

These public debates reflect more serious disagreements in the Soviet leadership regarding its relations with eastern Europe. The Soviet Foreign Ministry, by and large, housed the more benign attitude toward changes in eastern Europe. In contrast, a directive issued in January 1991, by the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, urged the use of political and economic leverage ("energy exports to eastern Europe must be viewed as an important instrument of our strategy in the region") to restore some degree of Soviet influence. In the words of the Soviet scholar who first drew the world's attention to the directive:

> This document draws the conclusion that it was necessary to restore the Soviet positions and Soviet influence in eastern Europe, to restrict the sovereignty of the countries in this region and to prevent them joining any alliance, including NATO and the EC. . . . At stake is the question of whether the defining momentum of the

[3]V. Razuvayev, "The West Begins in Poland," *New Times*, Moscow, Feb. 12-18, 1991.
[4]V. Mustatov, "East Europe: Typhoon of Change," *Pravda*, March 13, 1991.
[5]A. Kaznacheyev, "U.S.S.R.-East Europe: Hopes and Illusions," *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, April 17, 1991.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1989–90 revolution will lead to a European order or another wrestling match over who controls the countries along the Vistula, the Moldau and the Danube.[6]

Even a cursory glance at a map suggests that the main thrust of any Soviet effort to redress the geopolitical situation is likely to be directed at Poland. From the Soviet point of view, the restoration of some degree of control over Poland would greatly reduce the momentum of the centrifugal forces now at work in Lithuania, Byelorussia and the Ukraine. This consideration may have in part prompted some of the economic pressures that Moscow applied against Warsaw in 1991, perhaps in hope of destabilizing the new government led by Lech Wałęsa. It has doubtless contributed to Soviet reluctance to compromise with the Poles on the question of Soviet troop withdrawals as well as to Soviet demands that the Poles sign a new friendship treaty with clauses that the Poles interpreted as limiting their sovereignty.

But it is not only the reapplication of Soviet power that worries east Europeans. Soviet weakness is also a source of concern. Existing trade patterns have already been unilaterally severed by the Soviets, with very adverse impact on the east European economies. The east Europeans fear that catastrophe in the Soviet Union could precipitate massive migration to the west, perhaps on a scale of even as much as several million refugees. The fragile east European states could not handle such a situation.

One must therefore expect considerable uncertainty in the Soviet relationship with eastern Europe. That is why east European governments have largely favored some Western aid for the Soviet Union, but aid that would deliberately facilitate the restoration of the disrupted trade flows. That is also why, until some alternative emerges, NATO, with its American presence, has come to be viewed by east Europeans as the primary source of their security. For east Europeans, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, given its rule of unanimity, which places on the same level such entities as the Soviet Union and Monaco, could become an effective security system only when insecurity no longer exists.

Soviet concerns over the east European view of NATO have

[6]Interview with Vyacheslav Dashichev, ADN, June 13, 1991.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

doubtless been intensified by the realization that growing national self-assertion in not only the Baltic republics but also the Ukraine and Moldavia poses the prospect that the Western security perimeter may someday move even farther east. The dismemberment of the Soviet Union is becoming an increasingly serious Soviet concern.[7] Soviet theorists have therefore become increasingly anxious to formulate some alternative notion of European security. Some have even been returning to the old theme that the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact ought to be followed by the termination or replacement of NATO.

The foregoing underlines the shared stake of both East and West in the peaceful and stable transformation—and not just reform—of the Soviet Union. It is in the collective interest of the West, and international security more generally, that Western policy have as its strategic objective the progressive strengthening of the political and economic power of the various Soviet national republics, thereby generating a dynamic process that would eventually replicate the pluralism that already characterizes the West. The Soviet Union might thus eventually evolve into a looser confederation—or a league of sovereign states—with associate status in specific security and economic matters for those Soviet republics that opt for complete independence.

In a Soviet confederation the existing Soviet army, a huge multinational establishment based on compulsory military service, might gradually be transformed into a professional and smaller military formation, presumably subject to the confederal government. Some Soviet republics have indicated, however, that they might also choose to maintain separate national conventional forces, perhaps similar to the U.S. National Guard.[8] The confederal government would likely exercise control over existing Soviet strategic forces, probably staffed mostly by Russian nationals, but there could be an

[7]"Even superficial familiarization with the nature of statements by Western politicians indicates that they welcome trends which bring about deepening political anarchy, growing nationalism and separatism, and a breakup of statehood," M. Aleksandrov, "Security of the U.S.S.R.: Two Views of the Philosophy of Foreign Policy," *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, Feb. 22, 1991.

[8]V. Semivolos, "Should the Ukraine Have Its Own Army?" *Novoye Vremya*, no. 26, June 1991, discusses in detail the problems of future Ukrainian armed forces, and reaches the conclusion that "taking into consideration the future professionalization of the army and the renunciation of nuclear weapons and the corresponding maintenance, backup and delivery systems, the numerical strength of the army will drop to 200,000–300,000" from the approximately 700,000 Ukrainians who currently serve in the Soviet army.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

arrangement—perhaps as in NATO—for a republican decision-making role regarding the use of such forces. In this fashion the enormous Soviet nuclear arsenal would eventually be decoupled from the world's single most powerful conventional army, thereby somewhat mitigating the threat that Soviet military power still poses to the West.

Clearly any such prospect is still far off. Movement in that direction could be derailed by a sudden reversal in internal Soviet politics, including some belated attempt at centralized dictatorship. Moreover even sustained movement is likely to be subject to periodic halts, some reversals and much friction and turbulence. Nonetheless the benign scenario outlined above—which can no longer be relegated to the realm of political science fiction—is already being discussed in the Soviet Union. Such discussion reinforces the proposition that the vision of a transformed Soviet Union should serve as the strategic beacon for Western policy.

A politically united Europe, together with America, can assist such a peaceful transformation more deliberately than a Europe that itself remains susceptible to internal national rivalries.

VII

The post-Cold War era's third structural challenge to global security involves the Far East. Irrespective of future events in the Soviet Union, shared American-Japanese security concerns are now less likely to mitigate their intensifying economic rivalry. A more deliberate effort therefore will be needed to define the substance of genuine Japanese-American partnership. Fortunately on both sides of the Pacific there is growing recognition of the emerging economic-financial interdependence and interpenetration of the two economies. In time one might even envisage the expansion of the emerging North American Free Trade Agreement across the Pacific, thereby creating a larger framework for a cooperative American-Japanese relationship.

In the meantime the security question will have to be addressed within a strategic perspective that is sensitive to broader regional dynamics. The Pacific region, though economically the most vital sector of the global economy, lacks any viable security structure. That absence was not a major problem as long as the central security issue was the American-Soviet rivalry. But in the foreseeable future, China, given its

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

relatively successful economic transformation, is likely to emerge as a geopolitical contender in the Pacific region. This alone is bound to have a major regional impact, potentially prompting a significant shift in the Asian power balance away from U.S. and Japanese preponderance.

It is quite likely that within a decade or two Far Eastern security will be as dramatically transformed by the emergence of a more powerful China as European security has been transformed by the fading power of the Soviet Union. If present trends continue, by 2010 China will join the United States, the EC and Japan as one of the world's four leading economic powers. It may make its political and military weight in world affairs felt even earlier. That prospect has to be taken into account.

In any case a more complex interplay involving not only Japan and China but also other regional players is already in the process of gestation. A unified Korea, for example, could even be a nuclear power. Indonesia is likely to be more assertive in southeast Asia. India clearly is already a regional hegemon in south Asia as well as a nuclear power. It is unclear whether in the years to come India might suffer from significant internal insecurity or seek to play a more assertive role in a wider Asian context. Moreover Asia's list of possible interstate as well as internal conflicts certainly far exceeds that of Europe.

The United States is determined to remain a Pacific power, with its forces projected to the edges of the Asian mainland. Yet at the same time it wants Japan to assume a larger military role on the grounds that it behooves Japanese standing as an economic giant and emerging global power. The long-term danger of such pressures is that, at some point, either a serious clash may develop between America and Japan over U.S. geostrategic perspectives, or that Japan, forced for the first time since World War II to define its own geopolitical priorities, will plunge into a security role that far exceeds anything America actually desired.

For example, an ominous reaction to American demands for greater Japanese military participation came from a leading Japanese businessman in a commentary entitled "Learning from the Gulf War," which proposed that Japan "should revise the Japanese-U.S. security treaty and replace American units stationed here with our own self-defense forces. The constitution's war-renouncing Article 9 must be overhauled. Tokyo

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

should also cooperate with Seoul and Beijing to create an Asian security system independent of the superpowers."[9]

Symptomatic also in this regard were U.S.-Japanese frictions over the Persian Gulf War. American insistence that Japan finance a significant portion of the gulf effort and participate in some multinational peacekeeping forces produced an outpouring of public criticism directed at America. The Japanese felt that the American position, in effect, amounted to "taxation without representation," with America making the critical decisions and Japan expected to pay for them. The war itself was denounced as foolish and American demands on Japan as effectively amounting to blackmail. The fact that America had to finance the war through international contributions was interpreted as signaling that "there is a limit to America's ability to unilaterally lead the world" and that "America should humbly recognize this and behave accordingly."[10]

It is therefore far from clear that it is truly in the American interest to press Japan to assume larger military responsibilities. The problem is likely to be compounded by increased Chinese resentment of the American strategy. Chinese commentaries on the "world's strategic pattern" make it clear that in the Chinese view, "Europe is no longer the focus of the world strategic pattern, while the strategic position of the Asia-Pacific region is rising."[11] This makes the Chinese even more concerned that the Asian region as yet has no regional security structure similar to that of Europe, which could assimilate Japan in the manner that Germany is being contained.

The answer to the region's long-term security dilemmas is thus not likely to be derived from a more militarily powerful Japan, nor from an America permanently perched on the edge of the Asian mainland. It certainly is not desirable to generate a dynamic and destabilizing interplay between a more militaristic Japan, an antagonistically assertive China and a beleaguered Russia. Instead, in the wake of the Cold War,

[9]J. Itoh, chairman, Kanebo, Ltd., *Yomiuri Shimbun*, May 20,1991.

[10]Professor Fuji Kamiya, "Can We Still Love America," *Shokun Magazine*, translated in *Japanese Digest Forum*, May 9, 1991.

[11]Chen Xiagong, "The World's Strategic Pattern in the 1990s," *International Strategic Studies*, Beijing, March 1991, pp. 8–9. Chen's periodization of change in world affairs is in some respects quite similar to mine.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the opportunity should be exploited to shape an Asian security structure that gradually embraces its major powers and interested states, especially China.

Perhaps two sets of negotiations will be needed at some point: one pertaining to northeast Asia, the other to southeast. The first might focus particularly on the need to generate a four-power consensus on the reunification of Korea. The second might build on the agreements regarding Cambodia to create some standing consultative machinery for the resolution of territorial and political conflicts.

In both cases the point of departure should be close consultations and coordination between America and Japan. An enduring alliance between the two—but neither a U.S. military protectorate nor a regional Japanese military role—is the essential foundation for Asian security. Progress along these lines should permit the progressive pullback of American forces from forward bases in the Philippines, Korea and eventually perhaps even Japan. American troop withdrawal should be viewed not as a symptom of isolationism but as consistent with the gradual emergence on the world scene of new and wider security structures based on regional self-reliance.

VIII

The fourth major consequence of the Cold War's end was the freedom of action the United States enjoyed in conducting the war against Iraq. The Soviet Union had little real choice but to play the role of a benevolent—even if increasingly frustrated—spectator. It was no longer America's competitor for regional influence. That military victory, however, has plunged America into a deep, probably protracted, political and military absorption in the Middle East's various crises.

Regional power is now concentrated at two extremes: Iran is the gulf's only self-reliant military power, and Israel has no Arab military match. The United States will thus have to be the principal source of security in the gulf. Perhaps over time a new political relationship with Iran can be structured, but that surely remains an uncertain prospect. In the meantime the very weakness of the gulf's Arab states, their continued vital economic importance to the West and the unresolved legacies of the Gulf War's militarily decisive but politically inconclusive

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

outcome dictate the necessity of continued American military presence.

It had been argued that the successful destruction of Iraq by a Western-Arab coalition, which enjoyed Israel's benign self-restraint, would create the preconditions for movement toward a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Relieved of the potential threat from Iraq, the Israelis are more inclined to insist on their maximum objective: permanent retention of the West Bank. The Arabs, reeling from Iraq's defeat by a massive display of American power, are in no position either to make war or to settle with Israel largely on Israeli terms.

The danger is thus of gridlock, but one that runs the risk of absorbing American attention, diverting American resources and perhaps even stalemating American diplomacy. Even though the Middle East is now unambiguously an American sphere of influence, the paradoxical result of America's military victory over Iraq might be the reduction of America's capacity to capitalize more broadly and constructively on the end of the Cold War and make a substantial contribution to international security writ large.

The issue is ultimately that of American political will to sustain and push forward the needed peace process. The international community basically knows that the interrelated agenda of peace in the Middle East involves the following: shaping a viable security framework that also constrains the inflow of arms; implementing U.N. resolutions 242 and 338 regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict, including some transitional political status for the Palestinian nation; progress toward a regional partnership in economic development.

An assertive American effort to shape such a genuine framework of political compromise and regional security would doubtless enjoy the support of the major countries in Europe and Asia. It would be seen as in keeping with progress toward genuinely enhanced international security.

IX

In sum, international security in the post-Cold War era is likely to depend on the following:

—the degree to which Europe succeeds in both deepening its political and military unity and—without too much delay—widening its scope;

—the transformation of the Soviet Union into a loose and voluntary confederation, a transformation that is neither

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

halted by a sudden throwback to central dictatorship nor that produces violent explosions;

—movement in the Far East toward a regional security accommodation that constructively engages Japan, China, the United States and perhaps also the Soviet Union and other pertinent states;

—efforts by the United States, as the decisive arbiter of Middle East security, to set in motion a regional peace process.

The future American role in each of these areas will be centrally important. How Europe evolves will be influenced to some degree by American policies and presence. How the Soviet Union copes will be affected by the strategic design ultimately adopted by the successful Cold War coalition. How the Far East organizes itself will be conditioned by the role the United States insists on playing. And how the Middle East evolves depends very heavily on the degree to which America chooses to play a passive or active role. Indeed, the American role in helping to shape these answers will be critical simply because today's global politics include only one superpower, the United States. No other power currently possesses the attributes needed for effective global leverage: military reach, political clout, economic impact as well as social and cultural appeal.[12]

America's special status, however, is threatened by its own domestic shortcomings. To be sure it would be rash to underestimate the innate capacity of American society for rapid renovation. A burst of economic and technological renewal could well be sparked in America, drastically reversing even in the 1990s some of the downward trends in the country's economic indices. Unless America pays more attention to its domestic weaknesses a new global pecking order could emerge early in the next century, in the event that a unifying Europe and an economically dynamic Japan were to assume large political and military responsibilities.

Accordingly, U.S. policy will have to strike a more deliberate

[12] This proposition is no longer disputed even by Soviet advisers. See V. Lukashevich, "Farewell, Superpower—The Soviet Union?" *Krasnaia Zvezda*, May 25, 1991. He noted that "for many decades the Soviet Union held its rightful place as a superpower. It was a force to be reckoned with in the world. . . . But in the space of a few years we have hurled our country from this world pedestal with our own hands."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

balance among global needs for continued American commitment, the desirability of some devolution of U.S. regional security responsibilities and the imperatives of America's domestic renewal. This will require a more subtle American contribution to sustaining global security than was the case during the Cold War. More emphasis will have to be placed on cooperation with genuine partners, including shared decision-making in world security issues. American influence is in fact likely to be higher if the homeward redeployment of some of its forces precedes—not follows—the host country's demand.

The emerging global system thus is likely neither to be based on American hegemony nor derived from genuine international harmony. Though America is today admittedly the world's only superpower, global conditions are too complex and America's domestic health too precarious to sustain a worldwide Pax Americana. A truly new world order, based on consensus, rule of law and peaceful adjudication of disputes, may eventually become a reality. But that day is still far off. As of now, the phrase is a slogan in search of substantive meaning.

Isolationism, given the emergence of the global economy and the impact of modern communications, is also not a practical option. Thus the real alternatives are these: either a world of intensifying disorder—with a divided Europe, a Soviet Union plunging into violent chaos, a Far East destabilized by new power shifts and a Middle East marked by continued conflict—cumulatively producing a catastrophic breakdown in global security; or an incipient global security structure, derived from widening and increasingly self-reliant regional cooperation, backed by selective and proportionate American commitments.

In such a global security structure America—even with a diminished military presence abroad—will remain the principal source of nuclear deterrence and the ultimate guarantor of the proposition that any disrupter of security will be faced by a dominant coalition. At the same time America will be able to focus more on the imperatives of its domestic renewal, thereby buttressing its long-term capacity to sustain a policy of continued, but also more selective and proportionate, global commitment.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ze'ev B. Begin

THE LIKUD VISION FOR ISRAEL AT PEACE

Those who call for a "new order" in the Middle East are very generous in their regard for our troubled region, as if we ever had an "old order." The grim truth of the matter is that the Middle East is characterized by numerous political volcanoes, distributed randomly in space, which erupt violently, randomly in time. This is a textbook definition of disorder. Whether in cellular biology, solid state physics, social structure or political systems, the transformation of disorder into order entails the investment of energy for the application of a set of rules.

We in Israel have our concept of the relevant rules that we believe is shared by the international community, and we are ready to spend all needed energy toward transforming our region from chaos to order. My stand and that of the Likud Party is a Zionist position. Others will have different positions, which they can certainly present with conviction. If, from our respective positions, we are all ready to direct our energies toward signing peace treaties, then it is worthwhile stating those positions without the "constructive ambiguities" of the past, which have turned out to be not so constructive after all. Given the situation after the Cold War, the Gulf War and the indication of changing attitudes among some of the Arab governments, there is danger that false expectations will lead to a repetition of past errors. This time, therefore, let us try some "constructive clarity."

II

Our Zionist stand is based on the Zionist goal: the creation of a safe haven for the Jewish nation in the Land of Israel. It rests on two pillars: the right of the Jewish nation to the Land of Israel; and the right of the Jewish state to national security, to allow its sons and daughters to live in freedom. Upon these pillars rests the three-pronged policy of the Israeli govern-

---

Ze'ev B. Begin is a Likud member of the Israeli Knesset and chairman of its subcommittee on National Security Policy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment: the prevention of foreign rule west of the Jordan River, an initiative to establish understanding and mutual respect between Israelis and their Arab neighbors, and efforts to reach peace treaties between Israel and the Arab countries.

There are those who dismiss this Zionist stand as founded on aspirations of the past, not on a rational examination of difficulties in the present. I sometimes find myself envious of those of other nations, not as ancient as ours, not as rich with spiritual treasures, not as tied to the cradle of their heritage who, nevertheless, have deep feelings toward their country and express those feelings as "self-evident."

Early in my service as a member of the Knesset, I hosted a delegation of visitors headed by a member of the U.S. Congress from Alaska, which had been transferred to American sovereignty from the Russian tsars in the Alaska purchase some 125 years ago. For my guests it was self-evident that Alaska is part and parcel of the United States. I reminded my visitors that the "Hebron purchase" had taken place some four thousand years ago, between Abraham the Hebrew and Ephron the Hittite; that the "Jerusalem purchase" was sealed three thousand years ago between David the Jew and Aravna the Jebusite, and that we can present a document proving that in both cases our forefathers paid for those lands in cash—a document called the Bible.

North of Jerusalem the Arab village of Anata now stands where 2,600 years ago Jeremiah was born and raised in the village then called Anatot. Since his prophecy, and that of the other Hebrew prophets of that era, no one has surpassed them in spiritual achievement. In every realm of life new generations improve upon their predecessors, but in this case the Hebrew prophets peaked, both in literary style and in moral values. If there are universal values, they are reflected best in the writings of these sons of the Jewish nation. Therefore we believe that our quest for a natural, open, straightforward connection to these sources of our heritage should be taken as "self-evident."

In the United States there are several towns called Shiloh. It is inconceivable that the mayor of such a town could decree it illegal for a Jewish family to live there, just because they are Jews and because some Americans living there might be, as they say today, "sensitive." It is inconceivable to me, therefore, that Jews would be legally barred from dwelling in the original

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

biblical Shiloh, ten miles north of Jerusalem, on grounds of their Jewishness. This, too, is "self-evident."

These assertions seem, to some people, to conflict with the right of the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza to establish their own state. I would like, however, to challenge such a wrong impression. In order for a group of people to be considered a separate nation, to have the right to self-determination, that people must be different from other groups to such an extent that would justify its separation from them. In the Land of Israel, on both sides of the Jordan River, within the boundaries of Palestine, only two such groups live: the children of the Arab nation and the children of the Jewish nation. The Palestinian Arabs on both sides of the Jordan River are claimed as an integral part of the Arab nation even under the Palestinian charter of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). But the Syrian government, for instance, has for past decades considered the Palestinian Arabs to be "South Syrians"; the lack of distinguishing national qualities is one of the reasons why Syrian leaders have long been reserved about the need for a unique Palestinian Arab state.

Yet people still insist that the Arabs in the Land of Israel, that is the Arabs of Palestine, are distinguished in their traits and dialect from their Arab brethren in Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

For the sake of argument let us accept that position, although many would agree that the differences between an Italian from Milan and an Italian from Naples are deeper than the differences between an Arab from Baghdad and an Arab from Amman. But now, after we distinguish this group from the Arab nation and after we refer to them in a linguistic exercise as a "people," the proposition is imposed upon us that out of this "people" we should still distinguish the Arabs of Samaria-Judea-Gaza as a separate "people." This artificial distinction must lead, however, to the far-reaching conclusion that the Palestinian-Arab people is now separated into three different peoples: the Samarian-Judean-Gazan Arab people in the center, the Trans-Jordanian Arab people to the east and the Israeli Gallilean Arab people to the west. If the first has a right to self-determination, so have the other two. In other words: one becomes three, and the result is nonsensical.

Rhetorical positions aside, the Arab nation of all the nations on earth has enjoyed the fullest expression of its right to self-determination, in 20 independent states where 95 percent

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the sons and daughters of the Arab nation live. The need for a unique Palestinian Arab state west of the Jordan River was not heard before 1967 in the years when Jordan occupied Judea and Samaria.

In the Land of Israel, which some call Palestine, two states were established: one Arab, one Jewish. There is no group of different and distinct Arabs that is eligible on the basis of the principle of self-determination to establish an additional Arab state west of the Jordan River.

It is true that the 1978 Camp David accords state that negotiations on the final status of Samaria, Judea and the Gaza district will address the "legitimate rights" of its Arab inhabitants. But these legitimate rights do not include the right to establish another Arab state, especially as we know that such a state would eventually be established upon the ruins of the state of Israel. We must make every effort to reach an agreement with our Arab neighbors based on mutual respect, but we must not yield to the false claim that such an agreement must be based on the fictitious recognition of a "symmetry" between the rights of the Jewish nation and that small portion—one percent—of the Arab nation in the western Land of Israel.

III

The set of rules pertaining to the Arab-Israeli dispute are contained in three familiar international documents. First, U.N. resolution 242, adopted on November 22, 1967, called for "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied" and, at the same time, "acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area, and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries." The resolution is "a balanced whole," said Lord Caradon of Britain, its sponsor, in 1967. "To add to it or to detract from it would destroy the balance. . . . It must be considered as a whole and as it stands."

Six years later the U.N. Security Council ordered in resolution 338 that "negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices, aimed at establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East." Thus, resolution 242 offers guidelines toward the desired goal, and resolution 338 describes the method for getting there.

Building for peace in our region another tier was laid down in 1978 when Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

President Anwar al-Sadat signed the framework for peace in the Middle East at Camp David in Maryland. This agreement includes a declaration that "the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts." Based on the generalities of resolutions 242 and 338, the framework is much more specific and detailed.

Up to now the Arab states, with the exception of Egypt, have paid only lip service to their acceptance of resolutions 242 and 338, and this set of rules has been severely distorted, both by addition and by omission. The "right of self-determination of the Palestinians" does not appear in the text; an international parley is not mentioned; the parties appearing in the text only include states, and no "organization," or terrorist syndicate such as the PLO, is mentioned. The phrase "territories occupied" is neither preceded by "the," nor is it followed by "on all fronts." Moreover resolution 242 specifically mentions withdrawal of Israel's armed forces, and not its administration or any other aspect of its sovereignty.

Concurrent with undue additions, a major omission has become habitual in discussion: few remember that the crux of resolutions 242 and 338 is negotiations between parties aimed at establishing a just and durable peace. The rest of the texts, as important as they may be, are details, and since some of these significant details are disputed, the differences must be resolved through direct negotiations without prior conditions.

There is for example an obvious need to reconcile the conflicting rules of "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces" and "peace within secure and recognized boundaries." This is to be resolved by the rules through "negotiations between parties" as imbedded in resolution 338.

The different interpretations of resolution 242 also show the need for direct negotiations. That there are several legitimate interpretations can be learned from the observations of Professor Eugene V. Rostow, who served as the American undersecretary of state for political affairs in 1967 and who was involved in the drafting of resolution 242: "Since Israel has already returned the Sinai, which constitutes over 90 percent of the territory it occupied in 1967, a settlement between Israel and Jordan could satisfy resolution 242 if it transferred all, or some, or none of the West Bank to Jordanian sovereignty."

We know of course that geography does not guarantee

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

security, but we also know that in the Middle East a lack of minimum geography guarantees defeat. If a government of Israel declares, as some people expect it to, that it would be ready to shrink itself back to the pre-1967 lines "in exchange for peace," shortsightedness will triumph and peace will be defeated. The temptation to eliminate the ten-mile-wide Jewish democracy in one quick blow would be irresistible for Middle Eastern dictators, whether radical Arab nationalists such as those in Syria and Iraq, or Islamic fundamentalists in Iran or Algeria.

Even if our responsible position is not accepted, it is important not to be preoccupied with the fact that there exist different interpretations to resolution 242. Advocating the single, narrow interpretation of "land for peace" may leave no room for negotiations, unless the determination of a timetable for Israel's withdrawal to the pre-1967 armistice lines is defined as "negotiations." The very insistence on such an Israeli declaration as a precondition stands in direct contrast with the call for negotiations between parties, because by then the outcome of negotiations would have been decided before they even began.

The territorial issue as an "obstacle to peace" standing between Israel and the Arab states is artificial, and therefore it is unjustified. Of the 19 Arab states still in a state of war with Israel 16 do not share a border with Israel and, of the remaining three, Lebanon and Jordan do not have a dispute with Israel over the location of the border. Lebanon and Israel both recognize the international border between them, and King Hussein of Jordan, in his summer 1988 announcement that he was severing his ties with the West Bank, implicitly determined the Jordan River as the western border of his kingdom.

There is no reasonable explanation why Saudi Arabia, for example, is still in a state of war with Israel, nor is there reasonable justification for its American friends to avoid explaining that to the Saudi family. The club of democracies should demand that members of the Arab League refrain from raising the territorial excuse and insist that they fulfill their obligation as members of the United Nations: to pass from a state of war with another member state of the United Nations to a state of peace through direct negotiations between parties according to resolution 338.

It has become habit to neglect the fact that the Camp David

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

accords deal not only with the relations between Jews and Arabs west of the Jordan River, but require the broadening of the scope of peace to include Arab states. Sometimes the obvious is forgotten: it is a coalition of Arab states armed with tanks and fighter aircraft that will decide if there will be peace or war in the Middle East and not the Palestinian Arabs west of the Jordan River. Real peace requires discussion about reducing this threat and not about increasing Israeli vulnerability alone. After the Gulf War it is clear that more effort must now be devoted to this wider aspect of the conflict, and more rigorous treatment is needed here.

For too long we have been exposed to the guessing game of who means what, when he or she says this or that. We had been told that Iraq's leaders are moderate, actually, and Saddam Hussein is pragmatic (and "do not pay attention to the violent threats against Israel, they are necessary for internal consumption"). We were told that the PLO is moderate, actually, and Yasir Arafat is pragmatic ("and do not pay attention to continuing acts of terrorism by PLO constituent organizations"). Behind this smokescreen of alleged moderation, Iraq acquired and built a grand war machine from both Eastern and Western sources. The PLO in turn was the most enthusiastic supporter of Saddam Hussein in the Arab world and praised his threats to destroy half of Israel. Should Israel believe untested assumptions about Middle Eastern leaders, or should it hold them to certain standards? Learning the lessons of the past, we certainly need an accurate, simple and obvious litmus test of the other side's intentions.

The following two questions should be directed, on a one-by-one basis, to the Arab leaders of states who consider themselves to be in a state of war with Israel:

—Do you unequivocally accept the natural right of the Jewish people to establish and maintain a viable Jewish state in the Land of Israel (the word Palestine can also be used if it would help)?

—Are you ready to enter face-to-face, open, bilateral negotiations without prior conditions aimed at the signing of a contractual peace treaty with the Jewish state of Israel (or just Israel if that would help)?

"Negotiations without prior conditions" deserves clarification. It does not imply that each side abandon its own dreams or political positions. But preconditions cannot be placed on the actual opening of negotiations; it is illogical to attempt to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

force the other party to change its position in advance, as a condition to begin talks. Each side will come with its position, willing at least to sit openly face-to-face at the negotiating table, the proclaimed goal of the talks being the signing of peace treaties between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

Despite the prospect of receiving evasive or even negative answers, the leaders of the emerging world order can be expected to insist on positive answers to both these questions. This approach should be adopted as a brave, new diplomatic standard, leading to a meaningful peace process.

IV

These days the question is sometimes asked: How will regional arms control arrangements affect the political process in the Middle East? I would suggest that the question be reversed. It is the "meaningful peace process" that should affect arms control arrangements, and not vice versa. The reason is the awkward fact that the Middle East is different from Europe. In the Israeli situation the basic long-term threat is not miscalculation; it is cool, cruel, systematic calculation aimed at the elimination of the Jewish democracy from the heart of the Arab nations. Until this element is openly eliminated from Middle East politics, arms control arrangements will be of little use, or even detrimental. Because the basic issue of the legitimacy of a specific state in Europe did not exist, a bottom-up approach to arms control was workable there. But in the Middle East, where Israel is still generally considered illegitimate, a top-to-bottom approach must logically be applied.

A new political alignment in this armed, violent, intolerant part of the world must be accompanied by a realigned state of mind on the part of the Arab leadership. The fate of the Kurdish minority in Iraq and along the barren hilltops of southern Turkey is a reminder to all Middle Eastern peoples of the potential magnitude of national tragedy that can confront a nation incapable of defending itself in the Arab world of 1991.

"Missiles are not impressed by strategic depth," we are told. "When a missile is launched from Iraq or Syria it does not stop in Judea, in Samaria or in the Gaza district in order to receive permission to continue on its course." This statement, heard in the wake of the Gulf War, is intended to undermine the assertion that Israeli rule over the area west of the Jordan

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

River is vital to the existence of the Jewish state. The smart wording cannot hide the superficial thought behind this policy.

Even after the Arab missile attacks on Israel's population centers it must be understood that the source of the threat to Israel's existence is a ground attack, and a missile attack only exacerbates this threat.

We are faced here with the common military problem of calculating time and space. Israel will always be protected by a small standing army, dependent on its reserves, and will always require a process to mobilize them. The mobilization will always take a few days. It can be executed only after careful assessment and deliberation by Israel's democratic government. This is the practical timetable that should be compared with the observation that a few hours are sufficient for a large Arab land force to be deployed at a zero distance from Israel's major metropolitan area, the strategic center of the Israeli state. The significance of the Golan, of Judea and Samaria is not derived from the 20 miles (Golan) or 30 miles (Judea and Samaria) that they add to Israel, but rather comes from their rugged topography. Israel will always need reasonably defensive positions there to hold back a massive ground attack with a small standing army, while the Israeli reserve call-up is underway.

The problem of missiles exacerbates this danger. The Syrian army has fielded accurate missiles with a range of 60 miles, as well as missiles with a range of 300 miles, carrying conventional warheads weighing 1,000 kilograms and even carrying chemical warheads. Chinese missiles with a range of 1,400 miles were supplied to Saudi Arabia and could also be supplied to Iran. The fact of the matter is that a mobile Syrian army, coupled with even a partially restored Iraqi army, can cross the Jordan River in less time than it takes to deploy Israel's reserve forces at full strength. In a coordinated attack Israel's enemies can inflict serious damage to its airfields and depots using their accurate missiles, and inflict heavy casualties to population centers using the other missiles. This would disrupt Israel's ability to maintain the vital mobilization of its reserves, while a large ground force crosses the Jordan, greeted by Arab residents cheering on the roof tops in demilitarized Samaria, and reaching the heart of Israel in a single night's movement. This is a severe yet reasonable scenario, and its potential

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

realization carries the serious and not improbable ramification: the surrender of the Jewish state.

The realization that the threat to Israel's existence is indeed a ground attack from the east is shared by the Israeli Labor Party. Examination of the party's platform reveals this recognition in its keystone item, stressing that Israel's "security border" must be the Jordan River. Yet if the Jordan Valley is under Israeli sovereignty, according to the concept of "territorial compromise," but parts of Judea and Samaria are relinquished, this would immediately lead to the single possible result: the seizing of power there by the PLO and the Islamic fundamentalist terrorists, followed by the establishment of another terrorist Arab state, alongside Iraq, Syria and Libya. The danger in its constitution is its ability to mobilize the Arab force, using the slogan of Arab solidarity in order to implement the Arab "right of return" to Jaffa, Lod and Haifa.

Our Zionist conclusion is, therefore, logical and plausible. It is vital for Israeli security to control the Golan Heights as well as the entire area west of the Jordan River. By defending our land we will protect our people.

V

"That is all well and good," we are told, "but doesn't the situation in Europe prove that it is possible to agree on security arrangements capable of alleviating the tension between East and West? Aren't you exaggerating your demand for security standards?" On the contrary; we can look toward Europe and learn.

In the past few years the NATO allies have come to realize that the source of Europe's security problem is not nuclear weapons but the unacceptable disparity between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in conventional arms. In March 1989 representatives of 23 European states, East and West, along with U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker, gathered in Vienna for the first conference on limiting conventional forces in Europe (CFE), which is now about to conclude successfully in Brussels. The figures presented in Vienna were simple. For example, 52,000 tanks in the Warsaw Pact against 22,000 in NATO—a ratio of almost 2.5 to 1—was considered unreasonable and unacceptable to the Western democracies.

The CFE treaty is based upon three guidelines: the potential enemy is judged by its capabilities, not by its perceived intentions; capability is assessed through the infamous bean-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

counting method irrespective of weapon sophistication; and based on such an assessment the requirement is a 1:1 ratio between East and West armaments (20,000 tanks in the West must balance 20,000 tanks in the East, and the combined forces of eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland must not exceed 7,500 tanks, against the same 7,500 in France, Belgium and Holland).

It is both possible and necessary to compare these newly defined, reasonable standards of national security with the Middle East situation and examine whether Israeli citizens too can expect to enjoy these standards.

Before the Gulf War, in terms of disparity on Israel's eastern front alone (Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia), some 9,000 tanks were fielded, as compared to less than 4,000 in Israel. This 2.25-to-1 ratio, unacceptable in Europe, must also be considered alongside Israel's western front, taking into account the rise in fundamentalist Islam that has already reached Algeria.

The strategic depth in western Europe at its narrowest section, opposite Holland and Belgium, is some 300 miles. "Greater Israel," however, from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea opposite metropolitan Tel Aviv is only 45 miles.

In terms of early warning time, to most Israelis the current debate in NATO on whether the standard warning time for NATO troops should be two weeks, as in the past, or four-to-six weeks sounds ridiculous. Faced with dictatorships that are difficult to deter, a surprise attack is within their capability. Israel must be at a state of readiness measured in days or hours, not weeks or months.

Since the worst of all wars 45 years ago Europe has not experienced a war, while the Middle East in the past decade alone has known the horrors of the Iran-Iraq War and its one million casualties, and the Gulf War with its horrible consequences in 1991. Israel, of course, has also been the target of six wars since its inception and the recipient of cruel missile attacks in the recent Gulf War. The most accurate official account of the current Arab nations' intention toward Israel is the concluding declaration made on May 26, 1989, at the Casablanca summit of the Arab League, just two weeks after Israel announced its own peace initiative. It included the Arab commitment to "the right of return," and to the rallying of all

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Arab forces to achieve strategic parity to contain the "Israeli aggression."

Preempting a possible new alignment in the Middle East, Syria used the $2 billion check it received from Saudi Arabia (in exchange for the services rendered in the Gulf War by Syria's 9th Armored Division) to purchase Scud missiles from North Korea (which have a 300-mile range and a 1,000-kilogram warhead), 300 T-72-M1 tanks from Czechoslovakia, and it is discussing procurement of M-9 missiles from China. The Syrian protectorate imposed on Lebanon in May 1991 is another indication of Syria's regional ambitions.

All efforts aimed at arms control in the Middle East must therefore address first the enormous asymmetry in conventional arms between Israel and its enemies as it was applied in Europe.

VI

The Arab-Israeli dispute is so deeply rooted—in both the historical and psychological senses—that one should not expect it to be solved in a single short diplomatic move. With this realization in mind the participants in the Camp David accords agreed on a gradual approach. This in turn was translated to a "partial agreement," in two different meanings. First it is an interim agreement, defining a transitional period of five years, which will enable the parties to examine carefully the developments in the Middle East, in particular, those west of the Jordan River. Second the agreement is partial also in terms of substance. The parties are asked to seek agreement on the "softer" issues, on which they can hopefully agree, while addressing the harder issues would be deferred to a later phase (but still within the transitional period). It is understood that the hardest-to-solve point of contention is the final status of Samaria, Judea and the Gaza district.

The wisdom of Camp David dictated that the five transitional years should not be wasted, but instead should become a source for confidence building between Arabs and Jews west of the Jordan River. This approach was translated to the need to decrease to a minimum possible sources of friction between the Arab inhabitants and branches of the Israeli government. The tool proposed for that was a self-governing authority. Accordingly the Arab inhabitants of Samaria, Judea and Gaza will run their own affairs through an Arab administrative

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

council to be elected by them, while Israel takes care of its security through means determined by the government.

The concept of autonomy for the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza has its origin in the writings of Ze'ev Jabotinsky, the Likud mentor, more than 50 years ago. It was echoed in the platforms of the Likud Party and its Herut element before coming to power in 1977, and the concept was modified by Prime Minister Begin late that year. Originally it pertained to Arab religious and cultural autonomy, to be guaranteed under Israeli sovereignty. The 1977 modification greatly expanded its scope, and Arab autonomy is not now conceived as under Israeli sovereignty. This was a far-reaching leap in Likud thinking and is a significant concession on its part. The initial reservations about the Camp David accords voiced by some Likud leaders revolved around the prospects of relinquishing to Egypt the whole Sinai Peninsula, including Jewish towns there—reservations that were also shared by leaders of the Labor Party. But since 1978 the Camp David accords have been an essential part of the Likud platform.

It should be stressed that the agreement between Egypt and Israel concerning Arab autonomy pertains not to the territory of Samaria, Judea and Gaza, but to its Arab inhabitants. In early 1982, before the Egyptian delegation withdrew from the negotiations, Israel proposed an extensive, detailed list of powers and responsibilities to be transferred to the Arab administrative council.[1] These include: administration of justice, including supervision of the administrative and prosecution systems; administration of finance—budgeting and allocation, taxation; and local police, with the operation of a strong police force and maintenance of prisons for criminal offenders. This far-reaching proposal is still on the table, and was included in Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's letter to President Bush in April 1990.

An important element in the Camp David framework is the fact that it is open-ended. There is nothing in the accords that would preclude any agreed solution to the final status. The Arabs therefore have not been required to give up any of their positions from the outset, including their claim to Arab sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and Gaza. They will be able to raise their claims during negotiations on these issues, while the

[1]Egypt withdrew from those negotiations under Arab pressure, as admitted by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in an interview with the Kuwaiti newspaper, *Al-Anaba*, Jan. 6, 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

elected government of Israel will come to the negotiations with its own stand, according to the free decision of the majority in Israel.

It was understood at Camp David that an agreement between Jews and Arabs west of the Jordan River cannot stand alone. An integral part of the package must be, as agreed, the signing of a peace treaty with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan by the end of the transitional period. This wider scope of the peace process is essential to a successful long-term outcome of the negotiations, and it would prevent a future use of Jordan as a platform for Iraqi tanks moving toward Israel.

The Camp David framework is the only practical diplomatic vehicle that carries any hope for progress toward a workable solution, containing the necessary and the sufficient elements for beginning negotiations. It is important that our Arab neighbors examine these documents and assess their advantages without prejudice. They must give up the illusion that violence, from within or without, shall force us into more far-reaching proposals, such as a commitment to accept a future 21st Arab state west of the Jordan River. All of us will have to find a way to live side by side west of the Jordan River—and when our neighbors understand that, there is a possibility that they will sit with us, negotiate and agree, for their sake. We shall be there too, for our sake.

VII

The Gulf War reminds us once again that Israel lives under extremely difficult conditions, in a violent, totalitarian environment. It cannot be merely coincidence that among the 20 Arab states, which have been free from the yoke of colonialism for one or two generations, none has succeeded in establishing a democracy. The Arab states are oligarchies or dictatorships; their governments have not been legitimized by the democratic process. It is little wonder that they maintain power through the military and a suppressed press, and as far as order goes, too many of them were ordained in the order of state terrorism.

Political violence, it must be concluded, is characteristic in the Middle East, a region that relatively recently emerged from the Ottoman Empire, and whose borders have not yet solidified. The dictatorial nature of the regimes in the Arab countries is not conducive to change, and dictators often fall

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

into the habit of using hatred as a political tool. Today this hatred is specifically directed toward the Jewish state.

When people demand "Peace Now," it is our responsibility to ask them, "And what then?" The conflict between Israel and the Arab nations has deep historical and psychological roots pertaining not only to Samaria, Judea and Gaza but also to the Israeli coastal plain. What is Hebron to us, they call el-Halil; Ashkelon for us is Majdal to them; our Jerusalem is their Urshulim-el-Kuds, and our Haifa is for them also Haifa. This is not "just another" border dispute on acid rain, sardine fishing rights or even drug smuggling. For Israel it is an existential issue, and such a conflict cannot be ended by a quick fix.

For an attempted diplomacy in the Middle East, overenthusiasm is no virtue, and a cautious approach is no vice. For us Israelis guarded optimism has a different twist: it is important to be an optimist; it is vital to be on guard.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Daniel Pipes

IS DAMASCUS READY FOR PEACE?

After thirty-five years of grim relations, Damascus and Washington are suddenly agreeing on a few things. Syrian and American troops stood together in the deserts of Arabia, facing down Saddam Hussein and calling themselves allies. Then the Syrian media toned down their habitually vicious anti-American rhetoric, and diplomatic contacts increased steadily. In July President Hafez al-Assad agreed, apparently without preconditions, to participate in an American-sponsored peace conference.

These changes, some of them quite abrupt, raise several questions: Do they signal a fundamental shift in Syrian politics or are they merely prudential? Has Assad undergone a change of heart regarding Israel or is he making tactical adjustments? Should the U.S. government build on this quasi alliance or distance itself from a brutal tyrant?

To answer, we begin with an analysis of Assad's character and an examination of recent developments that have affected Syria. Next we scrutinize Syria's key bilateral relationship—the one with Israel. Within this context, finally, we focus on American policy.

II

Like any one-man dictatorship Syria is dominated by its ruler. President Assad unilaterally issues the country's laws and makes most of the life-and-death decisions affecting the twelve million Syrians he rules. Understanding Syrian politics, therefore, means beginning with Assad.

One way to understand Assad's character is to compare him with Saddam Hussein. They are about the same age (Saddam was born in 1937, Assad in 1930); they come from impoverished rural areas; they represent minority groups in their countries; and they have effectively ruled since about the same

---

Daniel Pipes is Director of Philadelphia's Foreign Policy Research Institute. This article is adapted from his forthcoming study for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, *Damascus Courts the West: Syrian Politics, 1989–91.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

year (1972 for Saddam, 1969 for Assad). In personality they share vaulting ambitions, a passion for secrecy and a Manichaean outlook that divides the world into agents and enemies. Both tend toward brinkmanship and are more interested in building their militaries than their countries. Each has imposed extreme centralization to create a stable order where turmoil had previously prevailed. Their political systems rely on Baath Party control, the pervasive use of informants and brutality. (Middle East Watch found torture in Iraq to be "used routinely"; Amnesty International described the Syrian jails as "almost a research center for torture.") Both have looked to Moscow for primary support but have occasionally wooed Washington. They have claimed to represent the Palestinians and sought to control weak neighbors. The two dictatorships are about as similar as any pair of governments on the planet.

Yet for all their similarities the two men differ profoundly. Whereas Saddam revels in brutality for its own sake, Assad resorts to it as an instrument of power. Saddam's dreams of glory distort his decision-making; Assad knows his limits and acts within them. Saddam's overt aggression makes him enemies; Assad's subtlety allows him to avoid trouble. Saddam displays an increasingly uncontrollable streak of impatience and has a terrible sense of timing (the invasion of Kuwait could not have occurred at a worse moment from the Iraqi point of view). Assad has a most refined sense of timing. He probes his opponents' weaknesses, waits for the right moment, chooses the most advantageous field of battle and strikes. (The seizure of Beirut in October 1990, 15 years after Syrian military involvement began, was a political masterpiece.) In this way, Assad has defeated one enemy after another: the Muslim Brethren, Lebanese militias, American troops in Beirut, Israelis in south Lebanon and Iraqi armed forces. In short, Assad is the virtuoso politician of the Middle East.

Understanding Assad's motives is not easy, for his words point only vaguely to what he thinks, and his actions only suggest what he intends.[1] As needs require, he shifts nimbly among policies. Throughout a decade, for example, he regularly condemned the Egyptian government for its 1979 peace

[1]Two biographies of Assad have recently appeared in English: Moshe Ma'oz, *Asad, The Sphinx of Damascus: A Political Biography*, New York: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1988, and Patrick Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

treaty with Israel. Then in 1989 he suddenly made up with Cairo.

Amid such shifts, however, three constants stand out: rule in Damascus by Assad and his people, the Alawites; pursuit of a Greater Syria; and the desire for strategic parity with Israel. The first is the most important. The Alawites, who constitute about 12 percent of the country's population, are sometimes portrayed as a sect of Islam, but Alawism is in fact a distinct religion. Accordingly an Alawite ruler in Damascus is repugnant to most Syrians, and this fact has shadowed Assad and the Alawites since their ascent to power in 1966. Muslim hostility in turn compels the regime to recruit heavily from its own community so that the government has a distinctly sectarian cast. Assad's overthrow would almost certainly lead to communal violence; merely to protect themselves the Alawites must stay in power. The result is a vicious cycle of hostility and repression.

Nevertheless the government does reach out to the majority Sunni Muslim population by avoiding contention in the domestic arena and stressing foreign policy issues. Foremost among these, at least since 1974, has been the dream of a Greater Syria—a notional territory that includes present-day Syria, Lebanon, Israel, the occupied territories, Jordan and a portion of Turkey. Israel is the most prominent of Greater Syria's several regions, and for several reasons. Anti-Zionism permits Assad to atone for the Alawite community's (and indeed Assad's own grandfather's) past friendliness to Zionism.[2] It allows Assad to tap the Sunni Muslims' hostility toward the Jewish state, binding his regime to the disenfranchised majority. And it gives rhetorical form to a territorial claim: that the region west of the Jordan River should be subject to Damascus. Assad's ambition toward Palestine is both direct (he claims Palestine as southern Syria) and indirect (he stands up for Palestinian rights and tries to take over Palestinian organizations). Since 1978 Assad's goal of controlling Palestine has taken the form of strategic parity with Israel, which Assad defines broadly: "It does not mean that we should have a tank for each Israeli tank. . . . Strategic parity is composed of many

[2]For example, a June 1936 letter to the French prime minister signed by six Alawite notables, possibly including Assad's grandfather, expressed solidarity with the Zionists in Palestine: "Those good Jews brought civilization and peace to the Arab Muslims, and they disbursed gold and prosperity over Palestine without damage to anyone or taking anything by force." Abu Musa al-Hariri, *Al-Alawiyun*, Beirut, 1980, pp. 228–31.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

elements. Before parity in weapons, it is parity in the cultural, economic and political fields."

Ironically it is precisely in those fields that Syria has done most poorly in recent years. Assad has imposed on Syria a Soviet-style police state with all the repression and poverty that it entails. Middle East Watch has said of the Assad regime:

> Having killed at least ten thousand of its citizens during the past two decades, it continues to kill through summary executions and violent treatment in prison. It tortures on a routine basis and arrests and holds thousands without charge or trial. It persecutes some of its minorities. It denies freedom of expression and association to its citizens and denies them their right to democratic participation in government.[3]

Economically Syria has been stalled for years in the grip of socialism, cronyism and huge military expenditures. Inept policies have produced an annual inflation rate of some 50 percent, a grossly overvalued Syrian lira and debts of some $6 billion to the West and $9 billion to the U.S.S.R. Although 30 percent of the work force is engaged in agriculture, grain has to be imported. Cities routinely experience electricity shortfalls, and ordinary items such as toilet paper are unavailable for long stretches of time. Oil is the one bright spot. The country now produces about 480,000 barrels a day, of which some 220,000 barrels are exported.

Assad himself takes little interest in economic issues, with the exception of oil production. And until 1987 it seemed he did not need to, for things were going his way. Despite his country's small population, meager economy, social tensions and communal conflicts, he had turned Syria into a leading player in the Middle East.

III

Then came Mikhail Gorbachev, perestroika, the collapse of communism in eastern Europe and the decline of Soviet bloc ambitions in the Middle East.

Changes to the north have directly affected Syria. Central Europe's new rulers are not only inclined to renounce their countries' former support for Assad but, in the phrase of then-Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Arens, they were "waiting in line" to renew relations with Israel.

[3]Middle East Watch, *Human Rights in Syria*, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1990, p. 134.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Changes in the U.S.S.R. are even more worrisome. Moscow's interest in the region has plummeted as Soviet domestic problems have multiplied, and the Kremlin has more urgent uses for its resources than subsidizing Syria's armed forces. By one estimate, in late 1989 arms shipments to Syria had dropped by more than 50 percent during Gorbachev's tenure.[4]

These changes notwithstanding, the Soviet-Syrian relationship remains thick. Moscow continues to be engaged in the Middle East and Assad is its principal ally there. In 1988, well into Gorbachev's administration, Assad granted the Soviets a lease without term to construct a naval base at the port city of Tartus, making this the only Soviet base in the Mediterranean and possibly the largest permanent Soviet naval base outside the U.S.S.R. Moreover 2,500 Soviet military advisers continue to work in Syria and advanced Soviet matériel still arrives. Early in 1991 Assad reportedly struck a $2 billion deal for Soviet arms. Given the many billions Damascus already owes Moscow, this is a noteworthy commitment.

Assad responded to the Soviet ebb tide by compromising long-standing positions that had hurt him in the West. In 1989, for example, government officials agreed to meet with Amnesty International. Mothers and wives of the "disappeared" were allowed to demonstrate. In March 1990 the government lifted the emergency law provisions instituted 28 years earlier. Syrians in exile received invitations to return, and mosque preachers found they could criticize the regime. In a characteristically despotic act of liberalization, the government called parliamentary elections on May 22, 1990, and permitted independents to increase their share of successful candidates from 18 percent to one-third. It was not democratic, but allowing opposition figures to address public gatherings did represent a concession.

The year prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait witnessed two dramatic changes in Syrian foreign policy. First was the announcement in December 1989 that full diplomatic ties with Egypt had been restored. After more than a decade of abusing Egyptian leaders for signing the Camp David accords this suggested a major realignment. In addition Assad softened the Syrian position vis-à-vis Israel. Early in 1990 he alerted former President Carter of his willingness to talk to the Israelis under

[4]*The New York Times*, Nov. 28, 1989.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

certain conditions. Likewise, after meeting with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in July 1990, Assad announced that, assuming other demands were fulfilled, "We are ready to join the peace process."[5]

Also to appease Western sentiments Assad released some Syrian Jewish women, reduced anti-Western propaganda, reestablished diplomatic relations with Great Britain, granted ready access to American diplomats and coordinated some policy with the U.S. government in Lebanon. He stopped terrorist attacks against Western targets in early 1989 and removed Muhammad al-Khuli, Syria's longtime terror mastermind, from his top position at military intelligence.

Thus even before the Iraqi invasion Assad was making changes here and there, adapting to his straitened circumstances, while leaving fundamentals as much intact as possible. Then Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait.

IV

The gulf crisis proved enormously beneficial to Assad. To begin with it caused a rise in the price of oil that brought Syria a windfall of $200 million. In addition funds came in from coalition partners: the European Community contributed $200 million to Syria, and the Japanese sent a loan of $500 million. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the other Gulf Cooperation Council states (Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman) pledged more than $2 billion.

The crisis also enhanced Syria's international position. By joining a coalition with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Syrian isolation in Arab politics came to an end. With Saddam out, Syrian arms loom large in Arab politics; except for Egypt no other government can compete for influence.

Even more noteworthy was Assad's joining a U.S.-led coalition. Syrian troops contributed little to the fighting, but they served as a symbol—giving the coalition the sanction of a radical anti-American regime and making it harder for Saddam Hussein to disparage America's Arab partners as stooges. Syria's sanction was appreciated in Washington, and Assad was not shy about proclaiming his importance. "I am your cover," he told American officials, while requesting his quid pro quo: financial aid, Syria's removal from the list of states sponsoring

[5]*The New York Times*, July 17, 1990.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

terrorism (which would offer a variety of benefits, including access to technology), political pressures on Israel and a guarantee that Israel would not use force against Syria.

In sum Assad's stand against Saddam Hussein won him an infusion of funds, new Arab friends and an enhanced regional stature. It also allowed him to switch from the anti-American to the pro-American camp in a single deft maneuver. He achieved this on his own terms with his dignity fully intact, with implicit forgiveness for past transgressions and without concessions. For Assad the Iraqi invasion was thus a providential event, easing several of his worst dilemmas and rescuing him from the cul-de-sac of Soviet clientship.

The gulf crisis also enabled Assad to reach a goal that he had been pursuing patiently for 15 years and that Syrians generally had been waiting to see for a lifetime: the domination of Lebanon.

Few Syrians have accepted Lebanon as an independent state since its creation in 1920. Only with the outbreak of Lebanon's civil war in 1975, however, did an opportunity to intervene militarily present itself. Since that war began Syria has increased its influence there each year. By the mid-1980s, 40,000 Syrian troops controlled about two-thirds of Lebanon. When the gulf crisis absorbed international attention and prevented Saddam Hussein from aiding his Lebanese protégé, General Michel Aoun, Assad moved swiftly. Fifteen years of effort culminated on October 13, 1990, when in three hours Assad's forces gained control of much of Beirut and the great majority of the country—all but Israel's "security zone" in the south and a few small patches here and there.

In May 1991 the Syrians initiated a rapid series of steps culminating in a treaty signed that month by the Syrian and Lebanese presidents. This agreement included an intent to work together in the political, military, economic, cultural and scientific realms; establishment of a supreme council made up of the president and three other officials from each country; and a formal request (with several conditions) for Syrian troops to remain on Lebanese soil.

To appease Lebanese sensitivities, words such as "unity" and "integration" were not used. The formulation became "one people in two separate states." Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Shara claimed that a majority of Lebanese and Syrians would welcome a union of their countries but added that his government was not seeking this "for the time being." The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

assassination of Michel Salhab, a prominent Lebanese critic of the treaty, one day after its signing, however, suggested that Syrian control of Lebanon was already a reality.

This de facto hegemony in Lebanon permits Assad to exercise close control over events there, such as shutting down the free press through which his opponents used to attack him. He can better tap the revenues of Lebanon's drug trade, which brings in an estimated $4 billion in profits each year. And he obtains a new potential military front against Israel. All of this strengthens Assad, but the last is of special importance, for Syria is the key to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

V

A belief that Palestinians are the crux of the Arab-Israeli conflict has, on occasion, caused the Arab states almost to disappear from many Western eyes. Yet the Arab states are in most respects more fundamental to the conflict than the Palestinians. The states made war on the nascent Israel in 1948 and transformed a local communal conflict into an international issue. After losing they decided to keep the issue alive by denying Palestinian refugees the opportunity to settle down. Arab kings, emirs and presidents founded the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) at a summit meeting in 1964. Arab states, not Palestinians, engaged in the 1967 and 1973 wars. Through four decades Palestinians have been pawns of Baghdad, Amman, Damascus and the other state capitals—not the other way around.

Of these states confronting Israel, Egypt was long the most important due to its military power, size, active leadership and geographic centrality. But this role ended in 1979 with the signing of a peace treaty with Israel; the action then moved to Damascus, the second most powerful of Israel's neighbors. Since 1979 Assad has had such control over the Arab decision to make war or peace that militarily the Arab-Israeli conflict has been a Syrian-Israeli conflict. So long as Assad refuses to come to terms with Israel, the conflict continues. Were he willing to do so, the international dimensions of the Arab-Israeli conflict would rapidly shrink; the Palestinian issue would become a local problem, terrible for those immediately involved but of minor importance to the outside world.

With regard to secondary issues, the interests of Syria and Israel coincide in several minor ways. In Lebanon, for example, Syrians stay away from regions essential to Israeli security,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

while the Israelis forebear Syrian control of more distant areas (so long as the troops stay away and advanced weapon systems are not introduced). Clashes occur, but each party knows what the other will accept.[6]

Both governments despise Yasir Arafat and seek an alternate Palestinian leadership. Though there is little likelihood the two governments will agree on a replacement for Arafat, they work together to limit his area of maneuver. In April 1991 Syrian forces won Israeli permission to move farther into southern Lebanon to wrest these precincts from PLO control.

Finally a number of secondary issues could be settled through negotiation. The Israelis, for instance, are eager to work out the sharing of Litani River water. Arms control agreements—confidence-building measures, demilitarized zones or troop and arms reductions—offer another arena of potential cooperation.

The Golan Heights, won by Israel from Syria during the 1967 war, presents more of a problem. Israelis are deeply reluctant to part with the territory, while Syrians demand it as an absolute condition for diplomatic progress. Even here, however, some tacit accord exists.

Several factors explain Israel's position. To begin with, Syrian guns on the Golan Heights shelled the farms of northern Israel from 1948 to 1967. Israelis want to keep the Golan Heights to ensure that this does not recur. They also point to the vital buffer role the area played in 1973. "Without the Golan," an Israeli resident of that region recently explained, "we would have probably lost the whole of northern Israel."[7]

Then again, Israel pays little price for keeping the Golan Heights. The border is quiet, and Syrian nationals in the region are few (about 16,000) and untroublesome. They are nearly all Druze—members of a sect deriving from Islam but not recognized by mainstream Muslims—and so fit about as well in Israel as in Syria.

These factors tempt Israelis to see the Golan territory as their own. Polls show that over 90 percent of the Israeli electorate consistently favors retaining the Golan, and Israeli

[6]According to Yitzhak Rabin, the understanding includes five elements: Syrian forces stay away from the Lebanese-Israeli border; the Syrians keep their surface-to-air missiles out of Lebanon; Syrian combat planes also stay out of the region; the Israeli "security zone" in south Lebanon goes unchallenged; and the South Lebanon Army controls the Jezzin enclave. *The Jerusalem Post*, May 21, 1991.

[7]*Der Spiegel*, March 25, 1991.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

leadership is firm. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir has often explained that Israel has no intention of giving up territory on the Golan Heights during future negotiations with Syria.[8] Yitzhak Rabin speaks for the majority of the Labor Party in saying: "Even in the context of peace with Syria, we should not go down from the Golan Heights."[9]

On the Syrian side, though Damascus occasionally calls for the Golan Heights to be returned, it never makes this the core issue with Israel, and with good reason. Israeli control of the Golan Heights serves Assad by deflecting discontent from him to an external enemy. As noted earlier Assad's weak domestic base means he depends on anti-Zionism to reach out to the majority Sunni population, and Israeli occupation of the Golan keeps him on the front line of confrontation with Israel.

But the same motive that allows Assad to accept Israeli retention of the Golan Heights works against his accepting the existence of Israel.

Since 1973 Assad's position on Israel has consisted of five no's, repeated thousands of times, privately and publicly:

—*No talks before withdrawal.* Israel must return all the territories won in 1967 before Syria will negotiate.

—*No partial solutions.* Confidence-building measures, ending the economic boycott, water arrangements and the like cannot precede an Israeli withdrawal; they can only follow it. (The 1974 Golan disengagement agreement is considered an exception.)

—*No direct bilateral negotiations with Israel.* Negotiations with Israel are acceptable only in the framework of an international conference based on U.N. resolutions and at a meeting convened by the United Nations.

—*No separate deal for the Golan Heights.* Israel must also withdraw from the other territories won in the 1967 war—the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza—and must allow self-determination for the Palestinians.

—*No formal peace treaty.* Should the Israelis meet all his demands, Assad would sign only a nonbelligerency agreement. He offers Israel no war, not diplomatic relations or other normal ties.

Each of these demands is unacceptable to both the Likud and

[8]IDF radio, March 18, 1991. Shamir has also stated that U.N. Security Council resolution 242 "has nothing to do with the Golan" (Israeli Television, March 18, 1991).

[9]Radio Jerusalem, April 9, 1991.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Labor parties. To an unusual degree, Israelis concur that face-to-face negotiations must precede the evacuation of territory; that interim measures must precede the return of land; that they should not accept a U.N.-sponsored conference; that Jerusalem is an integral part of the Jewish state; and that any return of Arab lands must be rewarded by a full peace treaty. In other words Assad can offer these terms with complete confidence in their rejection by any government of Israel.

Until now such a rejection has suited Assad. Are there reasons to believe this has changed? The evidence is mixed.

On the positive side Syria may no longer have a viable war option, for Moscow no longer encourages Syrian bellicosity. Also Assad himself has improved relations with Egypt and the United States. Further, several of Damascus's traditional five no's have been modified:

—*No talks before withdrawal.* This has changed. On July 14, 1991, the Syrian leader accepted President Bush's initiative as "an acceptable base," signaling a willingness to join in a U.S.-Soviet sponsored peace conference with Israel.

—*No partial solutions.* Foreign Minister Shara told Secretary of State James A. Baker in March 1991 that ending the state of war or taking other steps before an Israeli withdrawal "is like putting the cart before the horse." Two months later he explicitly rejected the American two-track diplomacy (which links solution of the Palestinian problem with settlement of the Arab states' conflict with Israel), announcing that his government "does not accept a separate peace between Israel and Syria, and between Israel and the Palestinians."[10]

—*No direct bilateral negotiations with Israel.* Assad has publicly agreed to "separate negotiations" with Israel on condition that they take place under the auspices of a U.N.-sponsored conference.

—*No separate deal for the Golan.* In theory, the Palestinian issue is even more urgent than before, for Assad now demands a solution of the Palestinian problem before ending the state of belligerency. Whether or not he will stick to this position is unclear.

—*No formal peace treaty.* Talk of peace is dismissed in Damascus as premature. At most the Syrians are willing to

[10]*Le Monde*, May 11, 1991.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

offer Israel a nonbelligerency agreement in return for the Golan Heights alone (and drop the other territories); this allows Assad to win back the captured Syrian territory without accepting the permanent existence of a Jewish state.

While flexibility on the first, third and last issues is counterbalanced by a seemingly hardened position on the fourth, Damascus's basic diplomatic position has overall been significantly changed.

On the negative side, though Syrian support of terrorism has diminished, it remains a concern. Terrorist incidents attributable to Damascus have gone down rapidly since 1986, especially those against Westerners, but they have not come to an end (the major example being Syrian involvement in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 in December 1988). Further, Syrian sponsorship of terrorist groups continues.

There is also reason to doubt whether Assad has actually given up on a war option. If he has, why does Damascus continue to devote 30 percent of gross domestic product and 55–60 percent of the government budget to military-related expenses? Why are Syrian fortifications along its Lebanese and Golan borders possibly the strongest in the world? Why were arms recently purchased from Moscow and Prague, including more and newer surface-to-air missile batteries? In the matter of surface-to-surface missiles, why did 60 to 80 Scud-C missile launchers arrive from North Korea in March 1991? Why, with 620 combat planes, did Assad purchase 48 MiG-29s and 24 Sukhoi-24s? Why, with 4,200 tanks, did he buy 300 more? And why yet another 2,300 artillery pieces? In addition why do two Syrian factories (near Damascus and Homs) produce several hundred metric tons of chemical gas year after year, and why is the gas weaponized on surface-to-surface missiles?

VI

The possibility that Assad might make war to save his regime raises the alternative question of whether making peace is compatible with his retaining power. Is he a powerful dictator who can ignore public opinion and end the struggle against Israel if he wanted to? Or is his minority government too precarious to afford such a step?

When necessary Assad can and does defy his public. This happened in 1974 when he signed a disengagement agreement with Israel, in 1976 when he backed a Lebanese-Christian coalition against Muslims and Palestinians, and in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1980 when he supported Iran in its war with Iraq. Most recently it took place with the unpopular decision to join the anti-Iraq coalition.

Many in Syria fell under Saddam's spell and disagreed vehemently with their government's anti-Iraq policy. In the eastern towns of Syria pro-Saddam demonstrations erupted. Protestors chanted pro-Iraqi slogans, waved Iraqi flags and carried pictures of the man their media called "the butcher of Baghdad." In the south of Damascus some protestors even defaced posters of Assad—an act of extreme provocation and danger. In September 1990 Syrians and foreign diplomats estimated that 75 percent of the Syrian population backed Saddam; in December Syrian authorities put the number at 85 percent.[11]

In brief Saddam's popularity among Syrians roughly matched what it was among Jordanians. But King Hussein of Jordan felt compelled to appease this sentiment; Assad overrode it using force and propaganda. Some 50,000 troops violently repressed the protests of late August, killing dozens. Radio jammers blocked pro-Saddam television broadcasts from Jordan and CNN transmissions from Lebanon.

At the same time, the regime tried to appease public opinion. Baath Party officials gave talks around the country to justify the government's position. The Syrian media virtually ignored the 18,000 Syrian soldiers in Saudi Arabia, effectively operating under U.S. command.[12] Moreover Syrian troops stayed out of the actual fighting against Iraq. This achingly careful treatment of public opinion suggests a sense of vulnerability.

In sum Assad, like any smart ruler, pursues an unpopular policy only when he feels he must. Because domestic decisions are more critical to the regime's survival, he regularly imposes his will at home (for example, appointing Alawites to most sensitive positions). On foreign policy he seems more reluctant to challenge majority opinion. This explains the regime's Greater Syria orientation and its virulent anti-Zionism.

Assad could probably make peace with Israel if the right incentives were in place: for example, if coming to terms with

[11]*The Wall Street Journal*, Sept. 27, 1990; *Time*, Dec. 3, 1991; *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 28, 1991.

[12]Conversely Saudi media heavily stressed the presence of Syrian troops as part of their pretense that 540,000 American soldiers did not exist.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Israel were the alternative to a major threat to his rule or a disastrous war, he would move in that direction. But this appears unlikely today.

Arab leaders have looked to Moscow for the means to make war on Israel, and to Washington for the means to make peace. Over time they have realized that getting territory from Israel is more likely through diplomacy than war.

But two models for Arab negotiation with Israel exist, the Sadat model and the Arafat model. Anwar al-Sadat was essentially sincere; he changed his policy, resolved problems with Israel and signed a peace treaty. Arafat was insincere, using negotiations to change Israeli public opinion, divide Washington from Jerusalem and enhance his position, while experiencing no change of heart about accepting Israel.

So far Assad more closely fits the Arafat model. Specifically he emulates Arafat in seeing negotiations as an alternate means of destroying the enemy. He shows no interest in settling with Israel; quite the contrary, the fundamentals of Syrian policy toward Israel remain in place, as do the main motives—living down the Alawite legacy of pro-Zionism, tapping Sunni anti-Zionism, fulfilling Baathist ideology.

A settlement, furthermore, would make Israel just another regional power and a participant in Middle East diplomacy. Were this the case Jerusalem would surely find more in common with Cairo and Amman than with Damascus, and would join their efforts to limit Syrian power. Israel's leverage in Lebanon might also increase. In other words Assad has good reason to work against Israel's integration into regional politics.

Nevertheless a major flare-up is unlikely. Assad will probably stick to peaceful means in his relations with Israel rather than spoil Damascus's precarious relations with the West or risk military humiliation. He is not likely to go further, for the Syrians would rather not pay the political price of resolution with Israel. At the same time, the Israelis would rather not take the military risk of giving up the Golan Heights. So while there is every reason for the U.S. government to pursue a peace process between Syria and Israel, this must be undertaken with modest expectations, patience and a sense of limits.

VII

Two initial questions have been answered. The Kuwait crisis has not engendered a fundamental shift in Syrian politics; Damascus is simply making the best of a difficult situation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Second, there has been no change of heart toward Israel, but some timely, tactical adjustments. Should then the U.S. government build on its new quasi alliance or distance itself from Assad's tyranny?

By way of an answer, three guidelines need to be observed:

—Expect few major changes in Damascus so long as Assad and the Alawites rule. The regime has a besieged quality and takes no unnecessary chances. Major changes are more likely when Sunnis regain power.

—The economy is Assad's weak spot. With the Soviet bloc no longer supplying funds as before, and with most oil-rich Middle East states cooperating with the United States, Washington can exert much greater influence over the outside income that pays for the military strength undergirding Assad's aggressive foreign policy.

—Syria is central to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Accordingly, going into a full-scale peace process without Syria is unrealistic. The other parties cannot make the key decisions of war and peace; they are intimidated by Damascus and would not be able to sustain their accords with Israel.

Within these guidelines, the principal danger today is that Washington is about to repeat with Assad the mistakes it made with Saddam—overly friendly relations lasting too long. Two considerations suggest this. First, the Middle East hosts many governments, courted and armed by an outside power, that later turn against that patron. Sadat did this to the Soviets, Khomeini to the Americans, Saddam Hussein to both. Given a chance, Assad may also turn on Washington.

Second, on the American side a tendency exists to imbue tactical alliances with a friendship that is not reciprocated. Americans expected Stalin to cooperate after 1945: Eastern Europe was the casualty. U.S. ties to Saddam Hussein should have shut down in 1988, along with the Iraq-Iran War, but foolishly continued for another two years. The same mistake may be repeated with Syria. It was appropriate in November 1990 for George Bush to bind Syria to the U.S.-led alliance by telling Assad what he wanted to hear. With the war over, the time has come for a more demanding U.S. position.

To begin with, American officials should remind Assad (and themselves) that lasting ties between states depend on common values. Early on Secretary Baker said, after meetings in Syria, "We can have close relations only with countries that share our

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fundamental values." Specifically, Washington should demand across-the-board changes as the price for its continued and future cooperation.

Damascus has signaled its willingness to enter into an Arab-Israel peace process, albeit in a highly circumscribed and inscrutable way. This is a good start toward better relations, but not enough. In addition Assad must now show flexibility and seriousness of purpose in those negotiations. He also needs to take steps that would alter the very nature of his regime. These would include: make major improvements in human rights; repay the over $1 billion owed to the West currently in arrears (a burden much facilitated by oil export revenues); end the military buildup and instead devote more resources to raising the Syrian standard of living; arrest and prosecute terrorists, expel the dozens of terrorist groups operating out of Syria or Syrian-held territory, and end direct Syrian involvement in terrorism; phase out Syrian troops from Lebanon; and end Syrian involvement in and sponsorship of the Lebanese drug trade.

A variety of symbolic and good faith gestures would also go far to improve the atmosphere: compensate the American victims of Syrian-sponsored terrorist attacks; allow Western scholars and journalists to enter Syria, do not unduly restrict their access, and do not censor their reports; help win the release of all American hostages in Lebanon; release the approximately 4,000 remaining Jews from captivity in Syria; and arrange for extradition to the West of such figures as Alois Brunner (the highest-ranking Nazi still at large and a man deemed by Simon Wiesenthal "the worst ever" of the Third Reich criminals) and Ahmad Jabril, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command.

Some of these demands may be unrealistic in the short term. Still they are worth asserting, for they mark enduring American positions. As we have seen elsewhere in the world, American stands that seem hopelessly idealistic for decades on end can suddenly become cutting-edge policies.

It is realistic to expect the implementation of these steps because none of them harms Syrian national interests. More to the point, with the exception of human rights improvements, neither do they infringe on the Assad regime's ability to retain power. Assad should be made to understand that rejection of these changes implies lack of serious interest in improving

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

relations with the United States; to the extent he accepts them, Washington should respond positively.

What can Washington do to press these points? The most promising approach is through Damascus's pocketbook. Damascus remains a beneficiary of the Generalized System of Preferences, a program that allows poor countries to export manufactured goods to the United States with reduced duties, though it may fail the provisions concerning workers' rights and terrorism. The Syrians are not required to reciprocate for commercial benefits they already enjoy, particularly access to American oil expertise to manage their tricky oil fields. The Syrians seek money on the American financial markets and in American commercial investment in Syria and trade. These can be denied. In addition credits can be withheld, most-favored-nation status denied and government-backed insurance refused.

Ideally American friends, both Western and Arab, will take similar steps; should they not do so, Washington should exert pressure on them. At the very minimum they can be induced not to subsidize the Syrian economy.

Should American leaders decide to make the taming of Syria a higher priority, they can adopt other steps, including a reduction in Syrian diplomatic missions, the imposition of travel restrictions on Syrian nationals and pressure on nearby states to take a tougher stand vis-à-vis Syria. Most ambitiously, Assad's Syrian enemies could be helped to unseat him, with an eye to bringing Sunnis to power in Damascus.

This is not the moment to decide among such options, but Americans should keep in mind the dangers posed by Damascus. Assad is a formidable opponent; influencing Syrian policy requires a steady hand and a willingness to endure setbacks. Above all, U.S.-Syrian bilateral ties are profoundly unequal. Assad now needs U.S. favor more than the reverse. Yet he will try to induce Washington to pay him for allowing himself to be helped; this must not happen. U.S.-Syrian relations can prosper only if American officials adhere to positions that are morally grounded and politically sound.

Similarly if America pressures Israel for concessions, the leadership in Damascus has no incentive to give up anything of importance, much less come to terms with Israel.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Alvin Z. Rubinstein

NEW WORLD ORDER OR HOLLOW VICTORY?

President Bush's triumph in the Gulf War is in danger of becoming a footnote in contemporary history, not the turning point it should be. His preliminary postwar efforts to establish a durable security system in the Middle East lack a strategic focus. America's readiness to resume arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the gulf emirates and the tentativeness of the arms control proposals unveiled for that region last May are more suggestive of past failures than future promise. The initiative of Secretary of State James A. Baker to convene an Arab-Israeli peace conference seeks again to arrange direct talks between adversaries, not to advance a conceptual approach for transforming regional conflicts. The vision that forged an international coalition and achieved success on the battlefield is not evident on the diplomatic front.

Opportunities to establish a stable regional order will not last long. Victory has left the United States the preeminent military power in the Middle East, as it did at the end of the Second World War. This time, however, American power is not as self-contained or rooted in a hegemonic economic position; it must rely on the political and financial support of other countries.

But neither is the United States constrained from proceeding along a new path, as it had been in 1945–48, because of its growing preoccupation with containing Soviet power, rebuilding Western Europe and deferring to the vestigial imperial pretensions of a depleted Britain and France. In the 1990s the United States may not be the dominant power it was in 1945, but relative to the other major actors in the international arena it alone is positioned, and perhaps only briefly, to shape the course of events in the Middle East for years, even decades, to come.

Just as the campaign to undo Saddam Hussein's aggression

Alvin Z. Rubinstein is Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute of Philadelphia.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

against Kuwait could not have been mounted or carried to a decisive conclusion by any power but the United States, so too does the establishment of a system of security in the Middle East depend on U.S. leaders seizing the moment to pioneer an arrangement that will end the vicious cycle of wars and ever-increasing expenditures on arms, to ensure security for all states in the region.

Behind the rhetoric of President Bush's call for "a new world order" lies the reality of an international system hurtling dangerously out of control. The old system and old ways are no longer adequate to the security needs of member states. Economic pressures, demographic upheavals, political instability exacerbated by ethnic and religious tensions, and budding conflicts over scarce resources are taking place in a world of profound environmental and societal disruptions. If these challenges are to be tackled with any success, a period of stability is essential. Pax Americana is not the answer: the United States has neither the power, the wealth nor the urge to impose an imperial order. At the present crossroads, ideas and institutions to encourage development, democratization and nation-building depend on first achieving a condition of security.

II

What happened in the gulf between August 2, 1990, and February 28, 1991, was the result of a unique confluence of circumstances. For once the concept of collective security as envisioned in the U.N. Charter worked. The U.S. response to Saddam Hussein's aggression was central, but the United States could not have done it alone; strong supporting assistance was needed. Five circumstances made for success in the gulf crisis: U.S. leadership; U.S.-Soviet cooperation; U.S. military capability; the role of the United Nations; and the willingness of nations to share the burden.

President Bush's leadership was crucial. A full assessment of the influences that determined his response to Iraq's aggression will have to await publication of documents and memoirs. (For example, what role did then-Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Britain play in the American president's decisions? Early in the crisis she reportedly urged President Bush to react forcefully and demand nothing less than an immediate and complete Iraqi withdrawal, on the grounds that aggression must never be allowed to garner benefits.) Nevertheless

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

even at this date a few factors appear to have been important in shaping the president's choices. George Bush was a child of the 1930s and a veteran of World War II. His formative political attitudes were shaped by the conviction that appeasement does not pay and that aggression must not go unanswered. In his reaction to the invasion of Kuwait, the remembrance of Munich resonated. By inclination an activist but also very much the pragmatist, Bush was motivated by concrete political goals, uncluttered by extraneous or imagined foreign policy complications.

His approach and the subsequent decision to use force was not the only possible response. Judging by the speeches and writings of key figures in the Carter administration, had the Democrats controlled the White House the response might have been quite different. There probably would not have been a massive military deployment in the gulf or an international mobilization to defeat Saddam Hussein on the battlefield. Instead the approach would have been based on protecting Saudi Arabia and deterring further Iraqi expansion, not liberating Kuwait. Sanctions would have been given more time, with protests confined to the United Nations and overtures to seek concessions from Saddam Hussein linked to pressuring Israel to put the Palestinian issue on the bargaining table. In the final analysis force would have been avoided for domestic political reasons and for fear of triggering an anti-American backlash in the Muslim world.[1]

All the more remarkable then was Bush's determination to see the crisis through to the end and use force, when all else had failed. With patience and tact he skillfully forged the international coalition, rallied support at home, cultivated the Soviet Union's cooperation (a development that owed a great deal to the special relationship between Secretary Baker and then-Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze) and obtained strong U.N. Security Council resolutions that ultimately included the right to use force to ensure Iraqi compliance.

The age-old debate over how significant the individual leader is in affecting the course of events received another affirmative answer in Bush's impact on the gulf crisis. To an even greater extent this was true of Saddam Hussein, who

[1]See for example Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Patience in the Gulf, Not War," *The New York Times*, Oct. 7, 1990; and George W. Ball, "In Search of Answers to the Middle East Crisis," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, Dec. 7, 1990.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

invariably chose the worst possible move at each step in the mounting crisis.[2]

The end of the Cold War and improved U.S.-Soviet relations made possible the American-led military campaign in the gulf. Without Soviet cooperation in the United Nations, Bush's task would have been much more difficult, perhaps impossible. In helping, Moscow jeopardized a lucrative relationship with its richest Arab client.

For the first time since the 1956 Suez Crisis the two superpowers did not back different clients in a Middle East conflict; and for the first time since the 1967 Six Day War the Soviet Union did nothing to shield a prized client from the consequences of its military folly. Not only did Moscow watch from the sidelines as the Iraqi military machine that it had largely created was destroyed, but it gave Washington the green light to proceed.

For three months, though deploring the Iraqi aggression and agreeing to the imposition of sanctions, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev had refused to approve the use of force. His personal adviser, Yevgeny Primakov, an Arabist, had held lengthy discussions with Saddam Hussein on a number of occasions to find a face-saving, nonmilitary way out of the crisis, one that would have maintained the Soviet-Iraqi relationship and Moscow's substantial stake in the country. Surprising, therefore, was Gorbachev's decision at the end of November 1990 to support U.N. Security Council resolution 678 authorizing the use of force, if necessary, to "restore international peace and security in the area." Gorbachev's support meant that the date for the final showdown could be fixed. Primakov and the Arabists in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lost to Shevardnadze (who, ironically, broke with Gorbachev three weeks later over domestic issues).

With the Soviet Union's unequivocal commitment to the liberation of Kuwait, the U.N. resolutions assumed much greater importance and facilitated Bush's task of convincing the U.S. public of the necessity to pursue the military option.

[2]According to an Iraqi dissident source, in a tape smuggled out of Iraq, Saddam Hussein told his commanders before the outbreak of actual hostilities that he was obeying God's orders in defying the U.N. resolutions. Overruling the skepticism of his military, he insisted that the United States would not be able to deploy enough troops to defeat Iraqi ground forces and that the coalition's technological superiority could be offset by "simple methods," such as holing up in underground shelters so that enemy planes would have no visible targets and waiting for the multinational coalition to break up. See Falah A. Jaber, *The Guardian*, June 11, 1991.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Soviet veto of U.N. resolution 678 would have deprived President Bush of the imprimatur of U.N. legitimacy, complicated consensus-building at home and weakened the international coalition. It might have swayed votes in the Senate in January 1991 and forestalled a positive vote for the use of force without an explicit declaration of war. By going along Gorbachev enabled Bush to go ahead.

That Moscow did not contribute military forces to the coalition was to be expected: the combination of incipient civil war at home and popular revulsion against eight years of war in Afghanistan imposed severe restraints on Gorbachev. In late February 1991, when the coalition brought Iraq to the brink of defeat, Gorbachev tried to broker an eight-point plan to give Saddam a face-saving way out. But despite scattered reports to the contrary, there is no evidence that Moscow did much (if anything) for Saddam. Gorbachev did not assist Iraq at the expense of defying U.N. resolutions; Moscow did not divide the international coalition or break the embargo or send additional Soviet advisers. The Soviet Union's behavior was sufficiently responsible and supportive for détente to have survived its toughest trial to date.

III

The availability of combat-ready forces capable of confronting Iraq's battle-tested army made Bush's political determination credible. In retrospect, Saddam Hussein's timing was as poor as his judgment. He failed to appreciate that the end of the Cold War, the unification of Germany and the signing in November 1990 of an agreement to reduce conventional forces in Europe all signified a momentous change in Soviet policy, away from relying on military means to achieve political goals and toward fostering reconciliation with the West. For Bush this confluence of events was providential. It gave him access to the military power he needed. More than half of the 540,000 U.S. troops sent to the gulf came from the central European front, where they had been primed to deter and if necessary fight invading Soviet forces. Together with British and French contingents they represented the cream of the army that NATO had been honing for combat for years. Their deployment, a magnificent logistical feat in itself, demonstrated the strength of the U.S. sea and airlift capability.

It was Bush's good fortune to have such a military force readily available. A few years down the post-Cold War road,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"I offer you hunger, thirst, forced marches...and death."–Garibaldi

We offer you 3 books for $1 each,

Plus a 4th at the low Members' Price.

And you can desert at any time

–History Book Club



7468. $24.95/$19.95

7369. $24.95/$21.50

7138. $24/$21.50

5520. $35/$26.50

No risk. No strings.
No pressure to reenlist.



6122. $22.95/$18.95



3590. $29.95/$23.95

4838. $35/$27.95



6692. $24.95/$21.50



6874. $35/$26.95



6346. $29.95/$22.95



3434. $29.95/$23.50



5967. $30/$22.95



1636. $22.50/$18.95



3673. $24.95/$18.95



2642. $24.95/$15.95



5884. $27.50/$18.50

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



4887. $29.95/**$22.50**



6155. $27.50/**$21.50**



1925. $22.95/**$17.50**



3087. $18.95/**$16.95**



1644. $29.95/**$17.50**



1396. $29.95/**$21.95**

5843. $27.50/**$21.50**

7716. $24.95/**$20.95**



1057. $19.95/**$17.50**



3467. $24/**$18.50**



4564. $27.50/**$21.50**



1495. $24.95/**$18.50**



5900. $18.95/**$15.95**



7740. $24.50/**$21.50**



4788. $19.95/**$16.50**

6619. $29.95/**$22.95**



1891. $19.95/**$14.95**



6767. $29.95/**$18.95**

(Pub. price/**Club price**)

MORE HISTORY—MORE SAVINGS

No matter what area of history you enjoy reading about most, you'll find that History Book Club offers some of the finest selections being published today. And no book club we know offers greater savings—as much as 30% off publishers' list prices.

You can save even more by taking advantage of our Introductory Offer. Select any three books on these two pages for $1 each when you take a fourth book at the low Members' Price, plus shipping and handling. Thereafter, you're not obligated to order any more books. You may cancel membership at any time by notifying History Book Club. We may cancel your membership if you elect not to buy at least one book in any six-month period.

How the Club works. You'll be able to choose from 150 to 200 books featured each month. History Book Club always offers its members well-made, long-lasting editions.

You'll receive our *Review* along with a dated Reply Form 15 times a year (about every 3½ weeks), plus up to 4 more offers of special selections. If you want the "Editors' Choice," do nothing—the book will come automatically. If you want another book, or no books at all, return the Reply Form by the date specified. A shipping and handling charge is added to each shipment.

Your HBC guarantee: If you receive an unwanted "Editors' Choice" because you had less than 10 days to decide, simply return it and pay nothing.

History Book Club®

Camp Hill, PA 17012-8804

Please enroll me in History Book Club according to the no-risk, no-commitment terms outlined in the accompanying ad. Send me the four books whose numbers I have listed below. Bill me $1 each for the 3 choices on the left, and the fourth at the low Members' Price, plus shipping and handling.

H053-9-0

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

1-13

Name_____
(Please print clearly)

Address_____ Apt. #____

City_____ State_____ Zip_____

All orders subject to approval. Prices generally higher in Canada.

© 1991 History Book Club, Inc.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

another gulf-type operation will be nearly impossible, given the deep cuts that are being projected in U.S. and West European defense budgets. In 1990 the United States had not yet begun to draw down its 380,000 troops in western Europe; by the mid-1990s this number will be reduced to about 100,000. Nor will combat air power, built with the Soviet Union in mind as the possible threat, be as formidable.

The third factor was the role of the United Nations. After years of ineptitude marked by Cold War divisions and unwillingness to condemn Third World aggressors, the United Nations reclaimed a major role in international relations. In legitimizing an international coalition that cut across established alliances, it helped bring about the defeat of Iraq. From the beginning the Security Council dominated the handling of the crisis, and its early moves quickly isolated Iraq diplomatically and economically. Most members of the General Assembly disapproved of Iraq's invasion, with its implicit threat to their own national existence, and allowed the great powers to work out a solution. Both the Arab League and the nonaligned movement were hopelessly divided and without resources to act.

With each successive step, and the coalition's obvious intention to persevere, pivotal states reversed deeply established policy positions: Turkey abandoned its aversion to intervening in any Arab conflict that did not directly involve its own security; Syria dropped its anti-Western stance and joined with the "imperialists" to topple an Arab rival; Iran did nothing to interfere with U.S.-engineered military operations, and it impounded the Iraqi military aircraft seeking a haven from the coalition's bombing; and Israel exercised uncharacteristic restraint, absorbing Iraqi Scud missile attacks and relying on U.S.-manned batteries of Patriot antiballistic missiles to protect its territory, thereby frustrating Saddam's attempt to transform the Gulf War into a new Arab-Israeli war.

With widespread support in the United Nations, countries like Jordan, Yemen, Libya, Algeria and the Sudan who tilted toward Iraq dared not challenge the blockade. This support gave President Bush the mandate he needed to isolate doubters at home and to push ahead with operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Once again it was the United States that shouldered the principal military responsibility; as in the case of Korea in 1950, it was this readiness to do so that assured a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

successful outcome for a U.N. operation to reverse an aggression.

Security is costly. As the price tag for deploying more than 600,000 troops to the gulf for an indeterminate period became an integral part of the debate in the United States over the relative merits of relying on sanctions or resorting to force, the president was compelled to solicit large financial contributions from wealthy countries: the gulf states, of course, and also Japan and Germany, the latter complying only after persistent U.S. prodding. In this instance, burden-sharing worked, but it was Washington's leverage, not the authority of the United Nations, that pried the funds loose from countries allied to the United States. This time their refusal to contribute would have occasioned serious strains in relations with the United States on whom they are still dependent militarily. Not so, though, in the future, when the United States, operating with a reduced military capability in a Eurasian environment inhabited by a less threatening Soviet Union, will find its ability to elicit military and financial assistance from allies for policing activities in Third World conflicts greatly diminished. If current plans for implementing U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping and arms control measures in the gulf cannot be adequately financed, then any prospects for establishing a new security system in the region are doomed to fail.

IV

A combination of unforeseen circumstances, therefore, led to the defeat of Saddam Hussein. In the process they gave rise to a new strategic environment, which effectively utilized could begin an era of regional stability and security. But the contours of this new environment are liable to change, and once changed they will be difficult to reshape in so felicitous a configuration. It is as if an upheaval has shaken or destroyed previous political-military positions and structures, and new ones have not yet been settled on. The material for rebuilding is at hand, but whether the architecture will be the old and familiar or new and original remains to be seen.

The most prominent feature of the new strategic environment is the reemergence of the United States as the preeminent military power in the Middle East. For the first time since 1945 the United States has the apparent ability to prevent regional wars. However it can do so only if it is willing to be responsible for regulating the weak multipolar system that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

emerged after 1945, and in particular since the late 1960s when Britain pulled out of the gulf and the Soviet Union entered as a major influence in the Arab world.

Victory brings the opportunity for change. But unless U.S. influence is harnessed to a grand strategic purpose that transforms regional conceptions of security, it will evanesce, and the Gulf War will fade in memory as American power withdraws before leaving the rudiments of a new security system in place. U.S.-Soviet cooperation, rooted in mutual self-interest and convergent regional aims, could make possible a type of quasi-hegemonial order in which U.S. activities to prevent future wars were tied to general monitoring by the U.N. Security Council.

This new situation stems from Moscow's shift from imperial rivalry to incipient accommodation. It is an outgrowth of the end of the Cold War, and the Soviet Union's parlous domestic situation, urgent need for détente and disenchantment with what Moscow has reaped in the Arab world. For three decades Soviet weapons made war in the Middle East (and much of the Third World) possible. These gave client states military options against regional rivals and spawned a multipolarity that placed conflict at its core. Regional actors acquired instant influence. They were able to exploit the U.S.-Soviet rivalry, accumulate powerful arsenals and trigger wars for reasons that had little to do with their security, for example, the Yemeni civil war (1962–67), the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) and the 1990 Iraqi seizure of Kuwait. Moreover at various times Moscow's protection shielded Egypt, Syria, Libya and Iraq from the consequences of their mistakes and perpetuated regional conflicts.

The second salient characteristic of the new strategic environment is the emerging congruence of American and Soviet aims in promoting regional stability, which is a necessary condition for a durable détente. By avoiding the polarizing commitments that fueled their imperial rivalry during the Cold War period, the two powers can do much to prevent a recurrence of the region's destabilizing cycle of wars. The prospects of their détente in the 1990s are far better than in the 1960s or 1970s, mainly because of Moscow's determination to end the Soviet Union's post-1917 isolation from Europe and European culture. Moscow knows that the key to making the Soviet Union a normal great power in Europe is to improve relations with the United States. All this has profound impli-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cations for prospects of security in the Middle East, because even a limited American military presence, if deployed with Soviet agreement for specific purposes, could have far-reaching consequences.

A third feature of the new environment is the shift in influence from the weak to the strong. Paradoxically the local actors were able to use the Cold War for their own ends, because their superpower patrons accorded them an importance far beyond their actual strategic-political value. As they were lavishly supplied with weapons, so were their rivals. This militarization bred an increased dependence, a realization that security and survival were based on having a reliable patron-protector. As long as the superpowers were absorbed with their own rivalry and content to foster regional polarization, they subsidized the regional ambitions of their clients; as long as they were driven by a quest for short-term advantages, they allowed themselves to be manipulated.

Détente has diminished the importance of Middle East clients and highlighted their extreme vulnerability: no country in the region can defend itself against major attack. All need access to outside assistance more than ever in this age of high-tech weapons and the rapid obsolescence of expensive arsenals. Saudi Arabia and the gulf emirates are the weakest—and the most logical candidates for a testing of a new security system. The gulf crisis demonstrated that unaided they are prey to covetous neighbors.

Like the leaders of any government the Saudis understandably want to retain maximum flexibility to pursue their interests, but their survival depends on protection by outside powers. In the past, Saudi realpolitik relied on a mix of survival insurance in the form of large-scale purchases of expensive weapons and the manipulation of great power rivalry and interest, as in the latter stages of the Iran-Iraq War when the Saudi-dominated Gulf Cooperation Council prompted Kuwait to maneuver the United States and the Soviet Union into reflagging Kuwaiti tankers. Iran was not permitted to emerge victorious over Iraq, lest the general balance of power in the area be upset. In 1990 the United States reacted as it did against Iraq partly for the same valid strategic reason—to prevent one regional power from controlling the oil in the gulf.

In the future who is going to manipulate whom—and for what purposes? For the United States to subordinate strategic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

objectives to commercial concerns would be to accept the role of pawn to Saudi Arabia's king and to condone the kind of unbridled corruption and arrogance that brought on the gulf crisis. Moreover politics—and business—as usual in the gulf will encourage perpetuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Under such conditions the consequences will surely be as doleful and costly as they have been in the past.

A new approach is needed, the principal aim of which should be to use the present short-lived opportunity to establish a different kind of security system. Only in an environment in which governments feel safe from aggression can the laudable dreams of justice, democratization and development have a chance of being realized; only then can the oil-rich gulf Arabs be induced to invest in the needy lands of the region. To expect any security system to do more than ensure security is to doom it to failure from the outset. No externally devised arrangement can—or should be expected to—by its limited nature end the manifold divisions and historically rooted ethnoreligious tensions between competing elites and groups.

V

War between nation states must be prevented. All countries in the region must be safeguarded against attack, conventional or unconventional (chemical, biological, nuclear). There must, however, be no confusion on this score: the absence of war is not synonymous with peace. The United States is capable of achieving the former, but not the latter. Its power lies in an ability to deter and punish attacks by one country against another, not to dampen or resolve ethnic or communal strife, whose roots are in premodern times.

Of central importance to the goal of security is the realization that it was the clash of armies that disrupted regional stability and that on occasion brought the superpowers into near-confrontation and scuttled tentative efforts at détente. Only nation states command armies capable of upsetting regional balances and unleashing widespread conflagrations. In this light, whatever the justice of Palestinian or Kurdish claims to statehood, their grievances are not of strategic concern, if only because neither has the ability to wage war and overturn the existing multipolar system in the Middle East. It may be noted also that no Arab government, regardless of its proclaimed pro-Palestinian sentiment, has ever gone to war to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

advance the cause of Palestinian statehood; nor will any ever go to war on behalf of the Kurds.

Second, U.S. efforts should focus on the gulf. It is there that the United States went to war to repel aggression, and there that its power and influence can be brought to bear to pioneer a new approach. Twice in a decade Iraq threatened the survival of regimes in the region. Iraqi power can be limited and the independence of its neighbors assured. To establish a stable system, the cooperation of Iran and Pakistan, both of which have vital interests in what happens on the Arabian peninsula, will be required.

Given this as the U.S. priority, Secretary Baker's initiative to promote an Israeli-Palestinian negotiation makes little strategic sense. Not even Syrian President Hafez al-Assad's apparent readiness to enter into direct talks with Israel changes the situation. Delays and diversions in organizing an international conference are inevitable, and they should not become the focus of the administration's Middle East policy. Compared to the gulf, the Arab-Israeli sector is strategically a minor sideshow in a period of U.S.-Soviet détente. In retrospect, Baker seems to have been motivated by several factors: a stronger concern for politics along the Potomac than calculations of gulf security; his personal desire to reassert a primary foreign policy role after being sidelined during the gulf crisis; the judgment that Israel's dependence on U.S. aid to resettle Soviet and Ethiopian Jews made the time ripe for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict; the belief that movement on the Palestinian issue would make Arab governments more willing to support a U.S. security plan in the gulf; a need to deflect attention away from the embarrassing Kurdish question; and a desire to redeem a promise President Bush had made to Congress. Whatever the reasoning the initiative has been distracting. Its thrust needs redirection.

Third, the U.N. Security Council must not again be marginalized. The United States is pursuing bilateralism when it should instead be promoting increased responsibilities for the United Nations. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney's travels to the gulf promote arms sales, but not "a new order"; they convey an unwarranted deference to Saudi wishes and a return to business and politics as usual.

A permanent inspectorate of peace-preserving forces should be constituted under the aegis of the U.N. Security Council. Operating on a five- to ten-year term, it would ensure

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions, undertake on-site and ongoing verification of military deployments along the borders of all the gulf countries and introduce confidence-building measures like those being institutionalized in Europe. These U.N. peacekeeping units—initially stationed in Iraq and Kuwait and eventually in Saudi Arabia, Iran and Oman—would be equipped with the latest surveillance technology, under some leasing arrangement with the United States and the Soviet Union, and be viewed as international civil servants, responsible to the U.N. Security Council and its Military Staff Committee. The annual cost to the United States would be the equivalent of one B-2 bomber—about $500 million to $600 million—and Japan, the European Community and each of the oil-rich Arab states in the gulf would be assessed equal amounts. The U.N. contingents currently operating in Iraq would have their mandate broadened to include all the gulf countries.

Fourth, the tidal flow of arms to the region must be slowed, not just missiles, but tanks, artillery and high-performance aircraft. Despite the enormous difficulties that stand in its way progress on this issue is prerequisite for any new approach to gulf security. Arms sales are big business; competition for a share of the market is intense. If left unregulated it will worsen. From 1974 to 1989, the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council accounted for more than 75 percent of the estimated total of $220 billion to $250 billion oil-for-arms trade in the Middle East, with Iraq being the biggest single buyer. A moratorium on sales is unrealistic, but allocation of a share of a curtailed and controlled market to leading arms exporters might be worth exploring. Senator Joseph Biden's (D-Del.) proposed cartel arrangement, dividing the sales of different types of weapons among leading exporting nations, merits a try. In addition to regulating the kinds and quantity of weapons introduced into the region and apportioning a fair share of the market among the major exporting nations, the cartel, operating under the aegis of the Security Council, would be responsible for monitoring arms shipments.

U.S. and Soviet satellites could track suspect air transports and arrange for on-site inspection at various air fields. The U.S. navy, supported by auxiliaries from other members of the Security Council, would bear the primary responsibility for ensuring that heavy weapons coming by sea through the Straits of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb accorded with the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quantities fixed by the cartel. Although other powers would participate in sea-going operations, only the United States has the capability for such an ongoing and extensive task. These inspection activities would be self-financing, the costs being borne by importers and exporters.

Such measures would rely heavily on the power-projection capability that the United States currently possesses to develop a new way of ensuring security in a crucial part of the world. An integrated approach, which controls and monitors both the flow of arms and the deployment of armies, would prevent the military buildup of any regional actor from exceeding the legitimate needs of self-defense. It would reduce regional insecurity by developing confidence in the levels of weaponry available to potential enemies and in the ability of a U.N.-mandated operation to ensure accountability from all parties. In time this might make local actors more amenable to lower levels of arms and encourage them to focus their resources on nation-building and development.

None of this will be easy. It may well prove to be unworkable. Still, let it not be written of George Bush's attempt to establish a new system of security in the gulf that it was found difficult and hence not tried. He will probably be the last American president to have served in the Second World War. He may also be the last one to have the opportunity and the means to show the way to a new world order.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

William J. Perry

DESERT STORM AND DETERRENCE

In Operation Desert Storm the United States employed for the first time a new class of military systems that gave American forces a revolutionary advance in military capability. Key to this capability is a new generation of military support systems—intelligence sensors, defense suppression systems and precision guidance subsystems—that serve as "force multipliers" by increasing the effectiveness of U.S. weapon systems. An army with such technology has an overwhelming advantage over an army without it, much as an army equipped with tanks would overwhelm an army with horse cavalry.

This new conventional military capability adds a powerful dimension to the ability of the United States to deter war. While it is certainly not as powerful as nuclear weapons, it is a more credible deterrent, particularly in regional conflicts vital to U.S. national interests. It can play a potentially significant role in deterring those regional conflicts that would involve the confrontation of armored forces (as opposed to guerrilla wars). With the increasing proliferation of modern weapons in politically unstable parts of the world, those types of wars might be expected to occur with increasing frequency. The new military capability can also serve as a credible deterrent to a regional power's use of chemical weapons. It should also strengthen the already high level of deterrence of a major war in Europe or Korea. The United States can now be confident that the defeat of a conventional armored assault in those regions could be achieved by conventional military forces, which could enable the United States to limit the role of its nuclear forces to the deterrence of nuclear attack.

II

That the United States has achieved a revolutionary advance in military capability is suggested by the results of the Gulf War. One overall measure of performance is the relatively low

---

William J. Perry is chairman of the firm Technology Strategies and Alliances, and co-director of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control. He was Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, 1977–81.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

number of coalition losses: tanks destroyed, prisoners captured and, not least, casualties incurred. These losses were so lopsided—roughly a thousand to one—that there is virtually no historical precedent. It is tempting to conclude, as some have done, that these low figures were attributable simply to the incompetence of the Iraqi military. Indeed the Soviet foreign minister, Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, appearing before the Supreme Soviet to discuss the performance of Soviet-supplied air defenses in Iraq, said that the failure was "not a reflection of a weakness of combat equipment. Ultimately equipment is good when it is in good hands." This explanation ignores two important realities: the size and capability of the Iraqi armed forces, and the devastating assault to which they were subjected during the air war.

Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq was reputed to have the fourth-largest army in the world. It was one of the most formidable regional military powers, with over a million men in its army, almost half of whom were in the Kuwaiti theater. Most Iraqi officers had gained recent combat experience in the Iran-Iraq War. Iraqi forces were equipped with large quantities of Soviet equipment, mostly modern, as well as some Western equipment, including Mirage aircraft and Exocet missiles. They had a dense air defense system, a large number of mobile missiles, 4,000 tanks, 3,000 modern long-range artillery and a demonstrated capability to deliver chemical weapons both by air and artillery. Iraq also had a unitary force operating within a few hundred miles of its supply base, while the United States led a disparate coalition some 6,000 miles from its primary supply base.

Why, then, were the U.S.-led coalition forces able to defeat the Iraqis so quickly, so decisively and with so few losses?

There were many significant factors favoring the coalition forces, some of which were unique to Desert Storm and cannot be counted on in any future conflict. Foremost among these were the quality and quantity of Saudi air bases and the ready supply of fuel in the theater. Because of Saddam Hussein's political misjudgments the coalition forces had more than five months to deploy and organize. The combination of build-up time and bases available largely offset what otherwise would have been a significant geographical advantage for the Iraqis.

Other factors favoring the coalition will be applicable, however, to a wide variety of military contingencies. Foremost among these was a great advantage in leadership. The leader-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ship of the coalition was superb, and the diverse military forces operated with an unprecedented unity, which was greatly facilitated by the command authority given to General Colin Powell and General H. Norman Schwarzkopf by the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. The Iraqi leadership, on the other hand, made serious strategic blunders, most notably allowing the five-month buildup. Even at a distance of 7,000 miles, U.S. air logistical support was outstanding and, after a slow start, the 13,000 mile sealift also became effective. In contrast Iraqi supply lines were essentially cut off early in the air war by the coalition's successful interdiction campaign.

Of course no military operation can be successful with poorly trained troops, and the U.S. military demonstrated that its forces were superbly trained. With an average service time of seven years and training time of two years, the all-volunteer force was notably better trained and motivated than the draftee force that the United States fielded in the Vietnam War. More generally the coalition forces had a significant advantage in training and motivation over the Iraqi forces, whose combat experience with Iran prepared them for a different type of war, and whose initial doubts about the wisdom and justice of their cause were greatly amplified by the pounding they took during the air war.

But all of these advantages combined do not account for a thousand-to-one discrepancy in performance. A significant part of that edge can be attributed to the revolutionary new military technology used by U.S forces for the first time in the Gulf War.

III

What is this technology and why was it so effective? To what extent can it be generalized to other situations and be effectively used as a deterrent to war?

This new military technology, built and deployed during the 1980s, was largely conceived and developed during the 1970s. It was developed as part of what former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown called the "offset strategy," in response to the then-perceived threat of an armored assault by the Warsaw Pact forces in central Europe. A key part of the strategy was to use U.S. technological advantage to offset the quantitative advantage of Soviet forces. At that time NATO estimated that if it had to face a surprise armored assault from the Warsaw Pact the West could be outnumbered three to one in personnel and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

armored equipment. NATO and in particular the United States sought to use technology as an equalizer or "force multiplier."

Much of the debate surrounding the offset strategy this past decade has been based on the false assumption that its primary objective was to use "high technology" to build better weapon systems than those of the Soviet Union. But it was not likely that higher quality tanks, guns or aircraft, by themselves, could offset a three-to-one disadvantage. The offset strategy was based instead on the premise that it was necessary to give these weapons a significant competitive advantage over their opposing counterparts by supporting them on the battlefield with newly developed equipment that multiplied their combat effectiveness. This strategy was pursued consistently by five administrations during the 1970s and 1980s, all the while being carefully observed by the Soviet Union. In 1983 Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, then chief of general staff of the Soviet Union, said that Americans were developing a "reconnaissance strike complex," and tried with limited success to move the Soviet military in that direction.

Most of the new military support systems in the offset strategy are designed around modern electronics and computers. Three components of this new support capability were most critical to the remarkable success of coalition forces in the Gulf War: communications, command, control and intelligence; defense suppression; and precision guidance.

C^3I gives any field commander what the military establishment calls "situation awareness." In Desert Storm coalition battlefield commanders knew where supporting friendly forces were located, where relevant opposing forces were located, and precisely where their own troops were located. This awareness was achieved by employing a diverse set of intelligence sensors, navigation systems and communication systems.

For the first time in a war the United States effectively used all of its various space satellite systems to support field commanders. Most of these systems were designed to support broader national objectives, not regional military operations. During Desert Shield, however, this diverse set of systems was used to generate data for maps, locate military units, identify military systems and pinpoint the location of the air defense and command-and-control installations of the Iraqi forces—data crucial to the planning that preceded the beginning of the air war. During Desert Storm all of these systems plus weather

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

satellites provided crucial support to the coalition forces, and communication systems and procedures were put in place to transmit their data to military commanders in the field.

But satellite systems, for all of their capabilities, are constrained by the laws of orbital mechanics, orbiting the earth periodically while the earth rotates below. As a consequence low-altitude satellites cannot hover over a region of interest to get continuous coverage of that area. Rather each satellite collects "snapshots" several times a day according to the frequency of its orbit and subject to weather conditions. Also in Desert Storm the data collected from satellites were subject to communication delays in getting to military commanders. These factors adversely affected the timeliness of data necessary for the planning of military operations or targeting.

Thus it was necessary to supplement the satellites with airborne reconnaissance systems capable of maintaining station and "staring" at a given region for many hours. In Desert Storm U.S. forces used a wide variety of tactical reconnaissance aircraft, both manned and unmanned, and including the aerial reconnaissance cameras used in previous wars. The older systems entailed one-day reporting delays, because of the time required to return and process the data (e.g., film) collected.

A new generation of tactical reconnaissance systems was also used with great effectiveness. Two systems, both manned airborne radars, illustrate the new capability: AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) and JSTARS (Joint Surveillance and Targeting Radar System). Each of these systems is a converted Boeing-707 transport aircraft carrying a large radar, advanced computers and communication equipment to relay the data to the ground. Because the target acquisition sensors on these systems are radars, they can operate day and night and in nearly all weather. Because of the on-board computers and communication equipment, data can be provided immediately, as it is collected, to intelligence command centers and to relevant military commanders.

One AWACS aircraft can instantaneously survey the air space over an area larger than Kuwait and detect and locate every aircraft flying in that area (except for the Stealth aircraft). AWACS played a critical role in giving coalition aircraft a significant advantage over Iraqi fighters in the air-to-air combat that occurred during the first week of the war, and thereby contributed, along with the excellent training of coalition

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pilots, to the one-sided results and brief duration of the air war.

After the Iraqi Air Force gave up combat operations, AWACS served exclusively as an airborne air traffic controller for the 2,000 to 3,000 sorties a day. It is noteworthy that Iraq had an AWACS-type aircraft but because of the coalition's air supremacy was not able to use it, which illustrates the point that AWACS both contributes to and is facilitated by air superiority.

JSTARS performs a similar function in the detection and location of ground vehicles, both moving and stationary. JSTARS was still being developed and evaluated when Desert Shield began. Because of the obvious importance to the impending military operations of real-time targeting data on ground vehicles, two JSTARS aircraft were pulled out of their test program for emergency deployment to the Kuwaiti theater.

During Desert Storm, JSTARS was used in three different missions. It detected and located the vehicles trying to resupply the in-theater Iraqi forces and passed these target data to strike aircraft with devastating effect. During the last weeks of the war Iraqi forces in Kuwait were essentially cut off from their supply base. JSTARS was also used to target Iraqi tanks when they came out of their bunkers. This role was performed first during the battle of Khafji when JSTARS targeted all of the tanks in the Iraqi force for successful attack by coalition aircraft and provided ground force commanders assurance that the Iraqis were not reinforcing their initial probe. Later during the five-day ground war, targeting data from JSTARS contributed significantly to the destruction of the Iraqi tank forces with almost no loss of coalition tanks.

On a few evenings one of the JSTARS aircraft was diverted from coverage of Kuwait to coverage of the Scud launching areas in western Iraq. This mission had some limited success in detecting and targeting Scud launchers. However only one JSTARS aircraft was available on any given evening, and it was generally positioned so that it could target the Iraqi vehicles carrying supplies to their forces in Kuwait. If a larger JSTARS force had been available, it is likely that some portion of this force would have been dedicated to searching for Scud missiles as they were transported to their launch areas. Had that happened it is possible that JSTARS could have developed a reasonably reliable signature of Scud activities so that, together with a small force of strike aircraft, it could have effectively

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

become an antiballistic missile system, attacking the missiles on the ground before they were launched.

In addition to the radar systems many U.S. reconnaissance systems and combat vehicles were equipped with night-vision devices (infrared detectors that form images by measuring small differences in temperature on the scene). Iraqi night-vision devices were neither as numerous nor as effective. As a result coalition military forces "owned the night." Infrared detectors, for example, were used to determine which bunkers had tanks inside (surveillance was conducted at dusk when the desert sand had cooled down, but the metal in the tank still held its heat). This contributed to the large-scale destruction of the Iraqi tank forces that took place before the ground war started. After the ground war began, the night-vision devices in U.S. tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and helicopters were used to direct fire against Iraqi tanks, often before the Iraqis even knew coalition forces were present.

Coalition forces also made effective use of navigation data from global positioning satellites. Many U.S. aircraft, ground vehicles and infantry units were equipped with GPS receivers, which gave them their precise location on the battlefield, as well as the precise time (for synchronization purposes). GPS was important to coalition ground forces because it enabled them to locate their units accurately, which otherwise would have been difficult in the desert because of the absence of natural identifying features. GPS was important to coalition air forces because it allowed them to update the accuracy of their inertial guidance systems and to improve the delivery accuracy of unguided ("dumb") bombs against fixed-coordinate targets. GPS provides location accuracies of about ten meters, more than a tenfold improvement over the navigation systems of previous generations.

Some of the intelligence data collected was processed at sites in the United States. Therefore it was necessary to make extensive use of satellite communications systems for sending daily large volumes of data, including high-resolution pictures, from the United States to the Middle East. Most of this traffic was carried by the Defense Satellite Communication System, which was operating at capacity and, because of the heavy load (on the order of 100 million bits per second), still had to be supplemented with commercial satellites and couriers.

In addition a new generation of digital radios was used for the first time to supplement the standard military radios in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

communicating within the theater. The purpose of the in-theater command-and-control system was to permit transmission to the field commanders of relevant intelligence data as it was collected. For example as JSTARS operators detected armored vehicles they would transmit the coordinates to the army command post on the ground, which used them to assign targets to artillery and attack helicopters. JSTARS also received data from AWACS on the locations of aircraft in the theater. Thus an air force officer on board the JSTARS aircraft was able to select a high-value ground target detected by JSTARS and transmit its coordinates directly to the closest strike aircraft indicated by AWACS data.

In sum this combination of intelligence sensors, precision navigation data and communications gave the coalition field commanders the ability to understand what was going on in the field to a degree that had never been achieved in any previous military operation.

During the first few weeks of the air war, coalition air strikes crippled the Iraqi C^3I system. This effort was achieved by making the collection of detailed data on this system a top priority prior to the air war, and by making its targeting a top priority during the air war. As a result, while coalition forces had outstanding situation awareness, the opposing forces had very little. A large part of the "multiplier effect" achieved during Desert Storm came from the remarkable situation awareness of coalition forces, for which Iraqi forces had neither an effective counterpart nor an effective countermeasure.

IV

Defense suppression is a second major component of the offset strategy. Defense suppression refers to the complex of systems designed to destroy or render ineffective the opposing air defense system before it can function. When General Powell testified before the House Armed Services Committee in December, just before the war started, he provided a prospective view of what war with the Iraqis might entail. He noted that the Iraqi air defense was dense, equipped with a large number of Soviet-built missiles, thousands of antiaircraft artillery guns, and linked with a hardened and redundant communication system. U.S. air operations against Vietnam and Israeli air operations against Egypt and Syria experienced attrition rates in the range of one-third of a percent to two

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

percent against less capable air defense systems. An attrition rate of one percent (one loss per 100 sorties) is less than the average rate in previous wars, but in the very intensive air operations conducted in the Gulf War (about 100,000 sorties in six weeks), such an attrition rate would have led to unacceptable losses: 1,000 coalition aircraft destroyed and more than a thousand crew members killed or captured. If losses had in fact occurred at that rate, coalition air forces probably would not have conducted 100,000 sorties, and the tactics of the war would have been substantially different.

But coalition air forces did not suffer historical attrition rates because the United States had developed novel and effective defense suppression systems. With the use of these new systems during Desert Storm, and because of the early achievement of air supremacy, coalition forces incurred losses of about one in 3,000 sorties instead of one in 100. Even if this calculation is revised to exclude support aircraft, the loss rate is still less than one in 1,000 combat sorties.

Defense suppression systems used in Desert Storm were of two different generic types: precursor systems and escort systems.

The role of precursor systems can best be illustrated by describing their performance the first night of the war. The Stealth attack bomber (the F-117A) and the Tomahawk (a ship-launched cruise missile) were sent in first to destroy the radars and the command-and-control network of the Iraqi air defense. Stealth fighters were chosen for this mission because their low radar cross-sections make them difficult to engage. Tomahawks are also difficult to engage because of medium-to-low radar cross sections plus a very low altitude of flight. Special operations forces (including the army's Apache helicopters) also played a role in the precursor attack that first night.

After these attacks disabled the Iraqi air defense, the main strike was initiated by standard (non-stealth) attack bombers accompanied by escort aircraft designed to suppress any radars still operating. These escorts were equipped with radiation-seeking missiles (which attack radars by homing in on their transmissions) and electronic countermeasure systems (which degrade radars by transmitting signals that mask the legitimate target return). In the first few days of Desert Storm, U.S. forces fired hundreds of radiation-seeking missiles. As a consequence the Iraqi operators of those air defense radars

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that were still functional became increasingly reluctant to turn them on. Without tracking data from their radars Iraqi gunners could be compared to duck hunters on a dark moonless night armed with rifles instead of shotguns and shooting at ducks flying 400 miles an hour.

Under these circumstances, the Iraqi air defense operators reverted to World War II tactics: during night operations over their cities they put up barrages of antiaircraft gun fire (flak); during daytime operations over their army units they used optical controls to direct shoulder-fired missiles and guns (including the Soviet-built ZSU-23 gun, which has an optical sight that is very effective in clear weather).

In order to minimize losses against these tactics, coalition air forces generally flew at night and at altitudes above the reach of the antiaircraft guns. This of course required that the coalition's strike aircraft be equipped with night-vision devices and armaments that could hit targets accurately from high altitudes. The British Tornado aircraft suffered significant losses to antiaircraft fire in the early phases of the war as they delivered runway-cratering munitions from low altitudes. After these initial losses, the British shifted to the high-level delivery of laser-guided bombs.

The A-10 aircraft, which is designed to attack hard defended ground targets such as tanks, has as its primary armament a 30-mm cannon typically fired from low altitudes. Indeed the A-10 is intended to get "down in the dirt" with the infantry it is supporting. Unlike other U.S. strike aircraft it has substantial armor plating to protect it from ground fire. Even so, during the course of Desert Storm, seven A-10s were lost, three of them to shoulder-fired missiles. The A-10s used their 30-mm cannon extensively to attack ground vehicles, but the A-10s in Desert Storm were also equipped with Maverick missiles, which they used to attack heavily defended targets from altitudes above the reach of antiaircraft guns. With this combination of tactics, armor and armament, A-10s played a major role in the destruction of Iraqi armored forces and supply vehicles.

The net result was that coalition air forces were able to conduct 2,000 to 3,000 sorties a day with losses averaging less than one aircraft per day. The outstanding performance of defense suppression was one of the most important factors in the military success of the coalition.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

v

Precision-guided weapons comprised the third component of the offset strategy used to great advantage in Desert Storm. Laser-guided bombs, laser-guided missiles and infrared-guided missiles were dramatically more effective and caused far fewer civilian casualties than the area bombing that characterized previous wars.

The effectiveness of precision weapons can be illustrated by the results of the Stealth attack bomber, since nearly all of its weapons were precision guided (in contrast to the F-16, for example, which delivered mostly "dumb" bombs). In Desert Storm the Stealth bomber typically carried two laser-guided 2,000 pound bombs. Because of their greatly reduced vulnerability to radar-directed fire, Stealth bombers were used in night operations to attack heavily defended targets, such as nuclear, chemical and biological facilities, command-and-control nodes, air defense radars, command centers and military production facilities.

They flew 1,300 sorties and delivered about 2,100 bombs (some bombs were held back because of cloud cover over the target area). Of the 2,100 bombs delivered, the preliminary assessment of the air force is that 1,700 fell within ten feet of where they were aimed. Considering the destructive force of a 2,000 pound bomb, it is likely that well over 80 percent of these 2,100 bombs destroyed their assigned targets. This is a remarkably high rate of effectiveness, particularly considering that Stealth fighters typically flew at medium altitudes to avoid the antiaircraft fire prevalent around their highly defended targets. During the 1,300 sorties, no Stealth bombers were shot down or even damaged.

It is important to emphasize the interdependence and interaction of intelligence, defense suppression and precision guidance. No one of these capabilities was sufficient by itself. The effectiveness of the coalition's defense suppression tactics depended on the precision-guided weapons; the effectiveness of the precision-guided weapons, in turn, depended on the intelligence data that identified and located targets; and the very survivability of the tactical intelligence systems depended on the effectiveness of the coalition's defense suppression systems. All of these critically depended on—and contributed to—the ability of the coalition to achieve early air supremacy. All of these were links in the chain of effectiveness, and if any

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

one had been removed, the overall effectiveness of the chain would have been significantly diminished. Operating together these systems made a vital contribution to shortening the war, to dramatically reducing coalition casualties and to reducing Iraqi civilian casualties.

VI

Although U.S. military leaders made very effective use of these new support systems, it appears that they underestimated the remarkable increase in military capability that these systems would provide. While the effectiveness of the new systems had been demonstrated on proving grounds for the last few years, they had never been used in a war, and the American military and certainly the public did not fully understand the extent to which they would dominate military operations. There had been, of course, no shortage of defense critics arguing that this new technology would not work well in a war.[1] These critics made a number of persuasive arguments.

They argued that the new technology was too expensive and therefore would result in too few weapons, that the new technology was so complex that it would be unreliable, and that it would be too difficult to operate in the field. The argument about too few weapons simply ignores the "force multiplier" effect that was clearly demonstrated in Desert Storm. The argument about reliability was refuted by the operating experiences of the new systems, which demonstrated combat readiness rates in excess of 90 percent. The argument that the new systems would be too difficult to operate was an explicit criticism of the weapons system designers, suggesting that they did not know how to design weapons systems that took human factors adequately into account, and an implicit criticism of U.S. military personnel, implying that they were not capable of operating equipment embodying modern technology. On the contrary Desert Storm demonstrated that the U.S. military is both capable and well trained, and that the designs of the new systems were entirely compatible with that level of training.

Finally, the critics expressed a general concern that the new systems would lose their effectiveness because of the confusion on the battlefield, the "fog of war." In fact there were many

[1]See, for example, James Fallows, *National Defense*, New York: Random House, 1981.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

factors, both physical and psychological, that caused confusion in this war. Coalition troops faced desert sand and dust, they contended with unseasonable rainstorms, and they fought combat missions under the cloud of an unprecedented man-made catastrophe—the smoke from hundreds of oil wells set on fire by the Iraqis. In addition the Iraqis tried in various ways to confuse, misdirect and demoralize coalition forces.

Coalition forces dealt with these problems by using a combination of tactics and technology. Effects of the physical fog were minimized by the use of a diverse set of sensors in different frequency bands, and the effects of the psychological fog were minimized by previous training under simulated combat conditions—most notably the combat training of U.S. forces at Nellis Air Force Base and the National Training Center at Fort Irwin. Key to coalition success, however, was the intelligence information that enabled coalition commanders to cut through the confusion.

To be sure there were shortcomings in the U.S. military operations. U.S. tactical intelligence systems achieved mixed results: JSTARS was effective in the timely reporting of the quantity and location of enemy equipment, but it is not designed to locate or count enemy personnel or make bomb damage assessments. Photographic systems partially filled these gaps, but suffered from weather outages and built-in reporting delays for film processing and delivery. Also, in communicating the intelligence data within the theater, there were significant problems both in the capacity of the data links and their ability to operate from service to service. As a result the services had to work around these problems, primarily by making extensive use of couriers, which sometimes led to significant delays in the availability of data whose timeliness was important.

These shortcomings argue for three high priorities in the ongoing defense modernization program: proceeding with the production and deployment of JSTARS; providing real-time data links for aerial reconnaissance cameras; and developing equipment software and procedures that achieve real service-to-service interoperability in data links.

Moreover there were several latent shortcomings that did not seriously affect military operations in Desert Storm but that could have important consequences in future operations. Because C^3I was so significant, it will be carefully studied by other nations, not only to learn how to emulate it, but also how

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to counter it. Many of the C^3I systems used in Desert Storm could be degraded by foreseeable countermeasures. In addition most of the communication systems were stretched beyond their capacity, and available Iraqi countermeasures could have reduced the capacity further. C^3I systems got a "free ride" to some extent, because inexplicably they were not subjected to countermeasures. But this is unlikely to happen again. Therefore a critically important part of the future U.S. defense program should be dedicated to the hardening of these systems, modifying them so they are less susceptible to countermeasures.

While precision-guided weapons were used with great effectiveness during Desert Storm, they represented only a fraction of the total bombs dropped. Because of the high density of antiaircraft guns in Iraq most of the bombs were released at medium or high altitudes, which decreased the accuracy of delivery of the "dumb bombs." Thus a clear lesson from Desert Storm is to increase the inventory of precision-guided weapons, whose accuracy is independent of the altitude of delivery. This need is particularly urgent for the navy. The navy's relative lack of emphasis in this area did not pose a serious problem in Desert Storm, because the availability and proximity of Saudi air bases meant that most of the air strikes were launched from ground bases instead of carriers. A future war with different geographical conditions, however, might necessitate launching the majority of air strikes from carriers. It is therefore important that carrier-based strike aircraft increase their capability to deliver precision-guided weapons.

Most of the current generation of both air force and navy precision-guided weapons require an operator to guide the missiles to impact, which increases the risk to the operator during that period. While the Iraqis were not able to take significant advantage of this vulnerability, another important emphasis in the U.S. defense program should be the expedited development of next-generation "fire and forget" weapons, which would be autonomously guided to the target after initial identification by the operator. This new generation would have the precision but not the vulnerability of the current generation weapons, and some would have all-weather capability.

U.S. chemical defense systems and air defense systems were not given significant combat tests, but it seems clear that the Patriot missile operated with high reliability and was quite

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

capable of hitting an incoming missile. However it did not effectively deal with relatively simple countermeasures.

It seems that when the Iraqis modified the Scud missile to extend its range and payload, they created an inadvertent countermeasure. This modification introduced an instability that made the missile vulnerable to breaking up during reentry into the atmosphere. As a result the Patriot was presented on many engagements with a multiplicity of targets, one of which was the warhead and the rest of which were pieces of the missile, creating the same effect as decoys. On some of these engagements the Patriot attacked the missile debris, missing the warhead. The Patriot results offer a straightforward lesson for defense planning; namely, that any program to develop a ballistic missile defense system will require serious attention to the development of counter-countermeasures, but even then some "leakage" can be expected.

Of course implementing a program to upgrade U.S. defense capabilities in the years ahead depends not only on judgments suggested here, but on the size of the defense budget. President Bush's long-term defense plan, unveiled last year and reaffirmed subsequent to Desert Storm, calls for a significant decrease in the defense budget over the next six years and a reduction of more than 400,000 military personnel and a proportionate number of civilian personnel. It is crucial to maintain the research and development strategy that contributed to the advantage U.S. forces enjoy today. This will require a continuing exploration of new military technology, a vigorous program to build and test prototypes, and a constrained acquisition program to selectively modernize the forces.[2] Such actions can maintain the American military advantage into the next century and are entirely compatible with the reduced defense budget proposed in the president's plan.

VII

Countries all over the world will conduct their own analyses of the coalition's military success, and some will try to emulate the technical systems critical to that success. There is no secret about how these systems were developed in the United States. In the 1970s U.S. defense officials saw the opportunity to

[2]See, for example, William J. Perry, "Defense Investment Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1989.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

exploit the new developments in microelectronics and computers to great advantage in military applications. The Defense Department conceived, developed, tested, produced and deployed the systems embodying the new technologies. Finally, the U.S. military developed the tactics for using the new systems, and conducted extensive training with them, mostly under simulated field conditions.

To sustain the U.S. position of leadership in this new military capability, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to control the sale of technology or components. Indeed, even if Washington tried, it could not control this technology. With the exception of Stealth, the underlying technology of these new weapon systems as well as the components imbedded in them can be found in commercial products that have been on the market for five to ten years. The U.S. advantage in this new military technology is not in components, but in systems, training and operational experience.

To sustain this advantage the United States must control the sale of the systems that are key to the offset strategy: intelligence sensors, Stealth aircraft and precision-guided weapons. Even if the United States maintains strict control over the sale of these systems, other nations will gain this capability in time, but not without substantial investment over many years. Just how long the United States maintains its advantage depends on how consistently it constrains the sale of this current generation of weapons, and how effectively it develops the next generation.

While this new military capability will add a new dimension to deterrence, it also has significant limitations. It will not add to the ability of the United States to deter a nuclear attack; for the foreseeable future, that deterrence will depend on the strength of U.S. nuclear forces. Also, the new capability will be quite limited in its effectiveness in any regional conflicts that are basically civil wars or dominated by guerrilla warfare. No one should be deluded into believing that the military capability that can easily defeat an army with 4,000 tanks in a desert is going to be the decisive factor in a jungle or urban guerrilla war.

A central national security issue for the United States in the 1990s will be how to use this remarkable new military capability wisely. This will require a national security policy that constrains the sale of systems critical to the offset strategy so that the United States protects its advantage, manages the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

declining defense budget with an investment strategy that extends its advantage, guards against the hubris of believing that this new military capability solves all of its national security problems, and positions its foreign policy so that the United States does not become either the world's policeman or the world's bully. Clearly the United States does not want to spend the rest of the decade fighting regional conflicts. The key to avoiding such entanglements is to use its new strength to deter these conflicts rather than fight them.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

McGeorge Bundy

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE GULF

In our life with nuclear danger, loaded as it is with uncertainty, there is occasional illumination in cases of crisis or conflict. The Gulf War was such a case, and there is a lot to be learned from it.

No nuclear weapons exploded in the Gulf War. In the most obvious sense they were not used, as indeed they have not been used since Nagasaki. This simple fact may be the most important one. Consider how great an event it would have been if tactical nuclear warheads had been exploded by anyone—say a dozen from the very large number that Americans could have used, or a few from the smaller set owned by the Israelis or even one by the command of Saddam Hussein. In three quite different ways such events would have changed both the future of the Middle East and the future of nuclear danger—and not for the better.

In that large sense the Gulf War has preserved the most hopeful single inheritance that we have from the first half-century of nuclear fission—the tradition of the nonuse of these weapons since 1945. The Gulf War has in fact reinforced that tradition, and in ways more remarkable than the simple fact that no nuclear weapon was exploded.

That weapons are not exploded does not of itself exhaust the more subtle question of whether they are used. Weapons—and not only nuclear weapons—can also play a role merely by their existence or possible existence. The very existence of the Roman legions was a powerful force for both the internal peace and the external safety of the empire. Somewhat more subtly the British, and later the Americans, developed a substantial strategy and practice based on the peacekeeping value of the fleet-in-being. It has been more difficult to develop a general theory of this sort for nuclear weapons: the

---

McGeorge Bundy is chairman of the Carnegie Corporation's Task Force on the Nuclear Threat. This essay is adapted from a spring 1991 Penrose Lecture to the American Philosophical Society.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

weapon is so grossly destructive that it is—in a quite special way—implausible as an instrument of peacekeeping.

There is indeed a general tempering effect in the very existence of the enormous arsenals of the two superpowers, most visible in their wariness of direct conflict with each other. Any such conflict *could* become nuclear, and this possibility creates what I have called existential deterrence. But this phenomenon is not at all the same as keeping the peace in the manner of Roman legions or British squadrons. There is more similarity, perhaps, in the few instances in which the availability of nuclear weapons on one side has been used to discourage some particularly unpleasant action by an opponent. There was just a whiff of this kind of threat in the American conduct of the gulf crisis, and it deserves attention.

II

What President Bush did with the nuclear weapon was to use it to warn Saddam Hussein against what he called "unconscionable acts" like "the use of chemical or biological weapons." His most clear-cut warning was part of a letter he wrote to Saddam on January 5, 1991, which Secretary of State James Baker delivered a week later at his Geneva meeting with the Iraqi foreign minister, Tariq Aziz. Formally, that letter was rejected and handed back. The contents were published at once in the American press, and it takes a very dim view of the wits of a very crafty man to suppose that Saddam was never aware of the letter's message.

The president did not say that "unconscionable acts" would produce an American nuclear attack, but he used words that were clearly designed not to exclude the possibility. In response to such acts, he said, "the American people would demand the strongest possible response," and "you and your country will pay a terrible price."

At a press conference on February 5, 1991, the president clarified his purpose. He was asked whether if Saddam were to use chemical weapons, the United States might "in turn use weapons of mass destruction." He avoided a direct answer by saying: "I think it's better never to say what you may be considering." The president said he was leaving the matter there because he wanted Saddam to "think very carefully" about launching a chemical attack and "because I would like to have every possible chance that he decides not to do this."

Saddam never did use chemical weapons, and it is unlikely

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that Mr. Bush regrets his veiled but powerful warning. Yet the president never said flatly that he would use the bomb, and one may doubt, as I do most strongly, that he would have let the use of gas by Saddam be the trigger to such an enormous choice.

The evidence available does not tell us how close the Iraqis came to the use of gas, and we have even less of a basis for estimating the effects of any such use. These uncertainties do not constitute an argument against the president's warning. It is easy to understand and, indeed, to respect the president's motive: in the short run any threat might seem desirable if it would help to moderate the behavior of a man as obviously vicious as Saddam Hussein.

Moreover there is a difference between an open-ended warning and a specific bomb threat. It is true that there can be embarrassment for a president who sounds casual about a nuclear threat. That happened to Truman in the Korean War and to Eisenhower, much less severely, in the crisis with China over the islands of Quemoy and Matsu. But Mr. Bush was careful in what he did and did not say, and his threat did not stir public concern. As we shall see, there are reasons to wish that there had been no such threat at all. But the immediate point is that this threat, limited to the case of an Iraqi chemical attack, was the only use, in *any* sense, of nuclear weapons in the gulf.

III

The much larger fact is that the bomb was *not* used in the ordinary sense of the word, and that this nonuse had general American approval before, during and after the war. During the crisis the amount of debate on the possible use of nuclear weapons was limited, and both its participants and its outcome are interesting. It was, in the main, an argument among conservatives. Let us confine ourselves to one example on each side.

Speaking for the use of tactical weapons was Congressman Dan Burton of Indiana, and against it the Republican whip, Newt Gingrich of Georgia. They spoke in January, with the air war already begun and the ground war imminent. Congressman Burton's argument was simple—that if the alternative was bloody ground warfare, tactical nuclear weapons should be used to save American lives. Not so, said Congressman Gingrich, and he gave powerful general reasons for his view: if the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United States should "establish a pattern out there that it is legitimate to use those kinds of weapons, our children and grandchildren are going to rue the day." On a more immediate note, he added: "We would not want to live in a world in which we had sent a signal to every country on the planet to get nuclear weapons as fast as we can." To top off his argument, Congressman Gingrich denied his colleague's premise that the conventional ground war was going to be bloody and protracted for Americans: "If you look at the quality of our weapons today, we can do an amazing amount of damage with a conventional weapon."

As we now know, Congressman Gingrich was right on his last point; he was well informed on defense questions and had before him the record of three weeks of highly successful action in the air. But it is important to recognize the power of his wider argument: for the sake of later generations we must do our best to keep these weapons unused. That is not an argument that could be overturned easily by a close count of casualties.

The president's associates showed themselves somewhat less careful, and they sometimes disagreed with one another. The most notable of these disagreements was that between some Pentagon officials and John Sununu, the White House chief of staff, who at one point found it prudent to give assurance that there was no likelihood of resort to tactical nuclear weapons. Nameless Pentagon sources then rebuked him for the military error of telling the enemy what we were not going to do. Mr. Sununu probably was right in his judgment of what Americans wanted to hear. But the reaction from the Pentagon reminds us that for a number of defense experts, in and out of uniform, there is still a strong appeal in the notion that the bomb should have its own minatory weight whenever that can help.

One cannot weigh these conflicting forces with any precision, but my own guess is that the weight of the bomb as a general threat—which I here distinguish from the president's use of it as a reinforcing deterrent to the opponent's use of other mass-destruction weapons—was very low in this crisis, at least in part because John Sununu was right about the American people's basic preference. Our wisest defense experts have understood for a long time that the threat of initiating nuclear warfare has been declining in military value.

In the final analysis of strategy, politics and morals we are

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Who defines Current History?

Phebe Marr on Iraq
Marshall Goldman on the Soviet economy
Andrew Pierre on the United States and the new Europe
Rashid Khalidi on the Palestinians and the Gulf War
Pauline Baker on the myths and realities of South Africa

And...
Wayne Smith, Robert Hunter, Robin Wright, Kenneth Adelman, Graham Fuller, Jerry Hough, Francis Fukuyama, Raymond Garthoff, Liu Binyan, Michael Hudson, Abraham Lowenthal, Itamar Rabinovich...



The writers who give definition to the news are the people who make Current History. For 77 years, our authors have made Current History required reading for understanding a changing world. Each month, Current History devotes an entire issue to one nation or region. Nowhere else can you find this kind of sustained, in-depth coverage of the Soviet Union, China, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. And nowhere else can you find—on a monthly basis—a chronology of the news from around the world.

Subscribe today. Don't let Current History pass you by.

YES, I want the insight, perspective, and the depth of reporting on world affairs that I can find only in Current History. Please enter my subscription today for ☐ 1 year (9 issues) US$31.00* ☐ 2 years US$61.00.

Order Current History immediately by calling 1-800-726-4464.

Name _____

Address _____ ☐ Payment enclosed ☐ Bill me

City _____ Charge my: ☐ Mastercard ☐ Visa

State _____ Zip _____ Card No. _____

Signature _____ Exp. Date _____

Current History • 4225 Main Street • Philadelphia, PA 19127

*Add US$6.25 for foreign and Canadian addresses

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NEW FROM LEXINGTON BOOKS

BEYOND THE SOVIET THREAT
The U.S. Army in a Post Cold War Environment
James B. Motley

"The first comprehensive analysis of the issues that will confront the U.S. Army in the years ahead. A major contribution to understanding the post Cold War era and the challenges that will confront U.S. policymakers."
— Grant S. Green, Jr.,
Former Assistant Director of Defense, (Force Management and Personnel) Office of the Secretary of Defense

1991 0-669-24986-6 $39.95

THE COLD WAR LEGACY
Thomas H. Naylor, *Duke University*

"The turn of history has delivered what Naylor was among the first to anticipate, an end to the Cold War...He was convinced that a 'revolution' was coming, and it came...If not a prophet, Naylor is certainly an astute observer and analyst. We will benefit by listening to him now."
—Terry Sanford, U.S. Senate, member of the Committee on Foreign Relations

1991 0-669-24984-X $21.95

THE PLACE OF MORALITY IN FOREIGN POLICY
Felix E. Oppenheim

Provides a thought-provoking examination of an all-too-often overlooked question central to any discussion of international relations and ethics: to what extent is morality relevant in foreign policy decisions? Written to challenge students and experts to explore in what instances morality and moral commitments really matter in international politics.

1991 0-669-21452-3 $14.95 paper

AMERICAN DEFENSE ANNUAL, 1991-1992
Joseph J. Kruzel, *Ohio State University*

Now updated to include the latest data from Operation Desert Storm, this is the indispensable guide to the current state of U.S. security policy and how recent dramatic changes in international politics may affect the course of security policy in the 90s.

"Defense reform is one of a number of topics covered...contains useful source material." — ***Foreign Affairs***

October 1991 0-669-27970-6 $24.95 paper

THE UNITED STATES ARMY
Challenges and Missions in the 1990s
Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Richard H. Schultz, Jr.

This portrait of the Army's future closely examines the new and emerging issues now confronting U.S. policymakers and military leaders. Bringing together 21 leading security specialists, this book provides incisive analysis of the Army's role within American defense policy in the world today and beyond.

1991 0-669-27562-X $39.95

U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
The Secret Side of American History
Charles D. Ameringer, *Penn State University*

"A lively, informative, and important book...Ameringer neither denounces nor glorifies the CIA and other intelligence agencies; instead he gives us an insightful and balanced survey of their role. Highly recommended."
— Stephen E. Ambrose, author of *Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician*

1990 0-669-21491-4 $24.95

For VISA, MasterCard, or American Express orders, call toll-free 1-800-323-7445

LEXINGTON BOOKS
PUBLISHING FOR PROFESSIONALS
An Imprint of Macmillan, Inc. / A Maxwell Macmillan Company
866 Third Avenue, New York, New York 10022

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

better off keeping this weapon unused except in deterrence of—and considered response to—a genuinely parallel ferocity by others. That is also the real direction of our thinking as a nation since 1945. Certainly the men in the field responsible for planning and executing Desert Storm were not attracted by tactical nuclear weapons. They correctly found it better to rely on systems that they knew their commander in chief would let them use. As far as we can tell, their plans for response even to chemical warfare did *not* include the bomb, and my own judgment is that what they did—and did not—propose to do is a better guide to the future than the president's carefully imprecise threat. I do not believe that chemical attacks are best answered by nuclear warheads, or chemical threats by nuclear threats. These two kinds of weapons are at quite different levels, both of horror and of military effectiveness.

In his strong and immediate desire to do all he could to keep Saddam from the use of chemical weapons, President Bush missed an excellent opportunity to make it clear that in reality, and as a matter of basic national policy, the United States would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in this crisis. A public declaration of this kind would not have changed existing U.S. policy but only reinforced it.

Since 1978 it has been the official policy of the United States not to initiate nuclear warfare against any state that has signed the Nonproliferation Treaty and has not allied itself to another nuclear weapon state. Iraq fits that description (although Iraq's nuclear behavior does not). But my point is not that President Bush should have been guided by a little-known but sensible policy announced in the Carter administration by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. My point is that had the president publicly rejected any such first use of nuclear weapons, at a moment of high international attention when American forces were being asked to face conventional combat, he would have greatly strengthened the worldwide cause of avoiding nuclear war and won honor for leadership around the world—especially at home.

IV

In the end the ground battle was even more one-sided than Congressman Gingrich—or anyone else—predicted. This happy result is one element in the broad demonstration throughout the war that conventional means of warfare, in the hands of expert commanders and well-trained forces, can now

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have a wholly new level of speed and power on the battlefield. Especially in the pinpoint accuracy of the most advanced systems, conventional weapons displayed a capacity for discrimination that no system dependent on nuclear explosions could ever hope to reach—not only because of the side effects of even low-yield nuclear weapons, but still more because of the enormous psychological shock of any nuclear attack.

We must not conclude from the gulf, however, that all future wars will be quick and easy. A war in which both sides were equipped and skilled, as only one side was this time, could be a dreadful affair for all concerned. Nonetheless it is a legacy from this war that the immediate priority for defense ministries in all kinds of countries will be the improvement of their conventional capabilities. It is these capabilities and not those of nuclear warheads that have won new renown.

The first discernible impact of this new renown is on the procurement priorities of the U.S. Department of Defense. In the hard choices of the American budget process it is conventional and not nuclear systems that have gained from the Gulf War. Obviously there is debate about the specific meaning of specific performances. Thus partisans of the Strategic Defense Initiative have been trying to claim that the Patriot missile proves their point, but so far they have not been persuasive. We do not even know for sure how much the Patriot actually reduced the physical damage done by Iraqi Scuds. But such debates do not change the larger verdict: when used with skill, modern conventional weapons can be highly effective.

I am not advocating an intensified conventional arms race, and still less an intensified competition in conventional arms sales. There are excellent reasons for cooperative moderation, based on a reduced estimate of danger and a new awareness of the costs of these competitions. But it is helpful, in limiting the role of nuclear weapons in American budgets, that our merely conventional systems performed so well in the gulf. Probably there are even better things to do with some of the billions we now spend on defense, but it remains true that there will always be a defense budget and that it is helpful for the balance within that budget to shift toward conventional forces.

The American level of investment in nuclear weaponry is not the only one to have been adversely affected by the Gulf War. There has been a still sharper, if still unfinished, result in Iraq. Because of a conviction strongly shared by President Bush and the American people, the destruction of Iraqi

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

installations related to nuclear weapons became a specific American military objective of high priority. The president undoubtedly had this objective in mind from very early in the crisis: the Saddam Hussein so starkly revealed on August 2, 1990, was not at all the sort of opponent whose pursuit of nuclear weapons would be a matter of indifference. When Mr. Bush learned from the polls that the American public shared his view, he turned his spotlight publicly on the danger of Saddam-with-a-bomb, and he may have stretched the evidence then available in presenting the possibility of an Iraqi bomb as both real and imminent. Now it seems clear that the Iraqi dictator had more fissionable material at his disposal than the U.S. ever suspected. I think it was wrong at the time to exaggerate the imminence and magnitude of the danger, but entirely right to put Saddam's nuclear weapons enterprise on the target lists. And I think what was right is much larger than what was wrong.

When war came, the Iraqi nuclear weapons enterprise was indeed repeatedly bombed, and prevention of an Iraqi bomb became a durable war aim, one roundly endorsed by the U.N. Security Council. With this mandate the American government has insisted on obtaining fully adequate evidence that the Iraqis are out of the nuclear weapons race. That process has been slower and harder than expected, involving several marginally successful trips to Iraq by a U.N. inspection team. Saddam's nuclear ambition, combined with his addiction to trickery, led him to a posture of pretended cooperation that was intended to conceal a continuing effort to get something, however crude and imperfect, that would make a bang.

Since it would be a failure of the most obvious and avoidable kind to allow this trickery to succeed, it seems predictable that the allies, led by President Bush, will do whatever is necessary to bring the Iraqi pursuit of nuclear weapons to an end. For reasons that have never been adequately explained, the victorious advance was halted before full control of Iraqi territory was achieved. If greater control is required for a satisfactory end to Saddam's sneaky nuclear adventure, I believe it can be imposed with international support. If that is done, this will be an important result of the Gulf War. It will become the very first case in which an existing effort to "have the bomb" has been decisively blocked by clear-cut and internationally approved military and political action. The nearest precedent also involves Iraq: the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

preemptive attack on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor executed by Israeli aircraft in June 1981.

v

On the other hand, it is also clear that without the trigger of Saddam's attack on Kuwait, neither the United States nor the U.N. Security Council would have taken effective action against an Iraqi bomb. In that sense the threat of such a bomb became a matter of direct concern and a target of opportunity, more by accident than by deliberate choice. We need to think about the meaning of this accident. What does it tell us about the interest we should have, and the action we should take, in other cases where a government we deeply mistrust may be coming close to possession of nuclear weapons? I am not at all suggesting that we should make war on every country in this position, or even that we should imitate the Israeli preemptive attack of 1981. What I am suggesting is that ending the danger of Iraqi nuclear weapons is so obviously right that we should strongly support our government in what I hope will be a strengthened effort to make the possession of these weapons more difficult for such competitors with Saddam as Kim Il Sung of North Korea and Muammar al-Qaddafi of Libya. The ways and means of such efforts are complex and even murky, but their justification is simple and clear: it is not good for the world that such men should have the bomb.

It does not undermine this conclusion, though it may moderate its force, for us to ask ourselves a few more questions about the Gulf War. Are we sure that its outcome would have been catastrophically different if in fact Saddam had obtained his nuclear weapon before he went after Kuwait? Would that nuclear force-in-being have given him a free hand in the conventional aggression to which, as it turned out, the United States and its coalition partners made such a devastating conventional reply? Would we have been deterred, in short, by Saddam's bomb? Or would we have decided that we must not let him have this cheap victory, that he could still be induced to refrain from nuclear warfare and that, all things considered, it was more dangerous to stand back than to stand up to him?

No one can know the answers to these questions. But it is a necessary legacy of this crisis that we should think about them, if only because there is no reason for any serene confidence

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that we shall never have to face a leader of this kind with a bomb in his control.

One question that may illuminate this matter is whether we believe that any such tyrant would ever dare to use his weapon against an opponent like the gulf coalition. Or would that be an act so likely to produce a massive reply in kind that it would amount to self-destruction on a thermonuclear scale? We know enough about rulers of this kind to conclude that they would at least consider this question. It is not self-evident that all is lost when such a ruler gets the bomb. Still it is quite clear from the unpleasant work of thinking about this situation that the world will be better off if it does not arise. The relatively near miss that we have had in the case of Iraq should give a healthy stimulus to the worldwide cause of nonproliferation.

VI

In this wider perspective there is another inheritance from the Gulf War that has relevance: the astonishing role that has been played—and is still being played—by the U.N. Security Council. It is a role that no one can yet claim to understand fully; the principal participants are still learning as they go, and each new resolution has been more astonishing than the one before. Hardest of all, both for participating officials and outside observers, may be the question of the relative weight of the national and international elements in this process.

For many years there has been an understandable skepticism about the role of the Security Council as a force distinct from the interacting behavior of its member states and especially its permanent members. Now there may be a weight to the whole process of the gulf resolutions that goes beyond the sum of the weights of the governments supporting them. That said, there remains the veto power of the permanent members and their proven willingness to use it. Nonetheless there is a demonstrated cause for hope in the cooperative performance at the United Nations, and it is not wrong to think that we may get help from that body on the wider and inescapably multinational question of nuclear danger. The Security Council tried and failed to deal with this question some 45 years ago, but we need no longer take that failure as the last word on the subject.

Coming back to the danger in the immediate area of the Gulf War, we must ask whether this one case can lead to wider choices for nuclear restraint in the region. Obviously much

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

depends on the way the matter is handled and still more on the eventual political situation of Iraq. But it is clear already that an Iraq that accepts and understands its necessary absence from the list of nuclear weapon states will make its own significant contribution to the stability of its region, as both Japan and Germany have done in their regions for a long time. The three cases are not at all identical, notably in the absence of any present prospect that in Iraq there will be a long symbiosis of foreign occupation with an emerging constitutional society. Nonetheless the German and Japanese cases are not irrelevant, and the intensity of the economic interdependence of Iraq with other countries, including the United States, leaves much room for continuing constructive interaction between Baghdad and countries it will need as friends.

VII

The new prestige of conventional weapons and the restraint of the nuclear ambitions of Iraq will be helpful in moderating nuclear danger, but they do not of themselves tell us that the Gulf War represents a decisive turning point. To see how thorny the question will continue to be in the Middle East, we have only to remind ourselves that the Gulf War did not come close to engaging the one set of nuclear weapons that exists today under the ownership and command of a Middle Eastern power—the nuclear arsenal of Israel.

The Israeli nuclear arsenal was doubly insulated: the government of Israel, with courageous prudence, refrained from a military reply to the vicious provocation of Saddam's Scud missile attacks; and, beyond that, it is safe to assume that even if there had been an Israeli decision to reply, that reply would not have been nuclear. Behind this double layer of Israeli good sense, the Israeli bomb was kept out of the war. But it remains a reality, and its existence will be a powerful element in any enlarged effort to reduce nuclear danger in the region.

There is no easy solution to this problem of regional arms control. What is clear is that Israel's substantial stockpile of nuclear weapons must not be left off the list of the realities that are critical to any future Middle East peace. It is understandable that the Israeli government has been reticent on this subject; there is a certain tactical good sense in its formal position that it is not a nuclear weapon state and will not be the first to introduce these weapons into the region. It is also understandable (although I think it is wrong) that our own

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

government has chosen to accept this formal Israeli stance. It is absurd, however, to try to talk seriously about the reduction of nuclear danger in the Middle East without taking into account the reality that Israel has a substantial stockpile of nuclear warheads.

The double insulation of the Israeli bomb from the Gulf War was not accidental. It reflects two important realities in Israeli policy. The first is that the Israelis understand and accept that they cannot hope to have a major role in the affairs of the Arab world except as these affairs directly affect the survival of Israel. Thus it was right for them to keep apart from what was in essence an assault by Saddam on the survival of Kuwait and the security of Saudi Arabia. The Israelis knew which side to root for, but they also knew that history would make any visible help from them unhelpful.

The second reality is that the Israelis must give decisive priority to their own survival. For that, and I believe only for that, they have provided themselves with the bomb. If I had been an Israeli decision-maker a generation ago, I think I might well have made the same choice. If the Israeli bomb is intended only as an ultimate deterrent protector for a small and overwhelmingly outnumbered nation—and if there is no reason to suppose that the weapon would ever be used for any less compelling purpose—then the Israeli bomb can become a quite untroubling phenomenon, if indeed there can be peace between Arabs and Israelis. The Israelis themselves have suggested that they would be able to join a nuclear-free zone if there were such a change in their basic relations to their neighbors. While the exact meaning of that suggestion is far from clear, it does reinforce the notion that a real peace would lessen the nuclear threat for all.

Thus we have a third lesson of the Gulf War. It tells us first that if the time and tide are right we can and should deal with a Saddamite nuclear ambition by preventing it. It tells us, second, that it is right in military strategy to prefer sophisticated conventional weapons to nuclear weapons of any kind. It tells us, third, with specific reference to the danger in the Israeli bomb, that the necessary answer is a genuine Arab-Israeli peace. And this third conclusion matches the one most of us have reached about a still larger nuclear danger—the one that exists in the enormous arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. The best way to make those arsenals less dangerous is to recognize the end of the Cold War and go on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from there, a process exemplified by recent agreements on conventional forces in Europe and strategic arms reductions.

It can be so in the Middle East as well, and now is the time for a great new effort to obtain a formal peace between Israel and the Arabs. It is the only road to nuclear safety, as indeed it is the only road away from the continuing conflict that has already led four times to open warfare. The Gulf War has not brought us Arab-Israeli peace, but it may have made that peace possible by leaving moderates stronger and immoderates weaker, on all sides.

The efforts for Arab-Israeli peace talks begun by Secretary Baker have not had much substantive success, but it is much too soon to be discouraged. The United States has more cards to play than the president has yet decided to use, and the first cool responses on all sides need not be the last. Similarly the cautious approach to Middle East arms limitations evident in the president's speech of May 29 need not be the last American word. What is missing, on both sets of issues, is the level of direct presidential engagement that marked the American response to Saddam after August 2, 1990. The role of peacemaker is just as presidential as that of commander in chief.

Nuclear danger neither caused nor decided the war in the gulf, but that war affected our nuclear world in some constructive ways. It showed once again that democracies, large or small, need not be unrestrained in resorting to such weapons; it showed that modern conventional systems are today the better investments, at least at the margin; and it showed that possession of nuclear weapons can be put off-limits for a particularly dangerous government, at least when the ground for such action is clear and the power to act sufficient. The Gulf War will command a durable place in the history of nuclear danger.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Carl Kaysen
Robert S. McNamara
George W. Rathjens

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AFTER THE COLD WAR

The Cold War had two chief features: the continuing confrontation on the border between the two Germanys that might, possibly without notice, break out into war, and the ideologically driven rivalry throughout the Third World.

Germany is now united within its 1945 boundaries, which have been recognized and accepted by all concerned; the Warsaw Pact has disappeared; and the three countries between the western border of the Soviet Union and the West, no longer in thrall to the Soviet Union, are admiring petitioners to the West. Communism has lost almost all of its appeal outside the borders of the few remaining polities that officially adhere to it—China, North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia and Cuba—and it is unlikely that it would survive even a modest easing of pervasive repressive central control in any of them.

Inside the Soviet Union, however, the struggle for change is producing turmoil; the forces of reaction, of reform and of disintegration are in contention, the outcome uncertain. While still possessing formidable inventories of nuclear and conventional weapons, the Soviet state shows no will to use its military power externally, and almost certainly lacks the political coherence to do so. An immediate external threat appears to be the only circumstance that would change that situation, and it is hard to see whence one would arise. Even the failure of perestroika and a retreat from glasnost led by a new military-authoritarian regime would not reconstitute the powerful, ideologically driven opponent supported by East European

---

Carl Kaysen and George W. Rathjens are members of the Defense and Arms Control Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Robert S. McNamara was U.S. Secretary of Defense, 1961–68, and President of the World Bank, 1968–81.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

allies that the United States saw from 1945 through much of the last decade.

Thus the great conflict that marked our lives for most of the twentieth century is over, and hardly more likely to be revived than the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries between Catholics and Protestants in Europe.

With the end of the Cold War, it is hard to construct even a semi-plausible military threat to the United States or to Europe west of the Soviet border in the immediate future. As General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has noted: "I'm running out of demons, I'm running out of villains. I'm down to Castro and Kim Il Sung." If this is so, it is reasonable to ask: What role will military force in general, and nuclear weapons in particular, play in the emerging world order?

II

Efforts at answering this question must begin with a reminder of the extraordinary revolution in military technology in the last half-century. The development of nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them accurately at intercontinental ranges opened a wide and increasing gap between what was technically feasible in the application of military power and what was politically usable.

At present, the world stockpile of nuclear weapons comprises some 52,000 nuclear warheads, 97 percent of them in the hands of the United States and the Soviet Union. Beyond the three other states acknowledging the possession of nuclear weapons—China, France and the United Kingdom—there are four or five states that either have some current nuclear capability or are on the threshold of achieving it.

The most striking fact about nuclear weapons is that since their development and the demonstration of their feasibility in July 1945, only two have ever been used in war. As President Truman said in his last State of the Union message, following the first hydrogen-bomb test:

> From now on, man moves into a new era of destructive power. . . . The war of the future would be one in which man could extinguish millions of lives at one blow, demolish the great cities of the world, wipe out the cultural achievements of the past and destroy the very structure of a civilization that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has slowly and painfully built up through hundreds of generations. Such a war is not a possible policy for rational men.

Yet for 38 years the United States has been building ever larger arsenals to wage (or at least be prepared to wage) just such a war.

The enormous buildup of nuclear weapons since 1945 was primarily, but not entirely, the product of the Cold War. The character of the military competition between the two superpowers was shaped by the existence of strategic nuclear weapons. Having hastily demobilized its armed forces at the end of the Second World War, the United States by 1947 began to rely heavily on nuclear weapons to counter the perceived threat to western Europe from the large Soviet army that had not been demobilized. The buildup of overseas U.S. air bases on the periphery of the Soviet Union and the deployment to them of nuclear-capable bombers stimulated a corresponding, though at first much slower, buildup of Soviet strategic forces.

The reciprocal fears aroused by the possibility of a devastating bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack intensified as the weapons and their means of delivery continued to improve. Profound ideological antipathy and demonization of the other side, the lag between the decision to build new weapons and their deployment, worst-case analyses, Soviet secrecy and successful Soviet bluffs about the size and capability of their forces, and American belief in the possibility of sustaining technological superiority—all were factors in keeping the process going. In the tactical arena similar factors and the belief that Soviet superiority in mobilized manpower in Europe could not be overcome led to the nuclearization of first American and then NATO's ground and tactical air forces in the 1950s and early 1960s.

The Soviet nuclear buildup was a response to that of the United States. The other nuclear powers, however, made their initial commitments to develop nuclear forces in varying circumstances. For the British it was the desire, in Prime Minister Macmillan's words, to continue to "eat at the top table," to participate in U.S. military, particularly nuclear, decision-making as an equal. France also invested in nuclear weapons for equally illusory political reasons, but with a difference: the French saw them as the symbol of independence, especially from the security umbrella of the United States, but also from the United Kingdom.

China began its quest for nuclear weapons as early as 1955

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as an ally and client of the Soviet Union. When the break between the two occurred (partly because of the Soviet refusal in 1959 to continue helping Beijing develop nuclear weapons) the Chinese pressed forward, as anxious about the potential nuclear threat from their neighboring former ally as they had initially been about the threat from the distant United States. In 1964 China exploded its first test weapon, becoming the fifth avowed nuclear weapons power.

India felt threatened by a powerful nuclear-armed neighbor, namely China, with whom it had an open political dispute and at whose hands it had suffered a humiliating though limited military defeat. The Indians, however, declared their test a "peaceful explosion," and denied that they had or wished to have weapons. Nevertheless the major incentive for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program has been the threat from India and India's nuclear program.

Israel does not acknowledge the nuclear capability it is widely believed to possess. Its more populous, heavily armed and deeply hostile neighboring states do not recognize its legitimacy and have remained in a state of war with Israel since its founding. Until now Israel has relied successfully on its conventional forces in four wars. However its nuclear capability is the ultimate security guarantee.

Evidence of the Israeli nuclear armory has spurred Iraqi and Libyan efforts to achieve nuclear capability.

It is noteworthy, however, that most states have not sought to acquire nuclear weapons. Some that clearly have the technical capability and resources to do so see no need or threat, or view the possible advantages as outweighed by the political costs. These include professed neutrals, such as Sweden, which started down the weapons path but then turned back, and potential adversaries, such as Argentina and Brazil, which have recently decided against continuing that path. Others such as Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark and Japan have seen their security interests served best by alliance with the United States. Many countries, perhaps the majority, are simply too poor in both technical and economic resources to contemplate acquiring nuclear weapons.

III

What of threats to peace since the beginning of the nuclear era? In Europe there were many moments of crisis that in pre-nuclear times probably would have led to war: the re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

peated crises in divided Berlin, beginning with the Soviet blockade of West Berlin in 1948; the Soviet invasions to put down dissident governments in Hungary and Czechoslovakia; incursions by U.S. military aircraft across Soviet borders, involving the shooting of U.S. planes and American U-2 flights across the Soviet heartland.

But deterrence worked. The possession of substantial nuclear armories by both sides certainly reinforced it, and may by itself have been a sufficient condition for its continuing effectiveness. Whether such possession was a necessary condition is unclear. The memory of the enormous toll of death and destruction in Europe wrought by conventional weapons in World War II may have been daunting enough to both the European members of NATO and the Soviet Union to maintain the peace. And it is certainly relevant that from the early 1950s to the early 1960s, when the United States had clear "strategic superiority" and even a near monopoly of effective nuclear capability, the Soviet Union was not deterred from using force or the threat of it to maintain suzerainty over its European domains.

Outside Europe the world changed continuously, beginning with the struggle for control of China. The former imperial powers of Europe retreated in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean, in part voluntarily, in part under duress. New states were created, many with unstable regimes and shifting allegiances in the superpower competition. Many of the changes involved violence: colonial revolts and guerrilla wars against the European powers, civil wars or less organized civil violence within new states and conflicts among them as well.

In all these struggles nuclear weapons played little, if any, part. The United States' near monopoly in deliverable nuclear weapons in no way deterred the Chinese communists from their conquest of the Chinese mainland. North Korea was not deterred from invading South Korea in 1950, nor North Vietnam from its support of guerrilla war in (and then its open invasion of) South Vietnam in the 1960s. Nor were Egypt and Syria deterred in 1973 from attacking Israel, which at the time had at least a "screwdriver-away" nuclear capability; or Argentina from seizing the British Falklands in 1982. Nor was Saddam Hussein deterred from seizing Kuwait in 1990, though he presumably knew that there was some risk that the United States, Britain and France would see such an attack and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

its likely consequences for the control of Saudi oil as a clear threat to their vital interests.

From the start of the nuclear age in 1945 enormous expenditures of ingenuity and ink have been devoted to analyses and discussions of nuclear strategy. While more voluminous in the United States, such analyses have by no means been confined to it and have spread over the entire world. Yet all this discussion has produced only one plausible scenario for the use of nuclear weapons in war: a situation where there is no prospect of retaliation, either against a nonnuclear state or against one so weakly armed as to permit the user to have full confidence in his nuclear forces' capacity to achieve a totally disarming first strike.

But even such circumstances have not, in fact, provided a sufficient basis for the use of nuclear weapons in war. Although American forces were in desperate straits twice during the Korean War—first immediately following the North Korean attack in 1950 and then when the Chinese crossed the Yalu—the United States did not use nuclear weapons. At that time, North Korea and China had no nuclear capability, and the Soviet Union only a negligible one. Although President Truman's hasty response to a reporter's question at a press conference in November 1950 appeared to suggest that he was considering the use of nuclear weapons, political leaders recoiled from the perceived political costs.[1] Just the suggestion that the United States might use nuclear weapons provoked an immediate descent on Washington by British Prime Minister Attlee, and a presidential assurance that no such action was contemplated.

Nearly four years later, when the besieged French in Dien Bien Phu were desperate, French and U.S. military leaders considered the possibility of relieving the fortress by using U.S. air strikes against the Vietnamese attackers. Within the U.S. military, discussion favored the use of low-yield nuclear weapons for that purpose. President Eisenhower later told his biographer that when these discussions were reported to him, he responded: "You boys must be crazy. We can't use those awful things against Asians for a second time in less than ten years. My God."[2] Self-deterrence was as effective as mutual deterrence.

[1]McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival*, New York: Random House, 1988, p. 231.
[2]Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983, vol. 2, p. 184.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IV

The end of the Cold War clearly does not in itself mean the end of international conflict, but it need not mean a return to an earlier style of international relations based on the balance of power and shifting alliances, with its ultimate reliance on national military forces. The unlimited destructiveness of nuclear weapons and the increasingly devastating power of conventional weapons call into question the utility of war as a policy instrument. So does recognition that wars fail to settle the conflicts that lead to them.

The post-Cold War era means that wars are not likely to occur within the context of a bipolar world dominated by two great ideological opponents. What this new era provides is the opportunity to strive for truly collective security and an international rule of law, in which self-help by the use of military force for resolving conflicts among nations loses its legitimacy. The U.N. charter and the instruments available under it can gain increasing credibility through increasing use and thus provide the framework for an evolving rule of law.

It is in America's deepest interest, even in the short run, to continue on the path of delegitimizing war and the unilateral use of military force in relations among states, and to lead the way to worldwide acceptance of this view. This requires that Washington and its allies do better than they have so far in the Middle East and elsewhere, not only in contesting overt interstate aggression but also in dealing with underlying causes of conflict. This is the aim that should inform U.S. military and diplomatic policies, and the U.S. government must persuade others of its primacy. This is the essence of the new international order that the end of the Cold War makes possible.

V

What of the role of nuclear weapons in this new order? Against what kinds of threats might they be useful? What interests would the United States judge to be so vital that nuclear weapons would be critical and credible for their defense? What threat could even pose the possibility of their use for deterrence?

In our view, it is hard to see any near-term need at all for those of the United States. It is hard to imagine any more

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

serious threats for France, Germany or the other countries of western Europe than that posed last year by Saddam Hussein, to which nuclear weapons were incredible as a deterrent and therefore irrelevant. As for the Soviet Union and China, it is implausible that either could use such weapons effectively to deal with its internal problems. And by comparison with those problems, all other threats pale, including even that of one attacking the other.

But so long as these states retain nuclear weapons, each may see them as useful in the narrowest deterrent role: to make sure that no other nuclear weapons state is tempted to attack them. In the changed world, however, the weight of international opinion, both official and public, against any use of nuclear weapons will be stronger than it has been, and the inhibitions on the use of nuclear weapons against states without nuclear arms will be stronger still.

But two states do face near or medium-term threats to their existence for which they might judge nuclear weapons credible deterrents or responses: Pakistan and Israel. The former is already seriously outgunned by India with conventional weapons, and the latter faces the near certainty of being so some years hence by the Arab states, which together have many times Israel's population, much higher birth rates and oil wealth to boot. While nuclear weapons may not be as useful for "war-fighting," given the development of "smart" technologies for delivery of conventional ordnance, nor as credible as deterrents as they were believed to be some years ago, it is implausible that Israel will not insist on retaining them as weapons of last resort, absent a resolution of its fundamental security problem. This may be true for Pakistan as well. Its leaders are likely at least to keep open the option of acquiring nuclear capabilities quickly should India do so, or should hostilities with India seem close. In both of these cases probably only international action could resolve the underlying conflicts or contain them below the level at which they lead to war. Nuclear capability, actual or potential, cannot be relied on to keep the peace.

VI

But a world free of nuclear weapons is at best a distant prospect. The five declared nuclear powers will each wish to keep some weapons as long as any of the others do. Further all or most will claim the necessity for keeping some weapons as a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hedge against the uncertainties of the status of "threshold" states and the possibilities of "breakout"—open deployment of nuclear weapons by one or more of them. The current deployments, however, particularly of the United States and the Soviet Union, are absurdly large and negotiations for reductions have been ridiculously slow. All the purposes that these weapons can conceivably serve could be met by forces no more, and perhaps less, than one-twentieth their current size.

To begin with, the more than 25,000 tactical warheads that both powers together deploy could be almost entirely dismantled. Many thousands are based in Europe, where their presence no longer serves any military or political purpose and where their use would destroy much of both eastern and western Europe. These weapons were developed and deployed in Europe in response to the Soviet Union's achieving the capacity to deliver a devastating nuclear attack against the United States. This led to a growing belief in NATO that the United States could not and would not respond to air attack by Warsaw Pact conventional forces against NATO Europe by immediately "unleashing" the Strategic Air Command. Hence, the birth of the concept of initiating nuclear action with the use of tactical or theater nuclear weapons.

Although no responsible political or military figure ever came up with a truly convincing explanation of how nuclear weapons might be used in Europe without unacceptable risks of catastrophic escalation, the possibility of their use could not be totally discounted.

Not surprisingly, NATO's deployment of theater nuclear weapons came to mean all things to all men. To those fearful that a strategic nuclear exchange would destroy the United States, it offered the hope that war in Europe might be deterred by the prospect of Warsaw Pact forces suffering unacceptable punishment, but without escalation to a strategic nuclear exchange. To those mainly concerned about the devastating consequences of any European war—mainly the Europeans themselves—theater nuclear weapons offered the prospect of coupling: making escalation from the use of conventional forces to the engagement of strategic forces by the superpowers sufficiently credible that Soviet leadership would be deterred from actions that might lead to conventional war. With these differences in beliefs and hopes about how nuclear weapons might be used, possible modifications in NATO force posture, whether as a result of Western initiative or

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in response to actions by the Soviet Union, inevitably have had divisive effects within the alliance. Hence, the controversies about the "neutron bomb," intermediate-range nuclear forces and futile American efforts to get the Europeans to increase their conventional forces and defense expenditures.

With the end of the threat of a devastating Warsaw Pact attack against western Europe, the rationale for NATO's theater nuclear weapons has disappeared. It is clear that all such weapons should be withdrawn from Europe. In fact we see no case for their deployment or retention anywhere, much less for the development of new ones.

This includes tactical nuclear weapons deployed on naval ships and nuclear bombs designed for antisubmarine warfare. The Soviets currently deploy some 6,000 of these, the United States perhaps half as many. The U.S. navy has so far strongly resisted Soviet requests to bring naval weapons into the discussions on nuclear arms control. Yet it has begun unilaterally to retire some of its naval antiaircraft and antisubmarine weapons. Moreover, the U.S. navy is organized around large carriers that are highly vulnerable to Soviet nuclear-armed antiship missiles. The Soviet navy has only one such vessel, and it does not play a central role in Soviet naval strategy. The U.S. navy is beginning to recognize that the tactical denuclearization of the seas may be to its advantage.

Turning to the disposition of strategic nuclear weapons, we must recognize the particular interpretation of deterrence embodied in the structure and targeting doctrine of U.S. strategic forces. The highest priority target has been the other side's strategic forces, both offensive and defensive, rather than the hundred-odd urban-industrial centers critical to the functioning of a modern society. Many military targets other than strategic forces further lengthen this target list. Our limited information about Soviet targeting suggests that they have a similar concept of deterrence. Thus the forces on both sides have been structured and targeted as first-strike or war-fighting forces. The proponents of this force structure have seen it as essential to providing "extended deterrence": deterrence of any Soviet military action against the West, not only a nuclear attack.

All strategic arms control negotiations with the Soviets have been conducted within this framework. An exemplary 1988 study illustrates how such thinking is reflected in consideration

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of arms reduction and force posture questions.[3] The authors estimate that with reduction of U.S. strategic warheads from 12,000 to 6,000 the United States could still destroy 1,500 to 2,000 Soviet targets in a retaliatory strike. Such a strike, in addition to eliminating these military targets, would kill tens of millions of civilians and reduce the economic and social order to chaos.

In common with most of the American establishment, the study's authors view this as adequate for deterrence, indeed, as being essentially as dissuasive as our present force of twice that number. But when postures involving the retention of "only" 3,000 warheads for each side are considered, consensus within the establishment splinters. The study simply notes that at those levels the outcomes of nuclear exchange calculations become quite sensitive to specific details of force posture assumptions. Consistent with this caution, others have noted that reductions by both sides to these levels "would require costly investment in mobility, higher alert rates for submarines, and inland basing of strategic bombers." And some even conclude that such reductions would be to Soviet advantage.

We believe such concerns are seriously flawed, as are weapons acquisition policies rationalized on these premises. Confronted with plausible crises, we do not believe American or Soviet leaders would have made—or would in the future make—different decisions if either or both nations had only what many have characterized as "minimal" deterrent forces: forces of a size and structure that would permit the destruction of, say, a dozen rather than thousands of targets in a retaliatory attack. Thus we do not see how commitment to forces capable of inflicting higher levels of destruction can offer American presidents politically exploitable military capabilities.

The acceptance of such "requirements" has given too much influence on American policy to those committed to them, and to the continued buildup and virtually unlimited modernization of strategic forces. These are points that clearly troubled both Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy as they became aware of U.S. air force planning in 1960–61.

We earlier noted President Truman's statement that nuclear war could not be a possible policy for a rational man. A few

[3]Michael May, George F. Bing and John D. Steinbruner, *Strategic Arms Reductions*, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

years later, in 1954—the same year of his famous public "massive retaliation" speech—Secretary of State John Foster Dulles observed within government councils that "the increased destructiveness of nuclear weapons and the approach of effective atomic parity are creating a situation in which general war would threaten the destruction of Western civilization and of the Soviet regime, and in which national objectives could not be obtained through a general war even if a military victory were won."

These points have, or should have, troubled all succeeding presidents and secretaries of state. President Reagan expressed the same view when he said that a nuclear war could never be won and therefore must never be fought. Yet this nation has continued to premise its war plans and procure its forces on the need for substantial counterforce nuclear capabilities. This was a significant factor in keeping the Cold War alive, and has been excessively dangerous—a point driven home particularly in the last several years as we have come to understand better the extent of misperception and miscalculation that characterized various Soviet-American confrontations, particularly the Cuban missile crisis.

Continuing with such planning—and with force acquisition based on it—now seems absurd. With the Cold War over, it suggests that U.S. strategic thinking remains chained to obsolete doctrines: that as a nation we are incapable of reacting intelligently to changes in the world scene.

The most seriously discussed alternative has been the aforementioned concept of "minimum deterrence." There have been many efforts to define strategic force postures consistent with the concept, going back at least to the Eisenhower administration when Donald Quarles, secretary of the air force and deputy secretary of defense, asked the question: "How much is enough?" Robert McNamara suggested early in the 1960s during the Kennedy administration that an ability to destroy in retaliation 20–25 percent of the Soviet population and 50 percent of its industrial capacity, something achievable with the delivery on the order of 100 one-megaton weapons, was surely an upper bound. McGeorge Bundy, national security adviser to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, wrote in 1969 that much lower damage levels might suffice: "In the real world of real political leaders . . . a decision that would bring even one hydrogen bomb on one city of one's own country would be recognized in advance as a catastrophic blunder; ten

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bombs on ten cities would be a disaster beyond history; and a hundred bombs on a hundred cities are unthinkable."[4]

Force requirements for "minimum deterrence" depend on how vulnerable those forces are to preemptive attack. This point, too, has been much discussed. Herbert York, the first director of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, has examined this question in light of the inevitable uncertainty about the weight of preemptive attack. He suggests that, assuming serious but feasible efforts to minimize the vulnerability of retaliatory forces, somewhere in the neighborhood of 100 weapons might be about right for each side.[5]

Although we have no quarrel with this estimate, nor with most of the other discussions of minimum deterrence in the last three decades, the size of the force required for the purpose depends on the size of others' nuclear forces. Moreover all of this discussion has been premised on a need for deterrence of attack by the Soviet Union that now seems among the least worrisome of imaginable threats to our society. If, as General Powell suggests, our only significant enemies are now North Korea and Cuba, we have no immediate military need for strategic nuclear forces for deterrence beyond that required for deterrence of nuclear attack by other nuclear powers. Looking ahead we see no military need whatsoever for any modernization of U.S. strategic forces for at least the remainder of this century, assuming that the Soviets follow similar policies.

VII

The question we must address is how to proceed from here to our ultimate objective. It is clear that the objective will never be reached by the tedious and seemingly interminable process of negotiation on which the superpowers have relied so far. Reductions to levels of, say, 1,000 warheads on each side, could be achieved by a series of unilateral actions, what in a lost hopeful moment twenty years ago was called the process of "mutual example." With both sides continuing to adhere to the antiballistic missile treaty, the United States could announce that it would decommission a certain number of missiles and

[4]McGeorge Bundy, "To Cap the Volcano," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1969, p. 10.

[5]Herbert York, "Remarks About Minimum Deterrence," a paper presented to a workshop on "The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Year 2000," held at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Oct. 22–24, 1990.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bombers, and disassemble their warheads within a fixed period, half to be done immediately, the other half when the Soviets undertook a reciprocal action.

At these proposed levels of warhead numbers, effective strategic equivalence does not require equality or near equality in numbers of the opposing forces. It requires only that each side recognize that the other can inflict unacceptable damage in a retaliatory strike. Equivalence is thus not a line, but a band of considerable width. Thus from 1965 to 1980, although U.S. strategic nuclear forces far outnumbered those of the Soviets and were qualitatively superior in many ways, they were strategically equivalent. President Gorbachev's understanding of the width of the band of equivalence led him to accept the disproportionately large reductions in Soviet forces relative to those of the United States in the INF and START treaties. Thus the process of reciprocal unilateral reductions could go forward without risk of meaningful strategic imbalance.

Similarly the United States can dispense with modernizing the remaining weapons. They are already efficacious enough to serve the residual function of minimum deterrence of the use of nuclear weapons by any state against the United States or its allies, which is all that we can ask or expect of them. Simply getting on with reductions and foregoing modernization is at least as likely to have a salutary effect in inducing emulation, not only by the Soviet Union but by the other nuclear powers. It is a better example than prolonged negotiations, which give the impression that the United States—which has had the most experience with them—continues to believe that nuclear forces offer such military and political advantage as to justify quibbling over the arcane details of force posture. At some point—perhaps in the neighborhood of 1,000 U.S. and Soviet warheads—France, the United Kingdom and China would have to be drawn into the reduction process if it were to continue.

There are several reasons why it is desirable to reduce the number of nuclear weapons even further. Perhaps the most basic is the fundamental immorality of relying on the threat of death and destruction to civilians and the urban fabric of civilization on the scale that even a few tens of modern nuclear weapons would produce. Such a strike would put at risk not only the citizens of the nuclear powers involved but millions of citizens of even distant nonbelligerent states affected by the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fallout of radiation, as Chernobyl made clear. The world has lived with a similar immorality ever since Germany and then Britain and the United States relied on air attack of cities as a major instrument of war. But the basic point remains and at bottom reflects the deeper moral difficulty of relying on war as an instrument of state policy.

There are more pragmatic reasons for seeking to continue the process of nuclear disarmament. First is the simple calculation that reducing the number and variety of weapons and the geographic breadth of their deployment reduces the probability of their accidental or unauthorized use. At any level of effort devoted to ensuring the central control and security of deployed weapons, the fewer there are, the less the probability of failure.

Second is the influence of the size and growth of the weapons stockpiles of the nuclear weapons states on the acceptance by the others of their nonnuclear status. Those states that have refused to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty have always justified their refusal by the asymmetry of obligation between the recognized nuclear weapons states and all others. The more the asymmetry is diminished the more likely it is that nonproliferation can achieve the status of an acceptable international regime. This too will require the involvement in the disarmament process of all the nuclear powers, not just the United States and the Soviet Union.

VIII

If there is no need for most of the world's nuclear weapons, nor for their modernization, it seems obvious that there is not much of a case for continued nuclear weapons testing or for the production of fissionable materials. The only remaining argument for continued testing—and it seems to us an argument of last resort—is that of safety. The United States has some weapons in its stockpile that are overly susceptible to accidental detonation, and some experts claim that further testing is required so that these faulty systems can be replaced with new, safer weapons. With reductions on the scale we envisage, however, these more worrisome weapons can be eliminated without replacement.

We strongly advocate that the United States go along with the rest of the world—Washington and London are now the only clear holdouts—to extend the proscription of the present test-ban treaty to include underground testing. The vigorous

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

underground test programs of the United States and the Soviet Union under the present treaty have made it almost a sham as regards arms control—though useful as an environmental protection measure. Consummating a comprehensive test-ban treaty could have some direct effect on nuclear weapons proliferation. Parties to it could still develop simple fission weapons. But without testing, such development would be somewhat more difficult and for thermonuclear and other sophisticated weapons probably impossible. We favor consummation of a comprehensive test ban treaty mainly because weapons testing has been so symbolic of the nuclear arms race—we might say symbolic of America's commitment to nuclear madness. Perhaps more than any other single action, a comprehensive test-ban treaty would signal both domestically and internationally the rejection of nuclear weaponry as a basis for security.

If the United States is prepared to do all this, why should it not lead or at least join others in a move for the abolition of all nuclear weapons? One of the standard arguments against this has been that notwithstanding undertakings to get rid of nuclear weapons, others might retain a few. The other is that even a world free of nuclear weapons would be intolerably unstable because in a crisis, or even at the hint of a crisis, the parties involved would be driven to develop, stockpile and perhaps use new weapons. The knowledge of how to make nuclear weapons is something from which we cannot escape. Both these points have merit, but focusing on them invites the search for a technical fix that will provide a way around them. There can be none.

This is all the more valid in that technological developments, aside from those in nuclear weaponry, have meant that increases in our destructive abilities have so outpaced whatever increases there have been in the resilience of our social infrastructures that war with modern weapons has to be seen as an increasingly unacceptable means for dealing with differences. And so we cannot emphasize too strongly the importance of seizing the moment—certainly the best opportunity since World War II—to work on reducing motivations for the use of force to deal with the world's problems, to try to realize the promise of the U.N. charter and to establish an international rule of law.

We should view getting rid of nuclear weapons as something facilitated by that larger effort. To the extent we succeed in that approach, getting rid of them will be easier, but less important.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A New International Perspective . . .



ISBN 0-309-04392-1; 1991, 412 pages, 6 x 9, index, hardbound, $34.95

FINDING COMMON GROUND

U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment

National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine

This new volume provides a policy outline and specific steps for an urgently needed re-vamping of U.S. and multilateral export controls in light of the dramatic change in East-West relations (including the dissolution of the Warsaw pact) and growing threats of nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile proliferation, and state-sponsored terrorism.

Detach and return to: National Academy Press, 2101 Constitution Ave., NW, P.O. Box 285, Washington, D.C. 20055

Please send me ____ copy(ies) of **Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment**. All orders must be prepaid. Please add $3.00 for shipping and handling.

To order by phone using VISA/MasterCard/American Express, call toll-free 1-800-624-6242. Call (202) 334-3313 in the Washington metropolitan area.

☐ I am enclosing a check for $_____

☐ Please bill my: _____ VISA ____ MasterCard

____ American Express.

Card Number:_____

Expiration Date: _____

Signature:_____

Name _____

Address _____

_____

City _____State _____ ZIP Code _____

FA

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BRASSEY'S

A Macmillan Publishing Co.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

THE ANNUAL REVIEW OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS 1991

By the Centre for European Policy Studies
ISBN 0-08-041513-7 Softcover
$59.95 September

SETTING EC PRIORITIES 1991–92

By the Centre for European Policy Studies
ISBN 0-08-040969-5 Softcover
$39.95 September

THE ALMANAC OF TRANSATLANTIC POLITICS: 1991–1992

By Matthew Cossolotto
ISBN 0-08-035978-7 Hardcover
$45.00 Now Available
ISBN 0-08-035979-5 Softcover
$32.00 Now Available

GERMAN UNIFICATION IN EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

Edited by Wolfgang Heisenburg
ISBN 0-08-041339-0 Hardcover
$56.00 September

MILITARY HISTORY

PAYBACK: AMERICA'S LONG WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST

By John K. Cooley
ISBN 0-08-040564-9 Hardcover
$19.95 October

GOD'S SAMURAI: LEAD PILOT AT PEARL HARBOR

By Gordon W. Prange et al.
ISBN 0-08-057440-9 Hardcover
$21.95 Available
ISBN 0-08-057441-7 Softcover
$11.95 October

THE WAY IT WAS: PEARL HARBOR—THE ORIGINAL PHOTOGRAPHS

By Donald M. Goldstein et al.
ISBN 0-08-040573-8 Hardcover
$29.95 September

THE CERTAIN TRUMPET: MAXWELL TAYLOR & THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN VIETNAM

By Douglas Kinnard
ISBN 0-08-040581-9 Hardcover
$22.95 September

THE STORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

By Henry Steele Commager
ISBN 0-08-041066-9 Hardcover
$23.95 October

YANK: THE STORY OF WORLD WAR II AS WRITTEN BY THE SOLDIERS

By the Staff of YANK
ISBN 0-08-041067-7 Softcover
$15.95 November

NEWSMEN & NATIONAL DEFENSE: IS CONFLICT INEVITABLE?

Edited by Lloyd J. Matthews
ISBN 0-08-040585-1 Hardcover
$30.00 October
ISBN 0-08-041065-0 Softcover
$11.95 October

GREAT SIEGES OF HISTORY

By William Seymour
ISBN 0-08-057696-7 Hardcover
$34.00 November

WARS IN AFGHANISTAN: WHAT BRITAIN GAVE UP AND THE SOVIET UNION LOST

By Edgar O'Ballance
ISBN 0-08-040722-6 Hardcover
$35.95 November

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: WAR CORRESPONDENT 1895–1900

Edited by Frederick Woods
ISBN 0-08-041331-5 Hardcover
$27.50 October

ALWAYS HOME: 50 YEARS OF THE USO— THE OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPHIC HISTORY

By Frank Coffey
ISBN 0-08-040576-2 Hardcover
$29.95 September

DEFENSE ANALYSIS

REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: RESTORING THE RULE OF LAW IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

By Robert F. Turner
ISBN 0-08-037435-2 Hardcover
$25.00 September

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

By Anthony H. Cordesman
ISBN 0-08-040989-X Hardcover
$44.95 Now Available

FAITH IN G.O.D.S.: STABILITY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

By Stanley Orman
ISBN 0-08-040979-2 Hardcover
$35.95 September

THE MILITARY BALANCE: 1991–1992

By the International Institute for Strategic Studies
ISBN 0-08-041324-2 Hardcover
$67.95 October

PSYCHOLOGY

THE FANATICS: A BEHAVIOURAL APPROACH TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE

By Maxwell Taylor
ISBN 0-08-036274-5 Hardcover
$29.95 September

Prices subject to change

ORDERS

Call Toll-Free:
1-800-257-5755

Or Mail to:

Macmillan Distribution Center,
Attn: Book Order Dept.,
100 Front St., Box 500,.
Riverside, NJ 08075-7500

The Leading Publisher in Foreign Policy, Defense & International Affairs

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Keith Richburg

BACK TO VIETNAM

With the State Department's announcement this year of a new "road map" for eventual normalization of relations with the communist government in Hanoi, the Bush administration appears to be inching slowly, if reluctantly, toward the formulation of a new U.S. policy toward Vietnam. The new approach attempts to look forward rather than back. More than 16 years after the fall of Saigon, such change is long overdue.

Since the end of the war in Indochina, U.S. policy toward Vietnam has been guided mainly by hostility and lingering resentment. The United States has had no diplomatic relations with Vietnam despite the fact that the communist government would appear to have met any suggested criteria for qualifying as the de facto rulers of a legitimate nation-state. Instead the United States lists Vietnam as one of a handful of "enemy" countries, along with Cuba and North Korea, that are barred from receiving American aid, investments, exports or credit.

The Bush administration also has followed the lead of its predecessors in blocking Vietnam's attempts to receive international assistance from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, although for most economists Hanoi's monetary reforms appear to meet IMF preconditions to receive lending.

The stated reason for this continued policy of hostility is Cambodia; on Christmas Day, 1978, Vietnam invaded its small neighbor, toppled the murderous regime of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge and installed in its place a more pliant communist regime of pro-Vietnamese Cambodian defectors. The rationale for the American policy was strategic—that is, just weeks before the invasion, all senior Vietnamese leaders traveled to Moscow to sign a 15-year treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union, giving the Kremlin a new foothold in the Southeast Asian mainland and turning Vietnam, in the prevailing view of

---

Keith Richburg is on leave from *The Washington Post* as journalist-in-residence at the East-West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the time, into a new Soviet "satellite" that threatened regional stability.

The Bush administration now appears to be moving to close the chapter on the Vietnam War by striking out with a more imaginative policy that takes into account the lessening of East-West tensions while recognizing Indochina's continuing importance to American interests in Southeast Asia. But the underlying premise of the administration's current plan shows less American farsightedness than initial press reports suggested. The so-called road map toward normalization would still hold U.S. relations with Vietnam hostage to a solution in Cambodia. And even with the June agreement for a Cambodian ceasefire and the pledge by the four warring factions to stop receiving foreign military aid, it still appears unlikely that the remaining obstacles to a full-fledged peace can be resolved anytime soon.

A policy that continues to link America's relations with Vietnam to an outcome in Cambodia ignores the fact that Washington has its own interests in forming new ties with Hanoi. The global and regional realities that shaped and guided earlier Indochina policy have shifted. With the end of the Cold War and Vietnam's near-desperate efforts to make an "opening to the West" to revive its moribund economy, the principal objective has been met. The Vietnamese are no longer the menacing "Cubans of Asia," as former Secretary of State Alexander Haig once deemed them.[1] The once-strong Soviet-Vietnamese partnership is already severed, as Moscow has served notice that it will drastically reduce aid to its former client. A strategic vacuum exists that America can now move to fill.

II

The current U.S. Indochina policy has its roots in the latter half of the Carter administration, when the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia left the White House embroiled in its own brand of bureaucratic warfare.

One side of the policy divide was argued by Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser who, mindful of the larger East-West rivalry, sought to enlist China as a strategic

[1]Haig, *Caveat,* New York: Macmillan, 1983.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

*Fortunately, **you** can get the tool for intelligent thought delivered straight to your door—and at a 33% savings.*

Some people would do anything for balanced, penetrating analysis of world events. But all you need to do is subscribe to FOREIGN POLICY.

This acclaimed quarterly takes you to the front lines of world events, from global trade to global warming...diplomatic relations to political revolutions. Engaging and enlightening, FOREIGN POLICY puts you in touch with the world's movers, shakers and policy-shapers—high caliber thinkers who explore the truth beyond the propaganda. That's why it's read by political leaders, journalists, scholars and executives around the world.

Don't miss out on the essentials



"To understand international affairs, yet not to read FOREIGN POLICY, is *not* to understand."
—Bernard Shaw, CNN

Order now and we'll deliver a year of FOREIGN POLICY to your door for just $19.95—a 33% savings off the newsstand price.

FOREIGN POLICY
The tool for intelligent thought.

Send with payment to
FOREIGN POLICY,
P.O. Box 2104,
Knoxville, IA 50198-2104.

Yes, I want a year of FOREIGN POLICY—at 33% off the cover price

- ☐ One year (four quarterly issues) $19.95.
- ☐ Two years $33.50. Save even more!
- ☐ My check or money order is enclosed.
- ☐ Bill to my ☐ Visa ☐ Master Card ☐ American Express ☐ Discover

Account # _____ Exp. Date _____

Signature _____

☐ Bill me. $_____ 5A243

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Oxford



New edition!

World Development Report 1991

THE WORLD BANK

Now in its fourteenth annual edition, the **World Development Report 1991** is an essential reference on the world economy and the state of social and economic development. Assessing the experience of developing as well as industrial countries to delineate major factors that contribute to development, this edition addresses policy and analytical issues in the areas of human resource development, openness, competition and technology, microeconomic dynamism, macroeconomic sustainability, and the appropriate role of the state. Drawing on lessons in these areas, the 1991 **Report** explores reform, external assistance, and development possibilities for the 1990s. A timely survey and synthesis of contemporary economic issues worldwide, the **World Development Report 1991** is invaluable to readers and policymakers concerned with economic development, international economics, and international politics.

1991 344 pp.; illus. paper $16.95 cloth $32.95

Price and publication date are subject to change.
To order send check or money order to:

Oxford University Press

Humanities and Social Sciences Marketing
200 Madison Avenue • New York, NY 10016

Europe's boldest intellectual and President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development paints a searing portrait of the next millennium—and of America's destiny



MILLENNIUM

"This startlingly fresh and sometimes maddeningly provocative book—a description of the future by one of the men who will make it—is required reading for anyone seriously interested in politics, culture, and finance."
— Walter Russell Mead, author of *Mortal Splendor: The American Empire in Transition*

"Outstanding...clear and challenging." —*Publishers Weekly*

At bookstores everywhere, or call toll-free 1-800-733-3000

TIMES BOOKS
RANDOM HOUSE

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

partner in an alliance against Moscow.[2] Opposing this perspective was Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, who believed that for too long U.S. foreign policy had failed to understand "the explosive forces of change in the developing world."[3]

Vance became interested early in establishing diplomatic relations with Vietnam, but his hopes were dashed when the Vietnamese obstinately insisted in 1977 that the United States pay billions of dollars in war "reparations." By 1978, the Vietnamese had dropped that aid demand as a precondition for normalization, belatedly recognizing that the mood in the United States had changed and that Americans who had taken to the streets to protest the war were less interested in helping Vietnam rebuild. Hanoi's realization came too late; Washington was already losing interest. The Vietnamese were informed that the "window" for normalization would open only after the November vote that year.[4]

Hanoi was clearly impatient. Tired of waiting for the U.S. administration and anxious to press ahead with its Cambodian invasion according to its own secret timetable, Hanoi sent most of the Vietnamese politburo to Moscow on November 3, 1978, to sign a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. The ongoing U.S.-Vietnamese talks on normalization were formally ended when Hanoi sent tanks and troops into Cambodia, culmination of a long-brewing border war between Vietnam and Cambodia that began soon after the communist victories in 1975.

Most of the complex background to that conflict was lost in the initial, startled reaction to Vietnam's invasion, which the West and the noncommunist governments in the region viewed as proof of Hanoi's "aggressive" intentions in the region. Flush from its victory over the American forces, Vietnam was seen as a "rogue elephant" about to go stampeding across Southeast Asia, encompassing not only Cambodia but also Thailand and the Malaysian peninsula.

The Carter administration was left with the question of how to respond. The Chinese had already begun a massive military resupply of the defeated Khmer Rouge forces, who were

[2]Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser (1977–1981)*, New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983. Also, for a full account of the evolution of the China policy under the Carter administration, see Nayan Chanda, *Brother Enemy: The War After the War*, New York: Collier Books, 1986.

[3]Vance, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in American Foreign Policy*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983, p. 23. Also see Chanda, *op. cit.*

[4]Author's interview with Richard Holbrooke, former assistant secretary of state for East Asia, February 1991.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

starting to regroup in the mountains of western Cambodia. And a senior colonel in Thailand's military intelligence unit had traveled to Paris to convince an aging former Cambodian prime minister, Son Sann, to launch an active noncommunist "third force" resistance movement with Thai help. Son Sann dispatched a former Cambodian brigade commander from the Lon Nol arm, General Dien Del, to the Thai-Cambodian border with instructions to try forming an anti-Vietnamese guerrilla army out of the dozen small anticommunist guerrilla bands then scattered along the frontier.[5]

One option was for Washington to embark on a major campaign to arm and support the noncommunists, who were already asking for enough matériel to field a force of a hundred thousand fighters. But the mood in Washington at the time was against any major U.S. recommitment to Indochina, particularly of a military nature. "It was only a few years after the Vietnam War had terminated," Vance recalled later in an interview. "Some thought it would be a mistake to get involved again. I thought it would be a mistake."[6]

In addition the noncommunists were viewed skeptically as relics of the past. Both Son Sann and the other leading resistance figure, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, were considered too unpredictable to warrant serious support. Son Sann's army was composed mostly of fighters from the discredited Lon Nol regime, while Sihanouk, then still aligned with the Khmer Rouge, was given to anti-American outbursts and had at best a questionable commitment to democracy.

The defeat in Vietnam also had seriously impaired American intelligence-gathering capabilities. Reconnaissance planes in the region had been relocated, and the United States had virtually no assets on the ground. "All methods of surveillance had diminished," one former White House staffer said. "The birds weren't in place."[7]

When Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency in 1981, the new secretary of state, Alexander Haig, like Brzezinski before

[5]This account of the formation of the KPNLF is based on the author's interview with General Dien Del, founder of the Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces, in Aranyaprathet, Thailand, in January 1991, and also based on interviews with KPNLF officials in Bangkok who asked not to be identified by name. The account of General Chovolit Yongchaiyudh's trip to Paris was confirmed by another retired Thai general who served on the National Security Council at the time.

[6]Author's telephone interview with former Secretary Vance in March, 1991.

[7]Author's interview with Michel Oksenberg, University of Michigan professor and former National Security Council staff member.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

him, saw the Soviet Union as the ultimate source of most problems in the Third World, and he repeatedly linked Cambodia, Afghanistan, Angola and Central America as pointing to a grand pattern of "Soviet aggressiveness" around the globe.[8]

In the years since Hanoi had signed its friendship treaty with Moscow, the Soviets—as their quid pro quo—began building up their air and naval forces at Cam Ranh Bay, near Danang. Soviet MiG-23 jets gave Moscow a new striking capability in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea, while access to the base for refueling and repair allowed them to reach the Indian Ocean in half the time it took from Vladivostok.

China viewed the Soviet buildup in Asia with growing alarm and also began deriding the Vietnamese as the "Cubans of Asia." On his first foray into the region in the summer of 1981, Secretary Haig echoed Chinese fears. "U.S. and Chinese perceptions of the international situation have never been closer," Haig said in Beijing.[9]

In fact Beijing's and Washington's objectives in Indochina were extremely far apart. The Chinese in 1981 wanted to keep the Khmer Rouge as a viable fighting force to pressure the Vietnamese to negotiate with Pol Pot. China had already opened a steady supply line to the Khmer Rouge, using Chinese freighters to send arms to Thailand's Sattahip naval base on the Gulf of Siam. Beijing had rebuilt Pol Pot's fighting strength from 20,000 guerrillas just after the Vietnamese invasion to 40,000 two years later. The Khmer Rouge had also been able to rebuild its civil administrative structure, using food and medical relief assistance to restore its decimated reception and distribution systems in camps along the border and in other parts of Cambodia under its control.[10]

Washington's stated policy at the time was never to allow the Khmer Rouge to return to power, and preferably for it not to have any say in a future Cambodian government. Behind the scenes, the Reagan administration increased Washington's commitment to the noncommunists, supplying up to $5 mil-

[8]Haig, from the transcript of his June 14, 1981, banquet toast in Beijing, and June 16, 1981, news conference in Beijing, as reprinted in *Department of State Bulletin*, vol. 81, no. 2053, August 1981.

[9]*Ibid.*

[10]Steve Heder, "Democratic Kampuchea: The Regime's Post-Mortem," in *Indochina Issues*, January 1981.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lion a year in nonlethal aid to the guerrillas. Arms for the noncommunists came from China, and also from Singapore, whose prime minister, Lee Kwan Yew, was one of the most staunchly anticommunist leaders in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

In comparison with its support for the insurgencies in Nicaragua and Afghanistan, White House backing for the Cambodian noncommunists was surprisingly modest. This reflected both timidity at getting too deeply involved in a potentially controversial entanglement in a dangerous region as well as fear that an overly independent course might antagonize China, which initially was suspicious of the administration because of Reagan's early support for Taiwan. This policy would later become a source of anger for the noncommunists, who would complain that Washington never gave them the massive backing needed to turn their fledgling forces into an effective anti-Vietnamese resistance.

The Reagan administration thus chose not to strike out on its own with a Cambodia policy independent of Beijing's. A separate policy might have allowed Washington to play the role of broker between Hanoi and Beijing. Instead the United States was cast in the unlikely role of China's handmaiden in Southeast Asia, pursuing Deng Xiaoping's "Pol Pot strategy."

III

While the Cambodian conflict continued as a military and political stalemate for most of the last decade, and while U.S. policy remained relatively consistent, the later years of the 1980s saw several fundamental shifts by key actors that would ultimately begin to untangle the Southeast Asian quagmire and pose new challenges for Washington.

The most dramatic shift came in the Soviet Union when Mikhail Gorbachev became the Communist Party general secretary and began his program of economic and political restructuring. In foreign policy Gorbachev showed a new willingness to scrap the Brezhnev Doctrine and to enter into negotiations to settle nettlesome regional conflicts. In July 1986, at Vladivostok, Gorbachev announced his willingness to restore relations with China and to negotiate to ease the sources of tension in Asia, thus opening the way for talks on Cambodia.

In response to Gorbachev's overtures, Deng listed three "conditions" for improvement of Sino-Soviet relations: re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

moval of Soviet forces from Mongolia and settlements of the long-running conflicts in Afghanistan and Cambodia. By late 1988, when the Chinese foreign minister made his historic first visit to Moscow, the Chinese apparently relaxed the latter two obstacles, adopting the position that those two conflicts need not be entirely settled, but only that serious efforts be engaged to resolve them.

China-watchers at the time marked a gradual evolution in Beijing's position on Cambodia and in the Chinese leadership's staunch support of the Khmer Rouge. Whereas past official statements seemed essentially apologetic about the Khmer Rouge and its history of atrocities, by the end of the 1980s Beijing recognized that Sihanouk should lead an interim coalition government and that none of the competing factions should dominate it. The Chinese in this context also committed themselves to cutting off aid to the Khmer Rouge as part of any settlement, although Beijing's sincerity in that pledge has yet to be tested.

Vietnam, too, appeared to make a dramatic shift in its thinking on Cambodia, in this case after the December 1986 Communist Party congress. At that session Vietnam's three most senior politburo figures stepped aside, allowing for the evolution of a reform-minded leadership under the newly named secretary general, Nguyen Van Linh. That congress put Vietnam on the path to economic reform, recognizing that the mismanagement of the past was in large measure responsible for the country's desperate economic plight, and pledging to adopt new measures designed to encourage private business activity and to attract foreign investment.

Political reforms in Vietnam have been more tenuous. This reflects the regime's dilemma in trying, on the one hand, to liberalize political life while, on the other, remaining unwilling to tolerate any opposition to the Communist Party's monopolistic hold on power. This contradiction was repeated at the most recent June 1991 congress, where the new party secretary general, Do Muoi, called reform "an irreversible process" even while reaffirming that socialism "is the only correct path."

As part of the regime's campaign of glasnost—called "doi moi," or renovation—political debate has been loosened considerably and the press has become more tenacious in exposing cases of official corruption. But in the area of multiparty pluralism and democratization, the regime has remained firm: "democracy" would be centralized and the party would main-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tain its monopoly on power. Hanoi viewed the collapse of the communist regimes in eastern Europe in 1989 as a major crisis and instituted a period of conservative retrenchment that continues today. Thus even with the most recent leadership changes that have brought a younger, more technocratically skilled leadership to the forefront, the party is still likely to continue downplaying political reform while continuing to liberalize the economy.

On Cambodia, however, the reform window brought a new diplomatic flexibility. From a long-held position of calling the situation inside Cambodia "irreversible" and refusing to negotiate, the longtime Vietnamese foreign minister, Nguyen Co Thach, shifted to a more accommodating view in his public statements to the Western press. By 1989 Vietnam was announcing that it would withdraw all of its combat troops from Cambodia by the end of the year; Hanoi even moved up the timetable, staging the "final" troop withdrawal that September. The fact that the withdrawal was not immediately met with some reciprocal recognition by the West—either full normalization with the United States or at least a relaxation of the economic embargo—is believed to have severely undercut Thach's position inside the politburo and led to his resignation at the June congress. The new leadership, however, has pledged to continue to try to improve relations with the United States as well as China.

Inside Cambodia the latter half of the 1980s saw more subtle, but equally important, changes. Specifically, the Vietnamese-installed regime of the People's Republic of Kampuchea appeared to begin shedding its image as a Vietnamese "puppet." As Vietnamese advisers began withdrawing, Cambodians increasingly began to take on the responsibilities of governance. And in the person of the young prime minister, Hun Sen, the Cambodian government appeared to be trying to take a more independent, nationalistic line. Journalists who traveled in Cambodia saw a revival of free-wheeling capitalism and a new measure of liberalization, particularly concerning religion, as pagodas reopened and monks reappeared on the streets.

The most significant regional shift of the late 1980s came in Thailand, the "front line" state that had adopted the most hard-line policy against Vietnam's Cambodian adventure and that had basically guided ASEAN's response since the inception of the conflict. After parliamentary elections in the summer of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1988, the incumbent prime minister, General Prem Tinsulanond, stunned Bangkok political analysts by announcing that he would not accept another invitation to form a new government.

Prem's successor was another retired general and diplomat, Chatichai Choonhavan, who immediately began articulating a new, more flexible approach to Indochina. His stated goal was to turn Indochina "from a battlefield to a marketplace." The rationale for the new approach seemed clear: after a decade of record growth Thailand was looking for new markets and new sources of raw materials to continue to fuel its boom. Chatichai and his coterie of young, Western-educated advisers envisioned a new regional alignment in Southeast Asia, with Bangkok serving as the hub of a potentially prosperous new growth sphere that would include not only the three Indochinese states but also Burma.

Under Chatichai's government, Bangkok gradually began to expand its business relationships into Indochina, even while continuing to allow the Khmer Rouge and its two allied noncommunist Cambodian resistance groups to use sanctuary bases on Thai soil. Since the Thai foreign ministry and elements of the powerful military establishment did not agree with Chatichai's policy shifts, Thailand appeared to be following a two-track Indochina policy, supporting the Cambodian resistance while launching new diplomatic initiatives to Phnom Penh.

The most dramatic—and controversial—of Chatichai's new initiatives was his invitation to Hun Sen to visit Bangkok in early 1989. The Cambodian prime minister, long derided by his opponents as a Vietnamese "puppet" and a "quisling," was suddenly treated with all the pomp due a visiting head of government, including dinner on the Oriental Queen yacht. The February 1991 military coup in Thailand ended Chatichai's elected government and signaled a possible shift to a more hard-line position toward both Vietnam and Cambodia.

The other major development was the opening in Indonesia in July 1988 of the first direct peace talks on the Cambodian conflict. The four warring Cambodian factions—the Hun Sen government, the Khmer Rouge and the two noncommunist groups led by Sihanouk and Son Sann—all took part in the talks. Agreeing to participate marked a major concession for the resistance, which previously had insisted that any negoti-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ations would have to be with Vietnam as the occupying power, and not with Hanoi's "puppets" in Phnom Penh.

The three days of talks, held at an ornate palace in the town of Bogor just outside Jakarta, ended in discord, with Khmer Rouge delegate Khieu Samphan blocking attempts to forge a final, joint communique. The Bogor talks nonetheless served at least three useful purposes: they established a formal negotiating framework for all the parties; they sharpened the broad outlines of a possible settlement based on the idea of a four-party power-sharing arrangement backed by an international presence; and they linked, for the first time, the issue of Vietnam's withdrawal with "the prevention of the recurrence of genocidal policies and practices of the Pol Pot regime."

IV

When George Bush took his oath of office on a cold January day in 1989, the transition at first seemed to presage new American thinking on Indochina. In his inaugural address Bush noted that there were Americans missing and unaccounted for in the world and, seemingly extending an olive branch to the nations responsible for their fate, he declared that goodwill begets goodwill.

The central focus of those remarks was the Middle East, where Shiite Muslim extremists still hold seven Americans captive. But Indochina-watchers also read into those remarks a similar reference to Vietnam, as Bush seemed to be holding out the possibility of a new relationship if Hanoi would settle the lingering issue of servicemen missing from the Vietnam War.

On the same day Bush took his oath, Richard Childress, Reagan's outgoing National Security Council staff assistant for Asian affairs, delivered to Congress a long-awaited technical report on the MIA issue. Among other things, it attempted to lay to rest the belief that Americans might still be alive in Indochina. The issue nevertheless retains its emotional and political resonance in the United States and could still be an obstacle.

In the preceding years the Reagan administration had taken steps to defuse the POW/MIA issue. Reagan's appointment of retired General John Vessey as Washington's chief negotiator on the matter, and the agreement to allow for private humanitarian assistance to Vietnam in prosthetics and disability

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

projects, appeared to point to a new period of cooperation on the issue. The number of joint searches of wartime crash sites increased.

In the months after that hopeful beginning, however, the Bush administration's Indochina policy came to be marked more by confusion and misdirection. Specifically on Cambodia—the major obstacle to a new relationship with Hanoi—the administration had inherited a decade-old policy that was becoming increasingly untenable as more and more members of Congress began questioning the wisdom of a position that allied the United States, however indirectly, with the reviled Khmer Rouge.

In the spring of 1989, when Secretary of State James Baker told a congressional committee that the Khmer Rouge was "a fact of life" and had to be included in any Cambodia settlement, he unleashed a torrent of criticism on the Hill. He was only restating what had been the longstanding U.S. position, but it was the first signal that the mood in Washington was shifting and that a new policy was indeed necessary.

Several factors contributed to the changed attitudes in Washington on the Cambodia issue. Vietnam in May 1988 announced plans to withdraw 50,000 of its occupation troops from Cambodia by year's end, with the remainder to be withdrawn before the end of 1989. That new timetable, dictated by Hanoi, hastened efforts to find a negotiated settlement while raising the fear that the Khmer Rouge would step in to fill the void in the event of a unilateral Vietnamese pullout. Increasingly frequent news reports warned that the Khmer Rouge was gaining ground and that cooperation was increasing between the noncommunists and Pol Pot's forces. By 1989 more and more members of Congress and their staffers were making trips into Cambodia. Most came away with the assessment that the Hun Sen government generally appeared in control of the country and had made great strides in rebuilding Cambodia from the devastation left by the Khmer Rouge.[11]

For most of the year the administration appeared to be grappling for a new policy on Indochina. First came the idea, spearheaded by Vice President Quayle, that Washington provide "lethal aid" to the noncommunist resistance to bolster

[11]The mood among congressional staffers was explained to the author by several staff members interviewed in Washington in the fall of 1990.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

their hand in negotiations with the two larger communist factions. That ill-fated venture was soon shelved after running into stiff congressional opposition and warnings from some ASEAN countries, particularly Indonesia, that it would only further inflame the situation.[12] But the "lethal aid" debate served to galvanize members of Congress over the issue and move Cambodia closer to the forefront of the legislative consciousness. Newspapers also began editorializing against the U.S. position in Indochina and suggesting it was time for the administration to begin talking to Hun Sen.

Support for the administration's Indochina policy further eroded following the failure of an international peace conference in Paris in August 1989. It was widely expected that Sihanouk—whom U.S. officials described as "our horse" in the four-sided power struggle—would use the Paris conference to break from his Khmer Rouge allies and find some kind of accommodation with Hun Sen. Instead Sihanouk came across in the Paris talks looking fickle, unpredictable and unable to part company with the mass murderers who had executed several of his own children. Administration "spin doctors" immediately went to work after the collapse of the conference, trying to blame Vietnamese and Cambodian intransigence for the breakdown of the talks. But the damage to Sihanouk's reputation was done.

Vietnam's September 1989 troop withdrawal once again turned the focus on the Khmer Rouge guerrillas, who immediately launched offensive operations around Pailin and in several other provinces close to the capital. The Hun Sen government initially seemed unlikely to last more than a few months. The Vietnamese-trained Cambodian army was well equipped but suffered from serious problems of poor communications, sagging morale and a lack of coordination among the various provincial armies battling the guerrillas. A much-vaunted village militia system seemed to collapse in the face of the guerrilla offensive and the government seemed wedded to a losing policy of trying to hold onto every inch of territory by scattering its forces—and thus making them more vulnerable

[12]At a press conference in Jakarta following Quayle's trip, the author, then Southeast Asia Bureau Chief for *The Washington Post*, asked Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas about the administrations's request for lethal aid and the advice he gave Quayle. Alatas said Indonesia felt that arming the resistance was not the correct move at the time and he said he told the vice president so "in the Indonesian way."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to ambushes—even as the guerrillas began operating in larger and larger units.[13]

By the summer of 1990 the revolt against the administration's Cambodia policy appeared to be spiraling out of the administration's control, particularly after several key senators—notably Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.), Alan Cranston (D-Cal.) and Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-Maine)—became interested. Much of the new interest was staff-generated, from a small, informal Indochina working group. Its members worked for senators on key committees—appropriations, intelligence and foreign relations—and in the majority leader's office. The staffers managed to convince their Senate bosses that the administration, then enjoying foreign policy success because of the collapse of communism in eastern Europe, was vulnerable in Cambodia. The initial Bush proposal for lethal aid provided a convenient peg for the debate, because the Senate was wary of covert programs following the Iran-contra revelations and the bruising battles over aid to the Nicaraguan contras. Also, because the area involved was Indochina, it found an echo in earlier concerns over the past U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. Several senators began referring to the possibility of the administration getting on the same "slippery slope" of involvement in a regional quagmire.

In July, with a bipartisan group of more than 60 senators signing a letter to Bush criticizing the administration's Cambodia policy, Baker hastily announced that Washington would be withdrawing its recognition of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea because of the inclusion of the Khmer Rouge. The decade-old policy was only just beginning to unravel.

V

Efforts to resolve the Cambodian conflict have centered on the so-called United Nations plan, the brainchild of Congressman Stephen J. Solarz (D-N.Y.) and Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. The plan essentially calls for the United Nations to step in and run key government ministries in

[13]The account of the problems plaguing the Cambodian military is based on my own interviews in the field in November 1989 just after the Vietnamese troop withdrawal. In January 1991 on a subsequent trip Khieu Kanarith, a Cambodian editor and party member, also confirmed that the government's initial problems in battling the resistance stemmed from its policy of scattering its forces.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cambodia during a "transition" period leading to democratic elections with all the Cambodian factions participating.

The U.N. plan is a noble attempt to break through the central obstacle that has stymied the search for a settlement in the past—the resistance groups' insistence that the Hun Sen government be effectively dismantled and replaced by an interim administration comprised of all the Cambodian factions until elections can be organized. Since Hun Sen has repeatedly rejected proposals to allow the Khmer Rouge any role in a future government before elections, the U.N. plan has been seen as a face-saving compromise that both sides could accept.

The resistance demand for an interim government of all four factions is based on the premise that elections organized by Hun Sen cannot be free and fair, particularly if he controls the key ministries of defense, finance and interior. But the demand now seems like an odd power play, given the recent trend in eastern Europe and Nicaragua, where existing socialist governments were able to organize free elections under international supervision without first being forced to invite the opposition to join an "interim" government. Even in Burma the existing government was rejected at the ballot box, although the regime subsequently refused to hand over power. In almost all the recent transitions, the opposition won the balloting, which suggests that under the proper international safeguards, Hun Sen would also be unlikely to succeed in any wholesale electoral fraud or vote-rigging. The resistance demand for an interim government thus seems a backdoor attempt to grab a slice of power before elections are held.

The U.N. plan carries several flaws, not least of which is the enormous cost of such a massive undertaking. Some estimates are as high as $20 billion for a lengthy transition period. When pressed on the question of how the plan will be financed, proponents glibly suggest that Japan would be willing to foot the cost, although Tokyo has not openly agreed to that scenario. And, cost aside, there is a serious question whether the world body would find a sufficient number of Khmer speakers qualified to administer the country during the transition.

Hanoi and Phnom Penh have generally objected to the provision of the plan that calls for all sides to lay down their arms and be counted. The fear in Phnom Penh is that while government troops will be easy to count, because the govern-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment controls the cities, the Khmer Rouge would almost certainly hide away a significant number of its forces and arms caches in the jungles, to be able to resume their fight at a later date.

Proponents of the U.N. plan see the eventual all-party elections as the surest way to prevent a return to power by the Khmer Rouge. According to this rather optimistic scenario, the Khmer Rouge, because of its past record of brutality, will certainly lose any free elections and China would then use the result as its face-saving excuse for cutting off the arms flow to its Khmer Rouge allies. But it would seem like fantasy to believe that after more than a dozen years of guerrilla warfare, the Khmer Rouge leaders would be willing to abide by the results of an election and simply disappear. More likely, the Khmer Rouge would try either to disrupt the elections before they take place or to raise enough official complaints during the cease-fire period to taint the results later.

The essential flaws in the U.N. plan are that it rests on the sincerity of the Cambodian factions and assumes a willingness to realize a negotiated settlement of their conflict. Nothing could be further from reality. The Khmer Rouge is uninterested in elections it knows it cannot win, and it appears to be counting on an outright military victory, with or without continued Chinese backing. Hun Sen, too, seems uninterested in elections as long as his forces can hold onto the major population centers and his government can continue chipping away at the global economic blockade through new commercial contacts with the West. He is already having some success with new business links to France, Australia and, supposedly, even hard-line anticommunist Singapore.

The new U.S. proposals to Vietnam outlined by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon—tying economic aid and eventual recognition to a Cambodia settlement—appear to rest on the old assumption about Vietnam's residual influence over its client in Phnom Penh. Just as the Chinese are supposed to deliver the Khmer Rouge at the conference table, the assumption is that Hanoi will be able to deliver Hun Sen. But even if Vietnam did create the People's Republic of Kampuchea regime out of whole cloth, that "puppet" state now appears to have found an independent voice. The P.R.K. is unlikely to take any position it sees as against its own survival interest, regardless of what Hanoi says.

Vietnam's support is crucial to the success of any peace plan.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But Vietnam's consistent public position, at least since the first Bogor peace talks, has been that it will support any plan acceptable to its client in Phnom Penh. Given Hanoi's desire to get rid of the Cambodian problem and move on with efforts to rebuild its economy with international help, the most unlikely scenario of all is that Phnom Penh would agree to a peace settlement that Vietnam rejects.

The notion of linking U.S.-Vietnamese relations to the signing of a Cambodian accord this summer, and then timing full diplomatic relations to come only after the establishment of an elected government in Phnom Penh, seems to ignore the reality of the stalemate in Cambodia and the deep-seated animosities of the four Cambodian factions. Even if an accord is signed—and the four sides took a significant step in that direction with their latest truce accord reached in Pattaya—the Cambodian problem is likely never to be fully resolved. If America wants to pursue its interests in normalizing ties with Hanoi, it should begin to decouple the two issues.

VI

The case for beginning a new bilateral relationship with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam begins first with a recognition that America has definite interests in the region that would best be served by a more normal relationship with communist Indochina.

Some analysts argue that Indochina has become peripheral to the United States and that ASEAN long ago supplanted Vietnam and Cambodia as the regional center. Indeed, the statistics taken alone sound convincing enough: ASEAN has two-thirds of the land of Southeast Asia and three-quarters of the population. More important, the ASEAN states together hold 95 percent of the region's wealth, measured in GNP. As economic development replaced military might as the measure of success in the 1980s, Indochina indeed became a back-burner area.

For most Americans, Vietnam remains not a place, but an era. For an entire generation of Americans that era is one of the most emotional, debated and analyzed in American history. Yet the principal concern is in exorcising the emotions of the past, not in building a coherent policy for the future.

This is particularly true of a core group of current policy-makers in Washington, many of whom were involved in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fighting the Vietnam War during the Nixon and Ford administrations. Most of the current administration's "Asia hands" are actually "China hands"—including the president himself—who apparently have come to believe that U.S. policy in Southeast Asia meant a choice between supporting Beijing or backing Hanoi. Many of the China hands continue to harbor romantic notions about the Middle Kingdom despite the bloody crackdown on prodemocracy demonstrators in June 1989. For those China hands working in the State Department and the White House in the early 1970s, the highlight of their careers was the opening of diplomatic relations with Beijing; the low point was the humiliation of American helicopters lifting off from the roof of the embassy in Saigon.

Not surprisingly some of the China hands who oppose normalized relations with Vietnam—arguing that the best policy was to squeeze concessions through the embargo—are the very same policymakers who, immediately after the massacre in Tiananmen Square, were warning that it would be dangerous to try to isolate China.

More recently, joining the debate over "most favored nation" trade privileges for Beijing, President Bush declared, "Our policy relies on an obvious fact—to influence China one cannot simply isolate China and I do not want to be the president who isolates China. I want to be the president to facilitate change for human rights in China." If Vietnam were substituted for China, President Bush's argument would still seem to hold true: the best approach for influencing internal reform is not isolation, but involvement. But whereas China enjoys an almost idealized status in American policy, Vietnam is still considered an enemy country. Far from deserving the same considerations of recognition and trade as China, Vietnam is seen as deserving punishment and retribution for handing America its first military defeat.

Despite the lingering emotions over Vietnam, however, the United States retains important strategic, economic and humanitarian interests in Indochina, not least of which is reducing the principal remaining source of regional tension in Southeast Asia.

There is now a geopolitical vacuum in Indochina. With the Soviet Union drawing down its forces from Cam Ranh Bay and drastically curtailing its open-ended economic aid, new possibilities exist for the West to reestablish influence in Vietnam. The United States is also facing the eventual phasing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

down of its own forces from bases in the Philippines—because of rising nationalist demands in Manila, budget constraints at home and, most recently, the volcanic activity of Mount Pinatubo. Washington thus has an interest in trying to identify and nullify possible regional flashpoints. To the extent that countries in the region see Vietnam as a threatening force that might take advantage of a U.S. withdrawal, Washington might ease that perception by integrating Vietnam into a stable and prosperous Southeast Asia. Ending the regime's isolation and giving it a stake in the region's continued growth would seem to be the best guarantor against future aggressive tendencies.

On the economic side, American businesses—led by the American chamber of commerce in Hong Kong—have been arguing that the current policy of embargo and isolation has left U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage as Vietnam attempts to woo foreign investment with one of the most liberal foreign investment laws in the region. The problems of investment are legion, from lack of a system of contract law to bureaucratic red tape and corruption. But now American businesses are forced to sit on the sidelines while British, Indian and European firms divide potentially lucrative contracts for oil exploration, while Japan establishes itself as the major noncommunist trading partner and while the Australians complete a new telecommunications system that has already improved telephone and facsimile services to and from the once largely isolated country.

A raft of humanitarian issues could also best be addressed in the context of normalized relations between Washington and Hanoi. Indeed, Washington this year opened an office in Hanoi to deal with the issue of the two thousand-plus American servicemen still missing from the Vietnam War, a move that tacitly acknowledges that such outstanding bilateral issues can best be resolved through more official high-level, in-country contacts.

The major humanitarian issue facing the region remains the problem of Indochinese "boat people" who continue to flee their homeland seeking asylum in the West. From a decade-long policy of granting automatic "first asylum" to Vietnamese refugees, the ASEAN countries have grown weary of what they now consider an undue burden on their resources. The refugee issue, and particularly the question of whether the "boat people" should be forcibly returned to Vietnam, has

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

become the most nettlesome problem souring Washington's relations with ASEAN.

Most of the major relief organizations dealing with the refugee problem are convinced that the ultimate solution lies in economic assistance to Vietnam to attack the problem at its source. Reducing Vietnam's dire poverty would remove, for many, the incentive to flee.

For those who want to see greater political pluralism in Vietnam, the question is one of approach: Is it better to strangle the regime through sanctions or to use economic and cultural relations to establish contacts with progressive forces for change?

A U.S. decision to normalize relations with Hanoi would have an immediate impact throughout the region. On balance, the move would help lessen regional tensions and improve America's leadership profile in Asia.

One of the early, strong arguments against normalization advanced within the Carter administration was that it would imperil America's then-emergent ties with China. But today many prominent China scholars dispute the notion that Washington must choose between Hanoi and Beijing since, among other reasons, most countries in the region have diplomatic relations with both. Moreover China itself has kept a diplomatic staff at its sprawling embassy in Hanoi even during the period of open hostility.

Given the current low state of Sino-American relations—brought on by the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, the continuing repression in China, America's growing trade deficit with the Chinese and complaints over Chinese missile sales—the leadership in Beijing would likely interpret any American move to recognize Vietnam as a direct affront. It could increase Beijing's paranoia about hostile encirclement and prompt it to disrupt the ongoing Cambodian negotiations. But China and Vietnam have lately shown signs of easing their own bilateral relationships, increasing border trade and allowing more official and unofficial contacts. If Washington lets potential Chinese dissatisfaction delay a move that is on balance positive and in America's interest, it will be allowing U.S. foreign policy to become hostage to the wishes of Beijing.

Reaction from ASEAN would likely be mixed, reflecting the schisms within the organization over the member-states' own relations with Hanoi. Hard-line Singapore, despite its own private trading links with Hanoi, would likely see it as yet

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

another example of Washington's unreliability and preoccupation with popular opinion. Malaysia, which has taken a key role in providing training for the Cambodian noncommunist resistance, would be similarly displeased. But Thailand and Indonesia—arguably the most important ASEAN states in terms of setting Indochina policy—would likely welcome a move toward normalization, as would the Philippines. All three countries have lately been improving their own bilateral diplomatic, trade and commercial ties with Hanoi. Those have included new air links, joint ventures in restaurants and hotels, and an exchange of high-level visits. Thailand's deposed prime minister, Chatichai, had urged the United States in 1989 to become active again in investing in Indochina and "to use Thailand as a springboard, a bridge" to the former adversary.[14]

Japan, likewise, would welcome any U.S. move toward normalization, if it included a lifting of the economic embargo. Japan is already one of Vietnam's largest trading partners, and Japanese businesses have set up small representative offices in Ho Chi Minh City. By some estimates Japan now accounts for about 12 percent of foreign investment in Vietnam. But because of the embargo and the importance Japan puts on its bilateral relationship with the United States, the Japanese have refrained from making major investments in Vietnam or issuing long-term credits to the Vietnamese.

The strongest argument against normalization is that the embargo is the only "stick" Washington now has to force Hanoi's support for a Cambodian peace plan. Washington, it is said, might disrupt the delicate peace talks by unilaterally removing it. Proponents of the peace plan argue that recognition in advance of a peace agreement would only convince Vietnam's hard-liners to dig in their heels further and refuse any concessions. But this view ignores the fact that America has its own bilateral interests in normalizing relations with Vietnam, interests that go beyond the Cambodian problem. Continued linkage of normalization to events in Cambodia—particularly after Vietnam has withdrawn its troops—keeps U.S. policy in the region hostage to the obstreperousness of the Cambodian factional leaders. The Pattaya agreements signed by the Cambodians in June seem to offer Washington

[14]From the author's interview with former Prime Minister Chatichai, November 10, 1989, in Bangkok.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the best opportunity so far to say that Vietnam has acted responsibly in the peace process and that the rest is now up to the Cambodians themselves.

Just days after U.S.-led ground troops liberated occupied Kuwait from the Iraqi army, President Bush declared, "The specter of Vietnam has been buried forever in the desert sands of the Arabian peninsula." If that is indeed the case, then normalization of relations with Vietnam now, more than 16 years after the fall of Saigon, is surely overdue. It would close out the final chapter of America's long and wrenching Indochina involvement, and truly allow Americans to put the Vietnam era behind them.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

M. Delal Baer

NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE

A new continentalism took hold on February 5, 1991, when the leaders of Canada, Mexico and the United States announced they would negotiate a North American Free Trade Agreement. NAFTA, if and when completed, will reshape corporate strategies, redraw the mental map of citizens in each country and gradually create a North American economic identity based on global competition.

NAFTA is the product of longstanding trends in both Mexico and Canada toward sharing production with U.S. companies and conducting more than 70 percent of their trade with the United States. The decision to deepen and formalize these economic ties, however, is a qualitative change that may prove politically challenging as well as economically rewarding. Advocates of open economic borders will have to compete with insular nationalists, ideas for innovative trinational cooperation with restrictive notions of sovereignty, liberalization with protectionism, and market philosophies with residual populism.

Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari set this process in motion in June 1990 when he requested a free-trade agreement with the United States. He thus reversed decades of inward-looking policies and, in effect, toppled a wall of mistrust in U.S.-Mexican relations. The Bush administration quickly recognized that the moment was ripe for a historic political reconciliation. This reconciliation has rippled throughout Latin America, replacing fears of U.S. hegemony with a pragmatic interest in hemispheric free trade.

A year after Salinas' initial request, negotiators held their first substantive meeting in Toronto, on June 12, 1991, forming working groups on market access, trade rules, services, investment, intellectual property and dispute settlement. A final treaty could be presented as early as the beginning of 1992, well before U.S. presidential elections, or in early 1993, well before Canadian elections. The timing of the talks is thus

---

M. Delal Baer is Director and Senior Fellow of the Mexico Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

designed to avoid politicization, which would complicate the task of making difficult concessions and achieving truly comprehensive economic liberalization.

But what forces have brought the United States, Mexico and Canada to this point? What difficulties does NAFTA present for all three nations, and what are its multilateral implications? In short what does the future hold for this new continental configuration?

II

Mexico's economy malfunctioned in the 1980s under the strain of its 60-year history of statism, economic nationalism and single-party rule. After falling oil prices, the mounting debt crisis and the exhaustion of import-substitution policies brought the economy to the brink of collapse in 1982, Mexican leaders were left little choice but to seek alternative growth strategies. Economic reform was born of necessity.

During the term of President Miguel de la Madrid, 1982–1988, Mexico jettisoned its statist policies—privatizing enterprises, trimming deficits, promoting exports and entering the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It has since virtually eliminated import licenses and reduced tariff rates to the current nine percent average.

De la Madrid may not have realized it, but he laid the groundwork for NAFTA as he transformed the nation's export profile. Mexico's exports shifted from oil, for which the market is global, to manufactures. Manufactured goods soared to 55 percent of all exports in 1989 from 14 percent in 1982. And with 85 percent of its manufactured exports destined for its northern neighbor, secure access to U.S. markets became increasingly important. The move toward free trade thus began in the 1980s, when Mexico signed a series of agreements to guard against potential U.S. protectionism, including one on subsidies and another on a framework for investment and trade. The decision to seek NAFTA is the logical culmination of these trends.

International factors also reinforced Mexico's leaning to free trade. Oil sales and commercial loans would no longer finance the nation's growth. Foreign investment is now essential to the success of Mexico's economic reform, and assured access to U.S. markets is Mexico's best hope to spark an investment boom. This is especially true in today's competitive world investment climate. The east European revolutions and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the need for capital inflows because of the U.S. trade and budget deficits have reshaped world financial demand and supply patterns. German reunification costs are estimated to total upwards of $600 billion and Polish, Czechoslovakian and Hungarian needs seem modest compared to those of the U.S.S.R. Moreover Persian Gulf reconstruction has absorbed Saudi and Kuwaiti resources. A free-trade agreement could help Mexico avoid suffering capital shortages.

Mexico's turn toward the United States thus reflects a rigorous facing of the facts. Dreamers may advocate trade integration with Latin America, but the region absorbs only a tiny fraction of Mexican exports. The uncertain prospects of accessing European Community markets after the EC's 1992 unification and the difficulty of penetrating Asian markets propelled Mexico toward NAFTA. The world appeared to be forming into regional blocs, and Mexico did not want to be left out. Ensuring against protectionism in its principal market seemed wiser than pursing the chimera of trade diversification.

But Mexico's economic opening and corresponding but less comprehensive political opening have posed major dilemmas for President Salinas. The decision to pursue a free-trade agreement was a stunning political act—heretical in some Mexican intellectual and political circles—and it defies Mexico's long history of defensive nationalism. This is a country haunted by the ghost of Malinche, the daughter of a local Indian ruler who was forced to betray her country by becoming the consort and adviser of its Spanish conqueror, Hernando Cortés. It is a nation that has suffered a string of traumas at the hands of foreign powers: the United States conquered half of Mexico's national territory in 1848, Napoleon III installed a Hapsburg emperor in 1864 and the United States occupied Veracruz and Tampico in 1914.

It is little surprise then that traditional Mexican nationalists see hegemonic designs in a free-trade agreement and fear a loss of cultural identity and national sovereignty. Salinas is nonetheless gambling that stagnation is riskier than violating outdated political taboos. Like Japan in the late nineteenth century, Mexico has decided that its sovereignty is best defended by opening to the outside.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

III

Driving Mexico's decision to challenge political orthodoxy is a new style and generation of leadership. Older generation politicians tended to study law at national schools and matured under the influence of the Cuban Revolution. Most of the Salinas team, by contrast, received advanced degrees in economics from U.S. universities and are inspired by the economic success of Asia's newly industrialized countries. President Salinas, for example, has a strong personal interest in Japan and sends his children to Japanese schools. Three generations removed from the Mexican Revolution and conscious of Mexico's youthful population, the Salinas team has modernized and fundamentally changed Mexico's economic and political doctrines.

The easing of Cold War tensions and the winding down of Central American conflicts also facilitated a rapprochement with the United States. The electoral defeat of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in 1990 lessened bilateral frictions over regional policy. The lowering of ideological tempers in the transition from the Reagan administration to the more pragmatic Bush administration also made it easier for Salinas to move closer to the United States.

The path to economic reform has nonetheless been difficult. Presidents de la Madrid and Salinas paid a high price for the economic mismanagement of their predecessors. The transition to economic openness entailed painful 40-percent income declines, high unemployment and left a backlog of social needs unattended. Mexico's 62-year-ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was taken to task in the 1988 presidential elections when Cuauhtémoc Cardenas Solórzano, the son of a revered former president, broke with the party to run on a populist platform. A chastened Salinas claimed a historically slender 50.74 percent of the vote and was forced to acknowledge the end of the single-party state. The pain of Mexico's own perestroika had unleashed the uncertainties of glasnost.

Pursuing NAFTA has become an integral part of Mexico's race to consolidate economic reform while coping with the uncertainties of political liberalization. Salinas entered office with an urgent need to make economic reform yield rapid growth, lest it be reversed by an impatient electorate and a populist opposition that viscerally rejects economic openness. A free-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trade agreement would enshrine Mexico's market policies and provide some assurance against policy deviations, such as the 1982 bank nationalization under President José Lopez Portillo. The post-Salinas continuity implied by a free-trade agreement will reassure international investors seeking predictability and stability. The future costs of withdrawing from an agreement would be high, disrupting trilateral political relations and economic constituencies that, by then, will rely on export growth. More important, NAFTA could jumpstart the Mexican economy and end the stagnation that devastated the middle class and threatened to further impoverish the nation's poorest. The best guarantee of the permanence of economic reform is improved social welfare. Whoever assumes Salinas' mantle may find that economic continuity is the best policy.

President Salinas has moved gradually on political reform to safeguard the institutionalization of his economic policies. He has made the irreversibility of economic reform a precondition to democracy. Economic restructuring, he may have observed, flourished after delaying a democratic transition in South Korea, whereas it has yet to follow from the beginning of political reform in the Soviet Union. But critics charge that Salinas has pursued "perestroika without glasnost."[1] Others imply that a free-trade agreement would help preserve the status quo with U.S. complicity. Indeed Mexico's history of dubious electoral practices makes political reform essential if modernization is to be complete.

Critics nonetheless tend to downplay significant, if gradual, trends toward political liberalization, such as a more impartial electoral law passed in 1989, efforts to improve the voter registration list and opposition victories at congressional, state and local levels. A free-trade agreement may help reinforce decentralized economic decision-making, erode the dirigiste tendency of an authoritarian state and decouple the economy from exclusive party control. Liberalized politics tend to accompany liberal economics.

Successful economic liberalization is an important ingredient in easing democratic transitions. Such was the case in Chile. There the coalition of President Patricio Aylwin Azócar was careful not to upset economic policies that had brought

[1]Lorenzo Meyer, "Aqui, perestroika sin glasnost," *Excelsior*, Dec. 13, 1991.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

consistent growth. Consensus on economic policy moderated the extreme left and undercut the scare tactics of the right. A free-trade agreement could inspire a similar consensus in Mexico, softening resistance to political opening. Mexico's left may be complicating the task of democratization by staking out unrealistic positions.

World events have themselves undermined the intellectual position of Mexico's left, increasing Salinas' margin of political maneuver and permitting policies unthinkable only a few years ago. Mexico's free-market orientation was legitimated as the devastation of the east European, Soviet and Cuban economies became apparent. The pragmatism of socialists like France's François Mitterrand and Spain's Felipe Gonzalez also validated Mexican policy. Political opponents are thus finding it hard to capitalize on the free-trade initiative, which polls show to be popular. Indeed one survey found that 59 percent of Mexicans would support the formation of a single nation with the United States, if that signified a better quality of life, suggesting basic attitudinal changes in Mexican nationalism and anti-Americanism.[2] Support for NAFTA has wooed Mexico's business and middle classes back to the fold of the PRI and permitted Salinas to straddle the center.

Mexico's free-trade strategy is already delivering results. Between January 1989 and March 1991, $13 billion entered the country, $8.4 billion (64 percent) in the form of direct foreign investment and $4.7 billion (26 percent) as other inflows, including capital repatriations. Gross domestic product grew by 3.9 percent in 1990 to $230 billion, the fourth consecutive year of growth. Economic growth associated with free trade could make possible the reconciling of political and economic reform. Salinas' gamble appears to be paying off.

IV

Mexico is not just another distant geopolitical interest for the United States. Geography alone dictates that neither

[2] "Economic Integration and Nationalism: Canada, the United States and Mexico," *Este País*, no. 1, April 1991, Mexico City.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

country can escape the influence of the other. Mexican author Adrián Lajous Martínez captured the fate of the two nations graphically when he likened them to Siamese twins, warning that if one becomes gangrenous, the other twin will also be afflicted. U.S. interest in a free-trade agreement with Mexico must be interpreted in this context.

Mexico's economic crisis drove home this point. In 1982, when Mexico nearly defaulted on its debt, the fate of more than one U.S. banking giant hung in the balance. Main Street U.S.A. lost more than 300,000 export jobs as the Mexican economy nose-dived in the 1980s, and in this period millions of Mexicans crossed the border illegally looking for work. As Mexico's recession ground on, U.S. policymakers contemplated the nightmarish implications of a destabilized Mexico for border security and American commitments around the globe. The lesson of Mexico's economic crisis is that the United States would rather have Spain than Peru on its border; it is not in the U.S. interest to have a well of Third World misery on its southern frontier. Free trade is not a panacea to cure Mexican underdevelopment, but it may be the best chance to promote growth and stability.

Less tangible but equally important is the new political culture of bilateral or trilateral relations implicit in a free-trade agreement. Mexico's traditional political culture viewed U.S. proximity as a curse, not an opportunity. Bilateral cooperation was limited or conducted under a cloak of secrecy; Mexican leaders did not wish to be accused of consorting with the enemy. In pursuing a free-trade agreement, however, Mexico has focused on common interests and the opportunities of the U.S. market. It is laying the ghost of Malinche to rest.

With a free-trade agreement the United States is likely to have a more effective partner in managing the tasks and tensions inevitable in a complex relationship, troubled by issues ranging from drugs to the environment. In contrast to the past, deliberate efforts are now being made to contain conflict in the interest of broad cooperation. The United States is also seeking to avoid high-handed tactics, such as the kidnapping of Mexican national Humberto Alvarez Machain, implicated in the case of slain U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agent Enrique Camarena Salazar, which would have paralyzed relations in earlier years. Qualitative leaps in cooperative drug enforcement and the revival of the annual cabi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

net-level Binational Commission are byproducts of this new bilateral relationship.

Mexico has also reoriented its diplomacy in light of its pragmatic economic self-interest. Mexico previously flirted with the Eastern bloc, cast anti-American votes in the United Nations, undermined U.S. regional goals, lent support to Cuban-sponsored guerrillas and romantically awaited an apocalyptic crisis in U.S. capitalism. But the image of Mexican presidents embracing Fidel Castro has now been supplanted by visits to Camp David. Indignant speeches about the perfidies of economic imperialism have been replaced by addresses to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. Mexico's offer to increase oil production during the Persian Gulf crisis points in the same direction. A free-trade agreement may mean the difference between a friendly or ambivalent neighbor, and between shared goals or regional conflict.

Salinas' request for a free-trade agreement was virtually assured of a warm response from a Texan president needing little education in the geopolitical or economic importance of Mexico. Texas is first to feel a Mexican downturn, and southwestern constituencies have been the first to benefit from a trade-driven boom along the border. President Bush also has been sensitive to the political risks Salinas has taken in launching a rapprochement with the United States. A rebuff of NAFTA would unsettle Mexico's economic progress and vindicate voices in Mexico and throughout Latin America who warn that the United States cannot be trusted. U.S. enthusiasm for free trade with Mexico, however, is not a product of a commitment to personalities or parties but to policies that it judges will best result in a friendly, stable and prosperous neighbor.

In purely economic terms the United States profits from Mexico's own prosperity. U.S. exports to Mexico increased from $12.4 billion in 1986 to $28.4 billion in 1990 as the Mexican economy recovered. This generated hundreds of thousands of U.S. jobs. About 70 percent of Mexico's imports come from the United States. As Mexico earns more from exports, it buys more from the United States. Most major

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

macroeconomic studies of a U.S.-Mexican free-trade agreement project growth in U.S. jobs.[3]

NAFTA will enhance U.S. competitiveness vis-à-vis Europe and Asia through the economies of scale and specialization in production to be achieved with continental rationalization. Trinational clarity of investment rules will provide a stable environment for long-term production strategies. Most attractive is the production-sharing option within North America. Production-sharing is a strategy that Asia and Europe have used to great advantage in penetrating U.S. markets. Japan, for example, has deliberately shifted labor-intensive production to less-developed neighbors in Asia. A North American production-sharing alliance will help U.S. industries gain competitiveness in a world where multipolar geoeconomic rivalry is supplanting bipolar geostrategic conflict.

A policy that achieves U.S. strategic purposes, improves the management of an essential bilateral relationship and furthers U.S. commercial interests is especially valuable in an era of budgetary restraint. In short, twin geoeconomic and geopolitical forces have converged to make NAFTA an attractive option for the United States.

V

The first steps toward North American trade integration were taken with the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), which went into effect on January 1, 1989. Canadian motivations in seeking a free-trade agreement were similar to Mexico's. Canadian trade is heavily weighted toward the United States, making guaranteed market access important to producers. Canada, too, lingered on the "third option" of diversifying its trading partners before facing the reality of trade geography. Sectoral arrangements were also considered before opting for a full-fledged free-trade agreement.

Mexico's decision to seek a free-trade agreement with the United States came as an awkward surprise for Canada at a time when Ottawa was grappling with domestic ethnic strife, Quebec's separatist urges and the future of the federation.

[3] Clopper Almon, *Industrial Effects of a Free-Trade Agreement between Mexico and the U.S.A.*, for the U.S. Department of Labor, Sept. 15, 1990; *The Likely Impact on the United States of a Free Trade Agreement with Mexico*, U.S. International Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.; *The Effects of a Free-Trade Agreement between the U.S. and Mexico*, for the U.S. Council of the Mexico-U.S. Business Committee, prepared by the Policy Economics Group at Peat Marwick, Washington, D.C., 1991.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Canada found it difficult to focus on continental trade integration when the nation itself seemed to be disintegrating.

Canada's decision to participate in the negotiations did not come easily. The prospect of reopening controversial free-trade decisions was daunting. Liberal Party opponents, who had uneasily digested the argument that Canada needed guaranteed access to U.S. markets, were now told that they would have to protect their preferences all over again. Indeed Canada fought a bitter 1988 election over the free-trade issue. Labor unions, environmentalists, church groups and cultural nationalists allied to fight CAFTA and have remobilized to fight free trade with Mexico. Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, now in a weakened political position, cannot relish the thought of renewed controversy. Unlike the United States, Canada does not yet enjoy a large export market in Mexico, nor does it face a pressing geopolitical rationale. The benefits of including Mexico are long term and abstract, while to opponents the dangers seem immediate.

Canada decided to participate in NAFTA because it could not afford to be absent from the negotiating table. Canadian exports often mirror those of Mexico, as in the automotive sector. Just as Mexico feared trade diversion due to Canada's preferential access to the U.S. market, so Canada faced a similar need to defend its trade interests. Canada also recognized that its traditionally favored position for U.S. foreign investment would face competition from Mexico. If the United States were to sign separate free-trade agreements with a multitude of countries, in what some have described as a "hub and spoke" arrangement, only the United States would have the preferential benefits of complete access to all markets.[4] Canada would also lose the option of negotiating transitional arrangements for vulnerable sectors of its economy. Canadian participation was thus driven as much by the dangers of absence as by the benefits of participation.

Canada believes it will ultimately benefit from the economies of scale and the efficiencies, specializations and investment flows that follow regional integration. The evolution of integrated continental trade and investment structures will make it increasingly difficult to compete outside that framework. While trade between Canada and Mexico is now only $2.3

[4] Richard Lipsey, "Canada at the U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Dance: Wallflower or Partner?" *Commentary*, no. 20, August 1990, C.D. Howe Institute, Toronto, Canada.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

billion, it grew by 20 percent in 1990, leading some to believe it could double in the 1990s. Canada is betting on future Mexican growth and wants to get in on the ground floor.

VI

The politics of free trade have proven to be more complex than expected. Ironically, the trepidations have issued more from the industrialized United States than from Mexico. An array of environmentalists, labor unions and human rights activists mobilized in the United States with surprising energy seeking to block Congress' extension of presidential "fast track" authority to negotiate a free-trade agreement with Mexico. The introduction of new issues has stretched the traditional parameters of trade negotiations, and may set new precedents for trade and economic integration.

The environment was the surprise issue of the NAFTA debate. Environmentalists argued that free trade would lead companies to seek pollution havens in Mexico, deplete natural resources and lead to the downward harmonization of standards. The supposition that American firms would relocate in Mexico in search of lower pollution-control costs was not borne out by one study showing that of the 271 new plants constructed overseas by America's Fortune 500 companies, over 50 percent were in the EC, 20 percent in Asia and only 3 percent in all of Latin America.[5] Similar logic suggests that California's strict regulatory environment has not hampered its ability to attract investment. Mexico's pollution problems nonetheless pose a health hazard for U.S. citizens in the border area, and Mexico's consumer exports must also meet U.S. safety standards.

Mainstream environmentalists temper concerns about ecology with sensitivity to Mexico's need for development. Environmental protection has been the luxury of rich industrialized nations. Trade-related growth could help Mexico break the vicious cycle of economic desperation that causes environmental degradation in many Third World nations. Trade talks offer environmentalists an opportunity to place their concerns on the negotiating table. Most acknowledge that Mexico is on a steep environmental learning curve and tends toward upward harmonization of standards with the United States.

[5] The Conference Board, *U.S. Investment Abroad: Nineties Open with a Board*, New York, Feb. 14, 1991.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Compliance, however, is still spotty, and enforcement is hampered by a lack of budgetary resources and trained personnel.

NAFTA will establish new precedents regarding trade and the environment and must therefore weigh these issues carefully. The alar and dioxin scares point to the difficulty of making sensible trade-offs between safety, costs and standards based on scientific certainty. These trade-offs are particularly critical in poor countries that must ponder additional new costs to vulnerable consumers. Mexico has indicated a willingness to impose those costs, as when it mandated the use of catalytic converters on new cars. The challenge to NAFTA negotiators will be in reconciling urgent environmental concerns with cost, excessive regulation and the exportation of U.S. litigiousness.

Mexico's political disputes also entered into the NAFTA debate. Some Mexican opposition figures sought a U.S. venue to air their political complaints, implying that a free-trade agreement should be contingent on international observers to check for fraud in Mexican elections. A few U.S. congressmen questioned whether it was appropriate to deepen commercial ties with a nation that did not fully share Western democratic institutions. Most seem to have decided that while Mexico's political system is far from perfect, it is not a pariah state that warrants imposition of sanctions. Rather Mexico may be more likely to evolve toward democracy with a free-trade agreement, given that a market economy inevitably intensifies the free flow of ideas. Mexico's political situation ultimately was not a decisive issue for most members of Congress.

The core issues in the NAFTA debate revolve around a tug-of-war between a liberal attitude toward world free trade and a protectionist streak in the U.S. body politic. Protectionism was expressed in the form of fears about lost American jobs, sectoral winners and losers, and Mexico being used as an export platform by Asian countries. The AFL-CIO declared war on NAFTA, asserting that low-wage Mexican labor would entice U.S. companies and precipitate the loss of 500,000 American jobs. These claims probably overstate the likely impact of a free-trade agreement, given the large differences in labor productivity and the fact that Mexico's economy is one-twenty-fifth the size of America's.

The debate is propelled more by fundamental changes in the global economy and fears of the decline in advanced industrial societies. The trauma of Asian and European inroads to the North American market underlies much of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

queasiness about NAFTA. Stagnant industrial productivity compared with Japan and Germany and persistent trade deficits have altered America's standing as the undisputed leader of the world economy. Import penetration from Asia and Europe has led to a misplaced protectionism, which has focused on Mexico.

The United States has yet to determine where to concentrate its competitive energies in the global economy. The strongest opposition to NAFTA comes from industries and unions that receive special quota and tariff protection, such as apparel and horticulture. These sectors not only oppose trade with Mexico but prefer to limit these imports from all sources. Yet the future of the U.S. work force is not in low-skill apparel jobs; arguments over low-wage Mexican labor misstate the challenge. The United States should not be competing with the low-wage Mexicos of the world, but with high-wage, high-technology nations like Germany and Japan.[6]

After extensive talks with Capitol Hill leaders, the White House responded to free-trade concerns with an "action plan" that expands the agenda of the trade talks to include noncommercial issues in parallel, multiple-track negotiations. The plan commits the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Mexican authorities to negotiate a comprehensive border agreement on environmental issues and to explore joint technical assistance and enforcement aid. Moreover it would preserve high U.S. environmental standards and offer nongovernmental environmental organizations a seat at U.S. trade representative advisory committees. The plan also promises to fund retraining of displaced workers and commits U.S. and Mexican labor departments to discuss labor standards and practices. Disputes over the size and scope of the labor-adjustment program will surely follow as labor attempts to extract a comprehensive labor-market policy from the administration. The action plan was nonetheless sufficient to win fast-track approval in both houses of Congress. Continued controversy is likely to make the final vote on NAFTA difficult.

The free-trade battle was especially divisive for Democrats. The Democratic National Committee passed a resolution against a free-trade agreement with Mexico, while the Democratic Leadership Council favored NAFTA. Democrats were

[6] *Scholars for Free Trade with Mexico*, letter to Congress signed by 24 scholars on April 10, 1991, and reprinted in *The Wall Street Journal*, April 24, 1991.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

forced to choose between organized labor and Hispanics, and between Sunbelt and Rustbelt constituents. Democrats who define themselves as friends of Latin America were torn between pressures at home and their foreign policy conscience. More than two-thirds of House Democrats ultimately voted against renewing fast-track negotiating authority, including 17 of the 22 Democratic committee chairmen. Interest group politics ruled the day: the textile- and shoe-producing southeast and northeast voted against fast-track; the auto and steel districts of Indiana, Illinois, Pennsylvania and Michigan followed suit; Sunbelt powerhouses like Texas, California and Florida favored fast-track and NAFTA.

The bruising battle over fast-track will leave its mark on the final document. Sensitive handling of the transition to free trade for weak sectors is important to mustering political support for a final agreement. Competitive industries can quickly adapt to a zero-tariff environment, but in sensitive sectors tariffs must be phased out slowly to prevent sudden closures and job losses. Safeguards such as tariff "snapbacks" to protect against import surges will also be considered.

The political challenge of NAFTA is to develop a trinational nonpartisan consensus on competitiveness and free trade. Four requirements stand out. First, free-traders must not sacrifice sensitivity and compassion for principle; there is no point denying that adjustment pressures exist. Second, in exchange for attention to its concerns labor, too, must end its ostrich-like denial of global economic realities. Labor has come to assume falsely that anyone who favors free trade is also anti-union. Third, all three nations must set their sights on improved economic competitiveness and so define NAFTA in the public domain. Finally is recognition that the cost of failure to achieve an agreement would be high. U.S.-Mexican relations would be set back a decade and North America would lose an opportunity to pursue a global competitive strategy, a fact that would be noticed by all trading nations.

VII

The NAFTA talks occur at a delicate moment in world trade. The GATT system was seriously strained by the December 1990

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stalemate at the Brussels ministerial meeting over issues pertaining to intellectual property, agriculture and services. If the Uruguay Round stalls, or if only a minimal solution is cobbled together, confidence in the multilateral process will wane and tendencies toward regional or unilateral problem-solving will increase. Regionalism has maintained an uneasy coexistence with GATT largely because a parallel multilateral liberalization softened preferential features. A multilateral failure would only heighten concerns about a loosening of pan-Atlantic bonds and worries that NAFTA would succumb to discriminatory temptations.

Fears of bloc formation may be exaggerated. NAFTA is unlikely to violate GATT principles or raise external barriers. Global trade rules are a high U.S. priority given that 74 percent of U.S. trade is conducted outside North America. Similarly, Japan's trade with its Pacific neighbors constitutes only 35 percent of its total trade, again reinforcing GATT priorities. Only Europe shows signs of bloc behavior; the 12 EC members conduct about 70 percent of trade among themselves or within the European Free Trade Association.[7] These trends explain why Japan has worried about the possible restrictive aspects of NAFTA, whereas the Europeans have been more sanguine.

Concerns about bloc formation also have overshadowed the salutary effect of NAFTA in quickly prodding Latin America to lower its external trade barriers. Jealousy over Mexico's favorable trade and investment position with the United States has Latin nations jostling to be next in the free-trade line. This feeling was amplified by President Bush's June 27, 1990, Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, which offers free trade in exchange for Latin American liberalization. Argentina, for example, announced tariff targets of 9 percent and Brazil is phasing tariffs to a target of 14.2 percent by 1994. South American tariff reduction and the elimination of import licensing benefit all exporters. Finally, most recent GATT members have come from Latin America, which will introduce new pressures on Europe and Asia to liberalize agriculture and other issues of interest to developing nations. Salinas' name was recently floated as a possible successor to GATT chief

[7] Jeffrey J. Schott, "Trading Blocs and the World Trading System," *The World Economy*, vol. 14, no. 1, 1991.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Arthur Dunkel, suggesting that Latin America's star in GATT is rising.

Progress in GATT may actually be furthered by a NAFTA that anticipates future directions in services, agriculture and investment. Regionalism, as in the case of NAFTA and Latin America, stimulates widening circles of liberalization that produce multilateral benefits. The formation of liberal regional groupings may ultimately create more manageable negotiating units for GATT. The challenge will be to sustain the vigor of multilateralism, enabling it to coexist with regionalism.

VIII

What does the future hold beyond NAFTA? What frictions might result from the close contact of a new relationship? Will NAFTA generate other forms of integration and, if so, what will North America look like 10 or 30 years from now?

Economic liberalization could transform the Americas within a generation. NAFTA signifies that Mexico has become a North American country, ready to share Western entrepreneurial values and participate in Western capital markets. Mexico is making this transition without relinquishing its Latin American identity, however, and will serve as an interlocutor between North, South and Central America. The Mexican example may spawn a host of aspiring little tigers. In the best of all possible worlds, Latin America may resemble a collection of nascent Spains.

This need not be a far-fetched scenario. Imagine a Mexico that reduces its demographic growth and sustains rapid economic expansion as a result of the specialization and productivity gains of a free-trade agreement. One need only recall that South Korea's per capita income was about half Mexico's in 1980 and that Italy was a labor-exporting country in the mid-1960s. Pioneering research suggests that Mexico may be able to increase the growth rate of its output per worker by 1.57 percent a year and increase its output per worker by 48 percent over 25 years, placing it roughly at Spain's level. U.S.-Mexican migration issues would become irrelevant, and the free movement of labor possible.[8]

The future will not be without problems. Some disagreement may surface between those who advocate more trilateral

[8] Timothy J. Kehoe, *Free Trade and Economic Growth*, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, July 1991.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

regulation and those who prefer more decentralization and sovereignty. These tendencies are already incipient. The left in all three countries seems more ready to mimimize assertion of sovereignty, a trend embodied in ideas such as a trilateral social charter and uniform health, safety and environmental regulations. These North American equivalents of Jacques Delors may meet homegrown Margaret Thatchers who will resist the creation of NAFTA institutional and regulatory structures. Officials in all three countries insist on the limited nature of NAFTA. Indeed NAFTA as currently envisioned bears no resemblance to the EC, which sets common external tariffs, permits free movement of labor and plans for increasingly supranational political and regulatory institutions.

The gradual forces that over the past 30 years led to NAFTA could over the next 30 years lead to some additional degree of unity. Imagine, for example, a slow increase in informal macroeconomic cooperation. Mexico is already intensely motivated to achieve inflation rates comparable to its North American neighbors, and a tax treaty among the three countries is probable. The United States will be increasingly sensitive to the impact of its macroeconomic policies on its neighbors. It seems likely that over time differences in trade balances, currency valuations and fiscal policies will narrow. If so, mechanisms for joint financing of emergency trade imbalances may be considered. The creation of trinational dispute-resolution mechanisms and rule-making bodies on border and environmental issues may also be embryonic forms of more comprehensive structures. After all, international organizations and agreements like GATT and NAFTA by definition mimimize assertions of sovereignty in favor of a joint rule-making authority.

A new North American political market of ideas may be another source of friction as cross-border politics becomes a feature of the NAFTA landscape. An interesting precedent was set with the cross-national coalitions formed among opponents of NAFTA during the fast-track debate. Partisans from the Pro-Canada Network made high-profile visits to Mexico City, while anti-treaty Mexicans lobbied alongside the AFL-CIO in the U.S. Congress. More broadly, political boundaries blur as Mexico cultivates U.S. Hispanic groups, Americans scrutinize Mexican elections and Canadian nongovernmental organizations expand their reach. The North American debate has become trilateralized with remarkable rapidity.

Cross-national regional integration will also be intensified.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The border communities of northern Mexico and the U.S. southwest increasingly form part of the same economic and social body, with a shared anatomy in infrastructure and services. This integration is most pronounced in twin cities on the border like Ciudad Juarez and El Paso, but is also expanding to interior cities like San Antonio and Mexico's industrial hub, Monterrey. Even more distant U.S. states like Arkansas and Colorado are carefully considering their integration with north-south trade and transportation flows. Regional protectionist alliances between Ontario, the American midwest and Mexico City's left may be a persistent phenomenon.

Ultimately the three economies may blend into an integrated production network and share a universal, science-based culture that traces its roots to Francis Bacon. The modern denizens of urban Mexico will have more in common with their counterparts in Toronto and Chicago than with campesinos in rural Oaxaca.

The heat of the debate surrounding NAFTA suggests that the real and perceived costs of an agreement could revive populism and protectionism, especially if member economies suffer a long recession. Economic growth solidified commitment to trade liberalization in the EC and would do the same for NAFTA.

It may be useful to revisit the spirit of the Monnet Commission, which provided a blueprint for Europe at a moment of extraordinary opportunity. The three nations of North America, in more modest fashion, have also arrived at a defining moment. They may want to create a wiseman's North American commission to operate in the post-ratification period. One objective would be to report on the impact of the agreement during implementation, providing sober judgments that temper politicized charges and countercharges. The commission might also adopt a forward-looking agenda on themes such as North American competitiveness, links between scientific institutions, borderland integration, the continental ecological system and educational and cultural exchanges. The historic import of NAFTA calls for marshaling creative resources as never before to consider the future of North America.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Stansfield Turner

INTELLIGENCE FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER

It is difficult to exaggerate how thoroughly the gathering of information on the Soviet Union, and especially its military power, has dominated U.S. intelligence operations since the Cold War began. Today, in light of the diminished Soviet military threat to western Europe, the sharp decline in the Soviet economy and the centrifugal forces pulling the Soviet Union apart, such concentration on that country and its military must inevitably decline. There will be differences over how much of a reduction is necessary, but it is difficult to see how anyone could argue that a substantial adjustment by the intelligence community is not in order.

Any reduction in effort against the Soviet Union will be resisted strongly in the CIA, where the Cold War ethos runs very deep. Similarly, any reduction in effort against the Soviet military threat will be opposed by the various military intelligence agencies when, after all, that threat is their raison d'être. Yet two of those military intelligence agencies collect not only military intelligence but also a major portion of U.S. political and economic data on the Soviet Union: the National Security Agency (NSA), which is responsible for most of our electronic intercepts; and the Satellite Reconnaissance Agency (SRA), which operates all intelligence satellites.[1]

Not only will new priorities have to be convincingly delineated, but some organizational changes will be needed as well, including a new position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI).

II

What should the new priorities be? Are there topics of sufficient import to the nation's well-being to replace the Soviets as the focus of U.S. intelligence? There are, and for the

[1]For reasons that are difficult to comprehend, the true name of this agency is classified. "Satellite Reconnaissance Agency" (SRA) is a fictional title that will be used for convenience in this article.

Stansfield Turner was Director of Central Intelligence, 1977–81. He is author, most recently, of *Terrorism and Democracy*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



O E C D O C D E

Recent OECD Publications on Economic Development

Transformation of Planned Economies: Property Rights Reform and Macroeconomic Stability.

Deals with some of the major issues facing those responsible for economic reform: privatization, property rights, competition and market-oriented "rules of the game," financial market reform, and structural conditions needed to attain macroeconomic policy objectives.
14-91-03-1, June 1991, 136 pages, ISBN 92-64-13491-3, $30.00

Services in Central and Eastern European Countries.

Demonstrates that the development of services should be given a prominent place in the transition process currently under way in the central and eastern European countries and should contribute to the expansion of their foreign trade. This report devotes particular attention to the service sectors in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.
22-91-01-1, May 1991, 54 pages, ISBN 92-64-13487-5, $18.00

Japanese Capital Exports and Asian Economic Development

by Derek Healey.

Argues that Japan's balance of payments surplus is not unduly large relative to its level of economic development, and that it is ill-advised to try to reduce this surplus, an important source of investment for development. Focusing on the Pacific-Asian region, the report looks closely at the links between trade, investment, and aid and draws lessons regarding the criteria that will likely affect Japanese overseas investment decisions in the years to come.
41-91-05-1, May 1991, 256 pages, ISBN 92-64-13484-0, $48.00

Competition and Economic Development.

Proceedings of a symposium designed to give representatives from both developed and developing countries an opportunity to exchange views on the use of competition policy as a tool for economic growth and development. The book includes 26 papers under four main subject headings: The Contribution of Competition Policy to Economic Development, Main Competition Policy Approaches, Regulatory Reform and the Respective Roles of the Public and Private Sectors, and Trade, Technology, and Competitive Opportunities.
24-91-02-3, May 1991, 268 pages, ISBN 92-64-03347-5, $34.00

Please send me:

☐ **Transformation of Planned Economies** $30.00
☐ **Services in Central and Eastern Europe** $18.00
☐ **Japanese Capital Exports** $48.00
☐ **Competition and Economic Development** $34.00

My Check or Money Order for $_____ is enclosed.

Charge my ☐ American Express ☐ MasterCard ☐ Visa

Card Number _____

Expiration Date _____

Signature _____

Name _____

Address _____

_____

_____

Send order to:

OECD Publications and Information Center
2001 L Street, N.W., Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20036-4910
Telephone: (202) 785-6323

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

KING FAHD and SAUDI ARABIA'S GREAT EVOLUTION



Dr. Nasser Ibrahim Rashid
Dr. Esber Ibrahim Shaheen

This unique TIMELY fact-filled book, a rich feast, presents an insightful, historical account of the meteoric ascent of Saudi Arabia. Written enthusiastically in smooth lyrical style, this book already rich with facts and figures is further supplemented by a very complete and useful appendices. MUST READING—a fascinating chronicle for the MIDDLE EAST WATCHER, the historian, the researcher, as well as the casual reader and anyone with special interest in the Gulf region.

354 p. color listed at $39.95 — Special Discount, Order number TXT610 for $19.95 — Plus $2.50 shipping and handling.

International Institute of Technology, Inc.
830 Wall St., Joplin, MO 64801

A world of information at your fingertips

Tracking the changing world economy or cataloging your rare coin collection— Observations of emerging democracies in Eastern Europe or profiling important contacts. *Notebook II* is the information database manager that allows you to collect and retrieve unlimited information for reports, manuscripts, or personal record keeping.

Notebook II's companion programs give bibliographic and on-line database capability, providing the serious observer with all the tools necessary to keep the world at your fingertips in an orderly fashion.

Notebook II
PRO/TEM

For more information, call 800/533-6922, or write Pro/Tem Software, Inc. 3790 El Camino Real, Suite 389, Palo Alto, CA 94306 (fax 415/323-0611)

Chosen By The World's Most Discriminating Guests

THE MADISON℠

Washington's Correct Address®

15th & M Streets, Northwest
Washington, D.C. 20005
202/862-1600 • 800/424-8577
Telex 64245

Marshall B. Coyne
Chairman of the Board

Free Catalog

Bargain Books

Choose from recent publishers' overstocks, remainders, imports and reprints – up to 8,000 titles each month, including 600-1,500 new arrivals – most at savings of 50% to 80%.

We publish a new catalog every 4 weeks, each offering an immense selection from all major publishers, and with more books at $1.95, $2.95, $3.95 than you'll find anywhere else: **Politics,** Fiction, Biography, Science, Art, Literature, Health, Movies, Nature, Gardening and more. Something for everyone, from yesterday's best sellers to titles you never knew existed, most in limited supply. We normally ship within 24 hours with a money-back guarantee.



Send me your FREE Catalog of Bargain Books.

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ Zip _____

HAMILTON Box 15-577, Falls Village CT 06031

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

simple reason that we live in an information age. Increasingly, having the best information is the key to success in almost any line of endeavor. The tremendous advantage U.S. forces achieved over Iraq in the Gulf War was because Washington knew more about what Baghdad's military was doing than Iraq did about American forces. Or imagine what help it would be in international trade negotiations to know precisely what internal subsidies and other devices the other side is employing. Information always has been power, but today there is more opportunity to obtain good information, and the United States has more capability to do that than any other nation.

This is an advantage not to be forsaken just because the Cold War is over, even though we may not be able to identify today exactly what information will give us the most power a decade or so from now. It will cost very little to maintain or expand U.S. human intelligence efforts. What will be expensive is the building of a robust network of satellites with a variety of sensors. Washington can easily construct a system that will detect any significant activity on the surface of the earth, day or night, under clouds or jungle cover, and with such frequency as to make deliberate evasion difficult. Physicist Edward Teller has estimated that such a system would cost $5 billion to purchase and $1 billion per year to operate. At twice that it would be a bargain because the ability to peer anywhere, anytime, is bound to be of great value in the uncertain new world ahead.

There is much more than this general case for continuing a wide-ranging intelligence effort. The most obvious specific impact of the new world order is that, except for Soviet nuclear weaponry, the preeminent threat to U.S. national security now lies in the economic sphere. The United States has turned from being a major creditor nation to the world's greatest debtor, and there are countless industries where U.S. companies are no longer competitive. We must, then, redefine "national security" by assigning economic strength greater prominence. That means we will need better economic intelligence. The United States does not want to be surprised by such worldwide developments as technological breakthroughs, new mercantilist strategies, sudden shortages of raw materials or unfair or illegal economic practices that disadvantage the country.

If the objective of collecting economic intelligence is to buttress national economic strength, then that requires mak-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing our businesses more competitive in the global marketplace. How can we do this with information acquired secretly abroad? Economic intelligence can range from the broad trends that foreign businesses are pursuing, all the way to what individual foreign competitors are bidding against U.S. corporations on specific contracts overseas. Some argue that when it comes to specific data such as competitive bids the government should not become a partner of business and distort the free enterprise system. The United States, however, would have no compunction about stealing military secrets to help it manufacture better weapons.

If economic strength should now be recognized as a vital component of national security, parallel with military power, why should America be concerned about stealing and employing economic secrets? But if the government provides economic intelligence to specific American corporations, how does Washington decide which ones should benefit? What about a corporation that operates in the United States and provides jobs for Americans but is foreign-owned? There are problems galore, but these are for the Commerce Department to handle on a case-by-case basis. One way to help, when there is no other, is to make information public. That may aid U.S. corporations less than some would like, but it also can lessen an advantage foreign corporations have over American firms.

While there are arguments over how far the U.S. government should go toward providing intelligence data to specific U.S. corporations, there is no question that friendly foreign countries make use of their intelligence services against U.S. businesses. Most everyone would agree that U.S. intelligence agencies should work closely with the American business community to prevent the loss of proprietary information to such foreign-government sponsored espionage. All of this says, then, that in an age of increasing attention to economic strength, there needs to be a more symbiotic relationship between the worlds of intelligence and business.

In addition to a shift toward economic intelligence, the new world order calls for more emphasis on political intelligence in Third World countries. Let us recall that over the past dozen years political events in Iran, Libya, Grenada, Panama, Lebanon and Kuwait have each involved the United States in commitments to the use of military force. The United States did not foresee that it would become involved in any of these

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CRANE RUSSAK
a member of Taylor & Francis Group

AUTUMN READING...

THE DIVIDED WORLD OF THE BOLIVIAN ANDES: A STRUCTURAL VIEW OF DOMINATION AND RESISTANCE
Dwight R. Hahn, John Carroll University, University Heights, Ohio

Bolivia is divided between two worlds in which values, perceptions and social organization are radically different. To understand this division and political outcomes, this book applies modes-of-production analysis to the Bolivian social formation. It demonstrates that the Bolivian state was unable to overcome the contradiction posed by indigenous ideology, which was reactive and resistant to the intrusion of capitalist reactions to production in the countryside.

Crane Russak • 1991 • 150 pages
❑ 0-8448-1695-7 HC $47.00

STATE, CLASS AND THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE MEXICAN BANKS
Russell N. White, Ph.D., Latin American Consulting, Inc., Kent, WA

This book provides an analytical history of Mexican banks and the transformation of commercial, bank and finance capital and ascertains the relevance of Mexican financial history as compared to the decision to nationalize the banks. Adressed are important political concepts about the nature of the State and class fractions of capital.

Crane Russak • 1991 • 285 pages
❑ 0-8448-1698-1 HC $47.00

TRANSITION AND TURMOIL IN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE
Edited by Robert A. Levine, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA

This book examines Western European policies on the basis of two premises, analytical and normative. The study consists of a brief introduction, seven chapters on major NATO nations and regions, and a final chapter concerning Europe's security future and for US policy toward Europe.

Crane Russak • 1991 • 250 pages
❑ 0-8448-1701-5 HC $42.00
❑ 0-8448-1702-3 SC $20.00

ALTERNATIVE CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE, VOLUME 2: NATO STRATEGY AND FORCE POSTURE ALTERNATIVES
Edited by Hans Gunter Brauch and Robert Kennedy

This volume examines NATO strategy and force posture alternatives in light of the changes that have taken place and are in the process of taking place in Europe today. A variety of opinions is presented on the future of NATO, its strategy and force structures as a "New Europe" begins to emerge in the post-Cold War period.

Crane Russak • 1991 • 224 pages
❑ 0-8448-1600-0 HC $45.00
❑ 0-8448-1601-9 SC $29.50

❑ Please send me the books I have indicated.
I have enclosed payment in the amount of $_____.
(Make check payable to Taylor & Francis. U.S. funds only please.) Please add $2.50 shipping and handling. For orders over $50.00, add 4%. PA Residents add 6% sales tax.

Charge my ___VISA ___MC ___AMEX
Card No. _____ Exp. Date _____
Signature _____
Telephone _____
(required for credit card)
P.O.# _____ Date _____
Name _____
(please print)
Address _____
_____
City _____ State _____ Zip _____

TO ORDER BY PHONE, CALL TOLL-FREE 1-800-821-8312

Send orders to:
CRANE RUSSAK
c/o Taylor & Francis
1900 Frost Road
Suite 101
Bristol, PA 19007

FA0791A

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

CUSTOM PUBLISHED TEXTBOOKS

A textbook which is relevant, up-to-date and personalized?

Yes!! **FOREIGN AFFAIRS Special Anthologies.**

The textbook which lets you pick the topic and title, write the introduction and conclusion, and even choose the articles.

Special Anthologies are the perfect educational tool for teaching current and/or historical events.

And now, **Special Anthologies** are available for classes with as few as 10 students.

Send us your list of FOREIGN AFFAIRS articles today and your **Special Anthology** will be available in 5 weeks or less.



To order, or for more information, contact:
Peter Kaufman, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 58 E. 68th St., New York, NY 10021
(212)734-0400; Fax (212) 861-1789

The Twentieth Century Fund

A research foundation engaged in public policy studies of economic, political, and social issues and institutions. 41 East 70th Street, New York, New York 10021 ▪ (212) 535-4441. Twentieth Century Fund papers and reports are distributed through The Brookings Institution.



Securing Europe by Richard H. Ullman. A Twentieth Century Fund Book, Published by Princeton University Press.

"In this lucid and insightful work one of our leading foreign policy analysts provocatively examines Europe's future in the uncharted waters beyond the cold war." —Ronald Steel

The Future of Banking by James L. Pierce. A Twentieth Century Fund Report, Published by Yale University Press.

"A 'must read' for all those who are now fretting about the condition of our banks." —Robert E. Litan





Partners in Prosperity: The Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the International Coordination of National Economic Policies, background paper by Robert Solomon.

FORTHCOMING

The Consequences of Peace: The New Internationalism and American Foreign Policy, by James Chace. Oxford University Press, Spring 1992

◆ ◆ ◆

The Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Covert Action and American Democracy, background paper by Allan E. Goodman and Bruce D. Berkowitz.

A look at the constitutional and policy issues inherent in covert action. (late 1991)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

situations. We cannot be confident of predicting today where we may choose to intervene tomorrow.

There are national rivalries whose outcomes will be of concern to Washington such as those between the Arab world and Israel, Pakistan and India, North and South Korea, the African National Congress and the South African government, Iraq and Iran. And we know there are global trends toward independence or autonomy for ethnic, religious or national groups and toward democracy in general. These trends will affect countries of interest: Yugoslavia, Romania, India, all of the Arab world and most of Africa. Because of the lessening of Cold War competition in the Third World, Washington may view such unstable situations from a more relaxed posture and be less inclined to become involved. Yet the United States can make good choices only by being well informed.

Finally, there are growing global problems such as terrorism, ecological abuse and drug trafficking that will require the United States to collect a diversity of information. With a global system of data collection, there will be many beneficent uses of information such as helping with the development of remote underdeveloped areas and in disaster-relief operations.

III

The need for military intelligence in the new world order will diminish but not disappear. So long as the Soviet Union maintains sizable conventional military forces, the United States must account for them, even if with a lesser sense of urgency. And Soviet nuclear forces will demand at least as much attention, perhaps more, if the United States is required to verify increasingly complex arms control agreements. Moreover Washington will want to know about renegade countries that manufacture and store nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. And even those nations' conventional weapons will be of interest, as Washington will want to know in advance of intended military operations, such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. These worldwide checks on weapons and a country's intentions for using them will require a highly intrusive monitoring and verification system. But in a new, more friendly world order, the United States will want that system to be as impersonal—as non-incriminating—as possible.

We will not want to be caught by friends in the act of spying,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as that is far more embarrassing than being caught by an adversary who accepts spying as just one more facet of an unpleasant relationship. And it is not only a matter of embarrassment. The effectiveness of the United States in urging order in the new world will be directly related to its ability to bring together coalitions of countries to grapple with international problems. Nevertheless, as we increase emphasis on securing economic intelligence, we will have to spy on the more developed countries–our allies and friends with whom we compete economically–but to whom we turn first for political and military assistance in a crisis. This means that rather than instinctively reaching for human, on-site spying, the United States will want to look to those impersonal technical systems, primarily satellite photography and intercepts.

This is not to say we should eschew human intelligence operations in the new world order, but that human spying must be employed more selectively. That runs exactly counter to what one inevitably hears when there has been an intelligence "failure," such as not predicting Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The litany is familiar. We should throw more and more human agents against such problems, because the only way to get inside the minds of adversaries and discern intentions is with human agents.

As a general proposition, that is simply not true. Electronic intercepts may be even more useful in discerning intentions. For instance, if a foreign official writes about plans in a message and the United States intercepts it, or if he discusses it and we record it with a listening device, those verbatim intercepts are likely to be more reliable than second-hand reports from an agent. Not only do agents have biases and human fallibilities, there is always the risk that an agent is, after all, working for someone else.

There are a number of recent examples in which technical intelligence systems either uncovered intentions or should have. One was in 1986 when the United States intercepted messages from the Libyan government to its embassy in East Germany, indicating foreknowledge of a terrorist bombing attack in West Berlin. Using that revelation, the U.S. government attempted to thwart the act, but unfortunately the information was not sufficiently specific. Another instance involved the September 1984 terrorist bombing of the U.S. embassy annex in Beirut. Satellite photographs taken before

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the bombing, but unfortunately overlooked, showed that someone had built a mock-up of the embassy annex and its defenses and had practiced driving trucks through them.

Human intelligence is not the sole detector of intentions, but there is an area where it does have a rather exclusive role to play, and it falls in an area where U.S. needs are increasing: forecasting events driven by ground swells in public attitudes, such as public animosities toward an incumbent government, or outbursts of destructive zealotry impelled by ethnic or religious fervor. It may at first seem strange to use the human spying apparatus for public pulse-taking. Human intelligence normally involves recruiting agents close to some important individual or decision-making body, or planting listening devices in the right place or surreptitiously photographing documents. Today, though, the United States faces an increasing number of situations in which the target is not a well-constructed plan that has been hammered out in discussions on which we can eavesdrop, or one which is eventually transcribed and can be copied or intercepted.

For instance, in my time as director of the CIA, our greatest failure was inadequately emphasizing the dangerous waters into which the Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran was sailing in 1978. What we needed to know was not that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his lieutenants were secretly scheming in Paris and employing such unorthodox techniques as sending taped cassettes of propaganda into Iran. If we had obtained that kind of information about Khomeini's plans, we would have questioned whether any of the schemes would have been effective. What we missed was the breadth and intensity of feeling against the shah inside Iran. That was what allowed Khomeini to ignite the country. Those feelings against the shah were shared by disparate groups that came together for the specific and temporary purpose of deposing him.

American intelligence operatives were simply not in touch with the mullahs in the mosques, who were telling the peasants how the shah was "profaning" Islam; nor with the merchants in the bazaars, who were grumbling about the stranglehold of the regime on the economy; or the politically educated, who were exasperated with the shah's unwillingness to share political power. Not only were we not talking with a broad enough cross section of people, we were not sampling attitudes widely enough across the country. In part that was because in the past few decades the State Department, and with it the CIA, have

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

confined their operations only to the capitals and one or two cities in major countries.

Even so U.S. diplomats try to stay abreast of public attitudes, and, logically, it is their task rather than that of the CIA. Unfortunately diplomatic personnel are contributing less and less in this area: in part because the burdens of diplomacy have increased; more so because totalitarian countries, such as the shah's Iran, do not tolerate State Department officers maintaining contact with dissident groups, some of them illegal. CIA officers who were not known by the local government to be employees of the U.S. government could do the job. Or they could recruit local agents to go out and clandestinely sample opinion. The latter would be more effective in any event, as there is a risk that citizens being interviewed would distort their answers if they were giving them to a foreigner. In addition we would want the same individual to do the sampling over a number of years. What is important is not what any single sample says but how it changes; for instance, whether there is increasing or decreasing support or opposition to a government.

One example of the importance of understanding public attitudes is our experience with maintaining peacekeeping forces in Beirut beginning in 1982. U.S. intelligence failed to detect the depth of animosity to this American military presence. When U.S. forces came to be seen as supportive of the Christian-dominated government, rather than as peacekeepers, a wave of terrorist acts from a variety of groups drove both U.S. peacekeeping forces and U.S. diplomats from Lebanon. This transpired not because some Islamic fundamentalist mullahs held secret meetings into which we might possibly have slipped an agent. Rather, the series of bombings, kidnappings, hijackings and murders designed to intimidate Washington came from a number of religious and ethnic groups in Lebanon. It was the cumulative effect of their separate actions that drove us out. Our clandestine intelligence operatives could have been out sampling those attitudes and determining that they were increasing to crisis proportions.

Still another case in which we were unaware of important indigenous attitudes was Nicaragua in the 1980s. Although the CIA was deeply involved in assisting the contras, it was not aware of how strongly the non-contra populace opposed the Sandinista government. Witness the fact that we had no inkling that the anti-Sandinista candidate, Violeta Barrios de

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Chamorro, would win the February 1990 elections by a landslide. It would have been a challenge to have sampled those attitudes, as many Nicaraguans were intimidated from expressing anti-Sandinista views. But that is precisely the kind of challenge U.S. human intelligence services are trained to meet.

A glaring example of a failure to understand foreign cultures and attitudes was the harebrained idea, spawned in the CIA, that selling arms to Iran in 1985 was the way to support "moderate" Iranians who would undercut the Khomeini government. Yet when the former national security adviser, Robert McFarlane, went secretly to Teheran to negotiate, he found that even someone as high up as Hojatolislam Hashemi Rafsanjani was terrified coming to a meeting, lest he be accused of consorting with the "Great Satan." All of this was seven years after the CIA (in my time) had underestimated the virulence of Islamic fundamentalists toward the United States.

IV

Even though these examples show that the United States has a serious intelligence gap to fill, it will not be easy to induce the government's clandestine services to fill it. CIA case officers are trained in recruiting agents, planting bugs and photographing documents. To ask them to go out and sense public attitudes is almost like asking a fighter pilot to leave his supersonic jet and become a crop duster in a propeller-driven biplane.

This is not to suggest that gauging public attitudes should become the primary role for America's clandestine services. Washington has seen several examples recently when it badly needed their traditional practices of recruiting agents to penetrate governments. One was in determining whether Saddam Hussein was going to attack Kuwait in August 1990. Another was in locating Manuel Antonio Noriega when the United States invaded Panama in December 1989. Unfortunately in neither case were U.S. human intelligence operatives able to uncover the intentions of these two tyrants. Why not?

In Panama the situation was ideal for recruiting agents. The United States has long maintained a large presence there, which should have made it easy to persuade Panamanians that they could benefit from supporting the U.S. government. Yet when American troops moved into Panama it took them an embarrassing four days to track down the dictator. There is no question that Noriega took extreme measures to elude U.S. troops by constantly moving about and having duplicate

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

automobiles and stand-ins. What the United States needed, and obviously did not have, was someone positioned inside Noriega's immediate entourage. The United States also did not have anyone inside Saddam Hussein's inner circle. Iraq was more of a challenge, considering the cultural differences, the difficulties facing any American working in the country at that time and the risks to anyone the CIA might have recruited.

There are several reasons why we were unable to effect penetrations like these and why our human spying will probably never be what we would like. To begin with, the CIA is a relatively young organization and has never developed a sound tradition in this area. In the CIA's early days the inordinate fear of its chief of counter-intelligence, James Angleton, about the possibility of Soviet penetration of the agency inhibited the recruitment of Soviet agents. After Angleton there was such a rush to recruit that many supposed agents were not adequately vetted. The CIA has yet to build a well-balanced clandestine service.

The more immediate problem is that the CIA's case officers operate under a handicap of not being able to maintain good "cover." The U.S. government will not ask American espionage personnel to make the sacrifices that the Soviets ask of their agents. Soviet agents will leave their homes behind, live for long periods in a foreign country, adopt its citizenship and engage in mundane business activities for years before commencing espionage operations. There is no way we could ask Americans to go to the often repressive countries on which we need to spy and live that way. Nor does Washington like to expose American agents to the penalties of being caught spying without holding diplomatic status.

The United States is not even good at maintaining the limited cover it does establish. Most agencies of the U.S. government are reluctant to have CIA clandestine personnel masquerading as their employees. And the CIA's clandestine people themselves are usually unwilling to pay the price of integrating themselves into another department's operations because that requires working full-time at two jobs simultaneously.

In face of these impediments any improvements the government can make to its human intelligence operations are likely to be marginal. Still we should try, as the payoff can be high when successful. All agencies of the U.S. government should be instructed that human spying is a presidentially and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

congressionally authorized activity, and that they must play a role in it. Some agencies ought even to be required to establish new functions overseas that would provide good cover for the CIA.

The CIA's clandestine service should also do more for itself. First it must appreciate that the cost of cover has increased substantially. At best, between 20–30 percent of a case officer's time will be spent spying. Second the clandestine service must accept the inconvenience of not having a separate CIA office in every embassy. Such offices are too easily identified. One of the most startling facts I came across in my years in the CIA was that the agency had its own officers' club overseas in the 1950s, back in the heyday of human intelligence. That could only have been an invitation to easy identification of the agents' roles.

Third the reward system for espionage must be changed. Presently it rests on numbers of agents recruited, but the focus needs to be on the quality of information obtained, judged over a period of time.

Finally the type of persons brought into American espionage must shift with the change in targets. We will need officers who are conversant with economics and with highly technical issues, such as nuclear proliferation, more than the broad-ranging political scientists who have traditionally constituted the backbone of the clandestine service.

In sum, the new world order will yield technical systems that will serve as a sword, the broad cutting edge of intelligence collection, and human spying operations that will serve as the rapier, to be applied judiciously to very specific requirements. Above all, America will have the ability to integrate both the human and the technical efforts that combine for successful collection. Each system has its strengths and its weaknesses. We must make them play to each other.

V

Ensuring such coordination is the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence. In theory he has the authority to carry it out, but in practice the mechanisms available to him are not sufficient. What is required is a relationship between the DCI and the collection agencies similar to that which military field commanders have to the army, navy and air force, and which was one of the keys to General Norman Schwarzkopf's success in the Gulf War. Schwarzkopf, as a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unified commander, had full operational control over all forces assigned to him. The departments of army, navy and air force were responsible for providing support to those forces, that is, for obtaining and training the necessary people, equipment and supplies, but not for directing their operations in the field.

The DCI is in an analogous position to a unified commander. He must operate the intelligence-collection assets of the country hour-by-hour every day. It happens, though, that his two most important collection assets, the NSA and SRA, have always been under the military command structure. It is convenient to have military units send up satellites and man listening posts on aircraft, ships and military bases; and the military has a vital need for the kinds of intelligence the technical systems of NSA and SRA collect. But if we are to shift priorities to economics and politics, we need some mechanism for ensuring that military priorities do not always prevail.

Today the DCI can order up whatever collection operations he wants, but the directors of these agencies know their bread is buttered in the Pentagon. To get their attention the DCI, rather than the secretary of defense, should have the authority to appoint and fire these directors. They are, after all, two of his most key subordinates in the entire intelligence community. The DCI also needs a staff with the capability and the authority to issue operating orders to all agencies collecting intelligence, human or technical. In short the intelligence requirements of the new world order make it increasingly important that a single authority balance the economic, political and military intelligence requirements of the nation. That someone cannot be in the military command. It has to be the DCI.

The DCI also needs authority to control the dissemination of the information collected. One major reason the Congress created the position in 1947 was to avoid the mistakes made just prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, when the army, navy and State Department intelligence bureaus were not fully sharing the clues each had about Japanese intentions. Today the collection agencies are almost as autonomous, with regard to excluding other agencies from what they have learned. Their rationale for this compartmentalization is to protect the "sources and methods" by which the information was gathered. That is a legitimate enough concern, but there is such excessive withholding that, in my

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

opinion, the United States is just as vulnerable to a Pearl Harbor now as in 1941.

Another problem runs in the opposite direction. The collecting agencies have tended to expand their assignment: from collecting the data to interpreting it. This is dangerous because there is no assurance that any single collection agency has all of the relevant information or skills for such interpretation. In 1979 the NSA produced a report that determined that the Soviets had introduced a new "combat brigade" into Cuba, a conclusion that went beyond reporting what the NSA had actually observed. NSA had not checked with the CIA or State Department on the history of this brigade, and hence its conclusion was wrong. This episode had a damaging impact on the ongoing SALT II negotiations.

VI

All told there will be considerable challenges in reorienting the collection agencies to a new set of priorities and in improving their total performance. Relatively speaking, though, there is an even greater need for improvement on the analytic side of the intelligence community. For one thing the U.S. government will rely less on spying to obtain information. In a more democratic and open new world order, there will be more information available from public debate, from the growing number of arrangements for on-site inspections for arms control purposes and from increasing international trade and travel.

Beyond that the quality of intelligence analysis has never met our expectations. Senator Daniel P. Moynihan (D-NY) has recommended that the CIA be placed under the secretary of state. He contended: "For a quarter of a century, the CIA has been repeatedly wrong about the major political and economic questions entrusted to its analysis."[2] Significantly, the senator cited "political and economic" analysis, not military. With military intelligence it is vital to know your opponent's military capabilities so that you can prepare to meet them. Yet gauging military capabilities is a much more straightforward, factual exercise than, say, forecasting a political revolution such as the fall of the shah or an economic explosion such as the transformation of South Korea over the past two decades.

One of the cardinal weaknesses of American intelligence

[2]*The New York Times*, May 19, 1991.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

analysis has been getting large bureaucracies to go out on a limb, that is, to stake their reputations on forecasting. For instance, as late as 1980 I was briefing the Joint Economic Committee of Congress in open session that the rate of growth of the Soviet Union's gross national product was declining, but that the rate of Soviet spending on defense was climbing. Neither I nor the CIA's analysts reached the conclusion that eventually something had to give: that there would be a political and economic crisis. Yet it was only a little more than four years after I left the CIA that Mikhail Gorbachev entered the scene and found the situation so desperate that he moved quickly into the highly risky waters of perestroika and glasnost.

We should not gloss over the enormity of this failure to forecast the magnitude of the Soviet crisis. We know now that there were many Soviet academics, economists and political thinkers, other than those officially presented to us by the Soviet government, who understood long before 1980 that the Soviet economic system was broken and that it was only a matter of time before someone had to try to repair it, as had Khrushchev. Yet I never heard a suggestion from the CIA, or the intelligence arms of the departments of defense or state, that numerous Soviets recognized a growing, systemic economic problem.

Today we hear some revisionist rumblings that the CIA did in fact see the Soviet collapse emerging after all. If some individual CIA analysts were more prescient than the corporate view, their ideas were filtered out in the bureaucratic process; and it is the corporate view that counts because that is what reaches the president and his advisers. On this one, the corporate view missed by a mile.

Why were so many of us so insensitive to the inevitable? One reason, I believe, is that there are too few incentives in the intelligence community for forecasting. Our analytic bureaus, especially those dealing with the U.S.S.R., have become such large bureaucracies that, in the process of moving a forecast up the line from the individual analyst to the head of the agency, iconoclastic ideas get watered down in favor of what has been the accepted wisdom. For instance, one reason the government failed to anticipate the Soviet economic crisis adequately was that it assumed the old Stalinist rules about repressing dissent still prevailed, that public attitudes did not count in the Soviet Union. Yet Gorbachev made his radical moves not just because economic productivity was declining,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

but because the attitudes of the Soviet public toward their government, their work and their communist party were so negative. There was no longer any hope that fear and repression could drive the Soviet people into working harder.

Another reason for many of the analytic shortcomings is that our analytical agencies do not have an adequate grasp of the cultures of many countries with which we must deal. This of course goes back in part to our failure to feel the pulse in other countries, but it is an even larger problem of education and appreciation.

Still another explanation of our analytic shortcomings is the clash between fresh intelligence and established policy. Predicting the shah's fall, for example, would have challenged a basic U.S. foreign policy in the Persian Gulf area. Escaping the confines of policy will always be a problem for intelligence analysts. It should be less for CIA analysts because the CIA is not involved in making policy, as are other agencies of the intelligence community such as Defense, State and Treasury. The single greatest disadvantage of Senator Moynihan's proposal would be its subordination of the CIA to a policymaking organization. Most DCIs have not taken public positions on policy issues. Still, on major issues of foreign policy, any analyst knows the thrust the president is taking and, thus, must feel some pressure to support his ultimate boss. We need then to find ways to strengthen the sense of independence of analysts throughout the community.

If we do not accept Senator Moynihan's suggestion, how else can we promote better analysis? Giving the DCI more authority over the collecting agencies is a partial solution to improving collection, but it is not the answer to the problem of analysis. The last thing we need is forced conformity of analysis. Let me point out, by way of contrast, that conformity of intelligence to political ideology has always been one of the great weaknesses of Soviet intelligence. I once had the opportunity to ask a senior Soviet defector whether the top Soviet leadership received reasonably accurate assessments of why the United States was doing what it was. He replied that even very senior people like then-Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, who certainly understood the United States well, did not dare report with full frankness if their views ran contrary to established doctrine.

Analysts need to be given incentives to be more rigorous, to take into account the perspectives of other nations and to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

present well-reasoned ideas that run counter to accepted wisdom or policy. The government could help by establishing awards, perhaps with monetary compensation, for forecasts that proved to be accurate, even if overlooked by the system. Analysts would be encouraged to keep documentary evidence of positions they had taken. The president could help by authorizing the DCI to shift individual analysts between agencies on temporary assignments. This could help break ingrained thinking.

Moreover Congress could enact legislation to provide intelligence analysts a better opportunity to attend academic institutions, participate in professional conferences, travel and live abroad, acquire language skills and thus become true experts in their areas. Congress could also authorize an expansion of the DCI's personal analytic staff, presently known as the National Intelligence Council. An enlarged NIC would still be small enough to prevent redundant tinkering with analysts' work as it goes up the organizational chain. An enlarged NIC also could be a partial solution to the problem of the collecting agencies' excessive restriction of dissemination. This would be a core group of analysts who would be cleared for all, or almost all, information—our insurance against another failure like Pearl Harbor.

VII

Congress should amend its 1947 legislation, which assigns the DCI the dual roles of coordinator of the intelligence community and head of the CIA. Then, there were no satellites to be operated on a national basis; the NSA had yet to be established, and electronic intercept work was being done by the military; the CIA was just being formed; and the entire intelligence community was much smaller, with military espionage divided between two modest components, army and navy intelligence. Today the intelligence budget runs to billions; we have a multitude of national satellites with a variety of sensors; the CIA is reported to have many thousands of people; the NSA has many more personnel, as well as some of the world's most powerful computers; and there is a Defense Intelligence Agency, an Air Force Intelligence Agency, plus a whole host of military laboratories dedicated to individual subjects, such as aerodynamics, underwater acoustics and tank armor.

The intelligence community has grown in size, complexity

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and importance to the point where it now requires a full-time leader, a Director of National Intelligence (DNI). That said, there has long been a conflict of interest in having one person direct both the community and one of its key elements, the CIA. For instance with spending on national security set to be cut substantially, the United States will need an impartial arbiter to determine how to eliminate the very considerable duplication within the intelligence community. The real clincher is that no matter how small or how large the adjustments in intelligence on the Soviet Union and on military matters need to be, they will be resisted. That resistance will flow from long-established convictions that have meaningful roots beneath them. The most meaningful is that the United States must not endanger its military capabilities, even if our leaders think that those capabilities will be needed less in the future.

Over the past decade, the military has striven for even greater control over intelligence operations, including a determined effort to duplicate the CIA's human-intelligence capabilities. In the process it has managed to shift intelligence funds to the point that over one-third of the total expenditure is under the Pentagon's control, not the DCI's; and another half jointly controlled. The military's concerns behind this shift are not unfounded. The CIA has never paid sufficient attention to, nor been very good at, military intelligence other than strategic nuclear matters.

We have a challenge then to reconcile this growing, overall influence of the military and the declining importance of the military segment of intelligence. Again, the answer lies in an impartial DNI who does not have to defend the CIA, as does the DCI, but who can devote full time to adjudicating as impartially as possible with the intelligence community. Still it would be both wise and politic to provide in law for military representation in the new DNI's organization. Provision should be made that either the DNI or his deputy would be either a retired or active military officer; and that the DNI would have three statutory deputies, at least one of whom would be a three or four-star military officer.

This officer could serve as the deputy for budgets. Such a position already exists within the intelligence community staff. The only change needed is that Congress would send the funds for intelligence directly to the DNI, and this deputy would disburse them to the various agencies of the community. Or, the military officer could be the deputy for analysis,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

again a position that already exists as head of the NIC. An enlarged NIC is essential to the concept of a DNI because without a sufficiently large analytic staff to keep abreast of developments, the DNI could be too dependent on others.

Finally, the military is more likely to fit well into the position of deputy for collection. This function exists today in the limited form of committees for the coordination of human, electronic and photographic collection. What is needed is more manpower to direct these operations. Day-to-day support would remain with the parent departments, primarily the Department of Defense.

Hopefully the creation of a DNI can be done by shifting people around rather than increasing the total number of people in intelligence assignments. Larger staffs and more central control are not always good solutions to problems. In this case centralization has been progressing almost from the day the position of DCI was created. Each successive director has found it necessary to play a more active role with the community, and presidents have augmented his authority progressively. Now the dramatic world events in 1989 and thereafter should tell us that we must implement dramatic changes if our intelligence capabilities are to keep abreast of these times.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited by Lucy Edwards Despard

General: Political and Legal

Andrew J. Pierre

CULTURAL FORCES IN WORLD POLITICS. By Ali A. Mazrui. Portsmouth (NH): Heinemann, 1990, 272 pp. $24.95 (paper).

Now the Albert Schweitzer Professor of Political Science at the State University of New York, Binghamton, Kenyan-born Ali Mazrui has long been educating us to the significance of developing-world cultures, traditions and outlooks in international politics. In this work he seeks to find the proper role for the Third World in what he considers to be a still Western-dominated global system. The North, he observes, has the capacity to destroy the globe through resource depletion, pollution and other ecological damage, or through nuclear war. Yet the South, he argues, cannot seek an "exit visa" from this world system. Rather it should pursue strategies for selective entry and selective participation. Mazrui suggests a number of steps: greater use of its indigenous resources rather than relying on outside assistance; domesticating, for local cultures and conditions, what must be bought from abroad; diversifying trade partners and aid donors; wider horizontal interpenetration within the Third World; finally, greater Southern austerity in using Northern resources. This is an erudite, encyclopedic and provocative essay.

OF TIME AND POWER: LEADERSHIP DURATION IN THE MODERN WORLD. By Henry S. Bienen and Nicolas van de Walle. Stanford (CA): Stanford University Press, 1991, 215 pp. $25.00.

All practicing politicians and aspiring leaders should be interested in this original book. It is a carefully crafted study of why some leaders stay in power for long periods while others fall by the wayside, based on a global survey of 2,256 heads of state in 167 countries. The primary conclusion of the authors is not particularly exciting: the longer a leader is in power, the less the risk of losing it (up to a point). The reason, however, is important, as shown in nations that have had a rapid succession of leadership changes followed by a period of longevity, e.g., Syria and Hafez al-Assad. The ability of leaders, once having achieved office, to build political organizations, reward followers and punish opponents is a key to continuity. The authors are Africanists and they make some interesting observations about variations among regions of the world.

COMMON GROUND ON TERRORISM: SOVIET-AMERICAN COOPERATION AGAINST THE POLITICS OF TERROR. Edited by John Marks and Igor Beliaev. New York: Norton, 1991, 183 pp. $22.50.

Much has been written about international terrorism, but this pioneer work suggests ways in which the United States and the Soviet Union can cooperate. The nongovernmental task force that guided this study in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cluded former senior officials from both sides, which doubtless contributed to the useful specificity of the analysis and proposals.

PUBLIC CHOICES AND POLICY CHANGE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. By Merilee S. Grindle and John W. Thomas. Baltimore (MD): The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991, 222 pp.

This work looks not so much at the obstacles to reform as the ways to get around them through imaginative management. The proper setting of an agenda for action, the process of making decisions and the implementation of reform are all analyzed in depth. The authors, at the Harvard Institute for International Development, have written a book for professionals. One wonders what a similar book would say with respect to one nation that most needs reform, the Soviet Union.

THE SOCCER WAR. By Ryszard Kapuscinski. New York: Knopf, 1991, 234 pp. $21.00.

For those who fear that television is making newspaper reporting from overseas obsolete, this is a wonderful reminder that there still is a foreign correspondent metier. A Polish journalist, Kapuscinski has covered 27 revolutions and wars in fewer years in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. He chronicles the sights and smells of the Congo when Lumumba was murdered, of war in the Ogaden, of strife in Cyprus and earthy conditions in many other hot spots in ways that only the written word can portray.

General: Military, Technological and Scientific

Gregory F. Treverton

SECURING EUROPE. By Richard H. Ullman. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1991. 183 pp. $19.95.

A Europe of "divisible peace," not free of conflict but free of major war: this is Ullman's vision, one he offers in explicit rebuttal to those "realist" analysts who conjure a future of anarchy replacing the grim stability of bipolarity. His argument is less the integrating power of the European Community, though that plays a role, than the absence of Soviet power in central Europe and the presence of a satisfied Germany, along with Europe's experience that war does not pay. His recommendation is a European Security Organization, which would eventually subsume NATO. There is plenty with which to argue—for example, will Soviet (or Russian), not to say German, interests in eastern Europe be limited to the negative one of forestalling any serious threat? But that is a tribute to the clarity of this masterful essay; it sets the standard for the debate.

HISTORY AND STRATEGY. By Marc Trachtenberg. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1991, 292 pp. $44.50 (paper, $14.95).

These essays are sketches from a major work in progress—a study of international politics in the first two postwar decades. More important, they represent an innovation in historical scholarship. Nuclear strategy, to Trachtenberg, seemed elegant but so abstract as to make it almost unimaginable that any real statesman was influenced by it. Yet historians typically

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

succumbed to the opposite fallacy, assuming political intentions were paramount and, in Bernadotte Schmidt's words, "the details of military preparations. . . are of small consequence." The sketches look hard at whether decisions in particular instances were influenced by, for instance, trends in the strategic balance as a strategist might see them; admirably, they let the chips fall where they may.

GRAND STRATEGIES IN WAR AND PEACE. Edited by Paul M. Kennedy. New Haven (CT): Yale University Press, 1991, 228 pp. $25.00.

Grand strategy—looking beyond military strategy to the political and economic setting of national purpose—was making a comeback before the Cold War ended, pushed by writers as different as Michael Howard and Edward Luttwak. This volume's authors are distinguished and their subjects range from the Roman empire to the Soviet Union. Kennedy's own chapter specifies the conclusion about the United States prefigured in his *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*: "It simply is not a sensible strategy to have the leading power of the Western World resting upon financial and industrial foundations that are increasingly less competitive internationally. . . while that same nation has retained (indeed expanded). . . military and political commitments."

NATIONAL SERVICE: PRO AND CON. Edited by Williamson M. Evers. Stanford (CA): Stanford University Press, 1990, 269 pp. $14.95 (paper).

As the Cold War's wane reduces the need for military manpower, the debate over national service will diminish apace, but it probably should not. As with most issues of public policy, there is more to national service than meets the eye, as this thorough collection of analyses and commentaries demonstrates, and as Evers' introduction clearly lays out. The sides in the debate are disarmingly mixed up: most free-market conservatives, like Milton Friedman or Martin Anderson, oppose national service, but the idea is endorsed by those communitarian conservatives (and welfare-state liberals) who hope to recreate a sense of community in American life.

CONGRESS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS. By James M. Lindsay. Baltimore (MD): The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991, 205 pp.

This careful examination of how Congress reaches decisions on major nuclear systems, including a clutch of specific case studies, comes to a conclusion that is a welcome antidote: "pork"—jobs in one's district—matters, and Congress gives presidents what they ask for, if they are determined; yet substance also counts. Indeed, "what best explains congressional decision making are the personal policy preferences of individual members."

UNITED GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES. By Michael A. Freney and Rebecca S. Hartley. Washington: National Planning Association, 1991, 178 pp. $17.50 (paper).

Reflecting the old adage about writing a long letter because there was no time for a short one, the authors have taken the time to write a short primer, insightful and packed with information, including 50 pages of chronologies and documents.

BEYOND THE THAW: A NEW NATIONAL STRATEGY. By S. J. Deitchman. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1991, 258 pp. $49.95 (paper, $17.95).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This think-piece by a veteran defense analyst is peppered with insights—for instance, the United States can no longer afford its "Pearl Harbor syndrome," being prepared to fight a major war begun with surprise. It is also nicely honest in assessing the current global context and framing a new strategy that gives priority to putting America's domestic house in order, complete with money estimates to match.

AFTER THE COLD WAR: QUESTIONING THE MORALITY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. Edited by Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Kenneth L. Schwab. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1991, 276 pp. $55.00 (paper, $16.95).

The "after" in the title is only half apt, for both nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence will remain with us. Focused on the United States and the Soviet Union, this thoughtful book's chapters look backward to ask how important nuclear weapons were in the Cold War peace, and forward to question both their purpose and their morality in the years ahead. The authors range politically from Richard Perle to Paul Warnke, and professionally from practitioners to political philosophers and churchpeople.

ON NOT CONFUSING OURSELVES: ESSAYS ON NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY IN HONOR OF ALBERT AND ROBERTA WOHLSTETTER. Edited by Andrew W. Marshall and others. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1991, 331 pp. $49.95.

The Wohlstetters may like hard strategic give-and-take best, but good food and wine comes in a close second (as anyone who has ever presumed to invite Albert to a conference knows). This festschrift by colleagues, former students and admirers celebrates the strategic and the culinary. He is the quintessential defense insider who had influence without ever writing a book (she wrote a famous one, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*, and he wrote lots of papers, many of the best of them classified). The retrospectives conjure up the excitement of RAND's heyday during the 1950s, and Robert Bartley's preface is positively mouth-watering.

APPROACHES TO PEACE: AN INTELLECTUAL MAP. Edited by W. Scott Thompson and Kenneth M. Jensen. Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1991, 413 pp.

The Institute, a Democratic idea given life by the Reagan administration, has struggled to reach beyond its conservative origins. This carefully edited volume reflects that reaching; it is what it promises, a map of approaches to limiting conflict—from alliances, arms control and law to focusing on the nature of domestic systems.

HEGEMONIC RIVALRY: FROM THUCYDIDES TO THE NUCLEAR AGE. Edited by Richard Ned Lebow and Barry S. Strauss. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1991, 295 pp. $39.95 (paper).

Strategists and international relations theorists, both of whom trace their lineage to Thucydides, meet classicists in an engaging debate over reinterpreting him and the relevance of his commentary on Athens and Sparta to present-day Soviet-American relations. 'Tis a pity that at this price so few others will get to the meeting.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ON DISARMAMENT: THE ROLE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY. Edited by Ralph A. Hallenbeck and David E. Shaver. New York: Praeger, 1991, 248 pp. $47.95 (paper, $17.95).

This may be more than most people want to know about a conventional-forces-in-Europe arms control treaty. For those interested, however, this product of the U.S. Army War College, written before the treaty was concluded this past summer, is rich background—numbers, arguments and documents.

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

THE FORGOTTEN LINK: LABOR'S STAKE IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION. By Richard Edwards and Paola Garonna. Savage (MD): Rowman & Littlefield, 1991, 144 pp. $42.50 (paper, $17.95).

Taking a positive view of the benefits labor can draw from the increasing internationalization of national economics, this book makes a series of recommendations concerning the removal of barriers, the management of migration, the encouragement of diversified instead of standardized production and the participation of workers in decisions about the use of technology. A useful bibliography should stimulate further work in this neglected field. The American author is a professor at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst; the Italian author is on the staff of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris.

EC TRADE POLICY AND THE THIRD WORLD: AN IRISH PERSPECTIVE. By Alan Matthews. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1991, 246 pp.

Written under the auspices of Trocaire, the Catholic Agency for World Development, with financial support from the Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin, this is an excellent survey of the trade policies of the European Community and its member governments as they affect developing countries. Thoroughgoing and quite precise, it is forthright in detailing the various kinds of protection of European industries and the restraints put on measures intended to favor the developing countries. It also makes suggestions about structural adjustments, especially in Ireland, that would enlarge the market for imports from the developing countries.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIALISM. By Marie Lavigne. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991, 412 pp. $65.00 (paper, $17.95).

Although current events have greatly changed many of the issues discussed in this book, which first appeared in France in 1985, this study continues to be of interest as a leading scholar's effort to clarify the problems of the interplay of socialist economies with those of the West and the developing world. It may also help, as she hopes, in dealing with the transition of socialist countries since "for quite a long time the past will cling to the international behavior of these countries. . . no matter how violently it is rejected."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETITION AND INTERDEPENDENCE: THE SEARCH FOR POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES, WEST GERMANY, AND JAPAN. Edited by Gunter Heiduk and Kozo Yamamura. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991, 255 pp. $35.00.

In these very interesting papers a diverse group of people argue with a mixture of agreements and differences about the state of technology in Germany, Japan and the United States. A good bit of attention focuses on which government policies (if any) have major effects compared to the internationalization of science and the policies and aptitudes of enterprises.

AFTER THE REVOLUTIONS: EAST-WEST TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN THE 1990s. Edited by Gary K. Bertsch, Heinrich Vogel and Jan Zielonka. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1991, 227 pp. $35.00 (paper).

Although the Cold War provided the main rationale for strategic export controls, its end will not lead to their quick removal. These good papers by people of various nationalities are most helpful in tracing some of the changes that have to be taken into account. Although most of the authors are cautious in their recommendations, one of the most experienced, Philip Hanson of the University of Birmingham, quite wisely warns that as a result of new complexities, "if it has been difficult in the past to reach agreement, I think that in the near future it will for a time be impossible. Still, we have to try. . . ."

AMERICAN HEGEMONY AND WORLD OIL. By Simon Bromley. University Park: Penn State University Press, 1991, 316 pp. $39.50.

After devoting a good deal of space to explaining why he finds most theories of international relations inadequate to explain American hegemony, Bromley pulls together a large number of facts as he retells the story of oil as a strategic commodity in modern times. He mixes good analytical points with quite dubious ones and sometimes lapses into overcomplicated scholarly lingo. He draws freely on a collection of quasi-Marxist ideas (or is it only the vocabulary?). But the whole leads him to what seem like realistic conclusions concerning the alteration rather than the elimination of American power.

PETROLE: CRISES, MARCHES ET POLITIQUES. By Pierre Jacquet and Françoise Nicolas. Paris: Dunod, 1991, 160 pp. Fr. 80.

Since oil is a raw material *pas comme les autres*, these French analysts look at its geography and politics as well as give a fairly detailed exposition of production, uses and markets (along with a 36-page statistical appendix). They examine the impact of the Persian Gulf crisis up to the war and also look forward to sketch several alternative possibilities for future arrangements between producers and consumers.

INTERACTIONS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: PERSPECTIVES FROM INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC HISTORY. Edited by Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich. New York: New York University Press, 1991, 376 pp. $15.00 (paper).

This attractive collection includes some ingenious examinations of rather arcane subjects, a few papers that do little more than document well-known generalizations and a few stimulating inquiries into the histor-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ical background of current issues, such as Charles P. Kindleberger on the changed place of the United States in the world economy, Albert Fishlow on Latin American debt and Detlef Lorenz on the essential characteristics of the newly industrialized countries. It is a festschrift for Wolfram Fischer.

TOWARD A NORTH AMERICAN COMMON MARKET. Edited by Charles F. Bonser. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1991, 125 pp. $22.50.

Based on a conference run largely by Indiana University, this fairly modest volume is much influenced by the idea that regional blocs will soon dominate world trade.

U.S.-MEXICAN INDUSTRIAL INTEGRATION: THE ROAD TO FREE TRADE. Edited by Sidney Weintraub with Luis Rubio F. and Alan D. Jones. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1991, 342 pp. $32.00.

Very good studies by Mexican and American authors compare the part that government policies and other factors have played in shaping the relations of the two countries' automobile, petrochemical, pharmaceutical, textile, computer and food industries. They show, according to the Mexican editor, "that the border is increasingly becoming not much more than an administrative barrier, albeit a cumbersome one, to industrial processes." Weintraub notes that the studies make clear "that the industrial strategies in the two countries are not completely separable."

POLITICAL ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS. By Jagdish Bhagwati. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991, 576 pp.

Among these 25 papers, all written since 1984, the author, a leader in international trade theory, calls attention to several on political economy "that represent a major turning point in my intellectual efforts."

PARALLEL POLITICS: ECONOMIC POLICYMAKING IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES. Edited by Samuel Kernell. Washington: Brookings, 1991, 390 pp. $36.95 (paper, $15.95).

In the hope of helping Japanese and Americans to improve their understanding of each other's ways of dealing with economic issues, specialists from both countries carried out comparative studies of policy-making in budgets, tax reform and structural change. These are usefully set in essays on the way politics shape these matters in both countries.

INTERNATIONAL MONEY AND DEBT: CHALLENGES FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY. Edited by Rudiger Dornbusch and Steve Marcus. San Francisco: International Center for Economic Growth, 1991, 200 pp. $12.95 (paper).

The case for yet another collection of papers on international debt lies largely in some of the points made by authors who have been close to the actual workings of international finance in recent years.

FOREIGN ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION: TRANSFORMATIONS IN SOCIALIST AND MARKET ECONOMIES. Edited by Andras Koves and Paul Marer. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1991, 288 pp. $42.50 (paper, $17.95).

THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENTS ON EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS. Edited by Gary Bertsch and Steven Elliott-Gower. New York: New York University Press, 1991, 407 pp. $75.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Written close to the watershed of change in east European economic arrangements, the numerous conference papers in these two volumes—mostly by highly qualified authors—inevitably include both old and new thinking and stimulating analyses as well as some highly predictable pages.

The United States

Gaddis Smith

THE CRISIS YEARS: KENNEDY AND KHRUSHCHEV, 1960–1963. By Michael R. Beschloss. New York: HarperCollins, 1991, 816 pp. $29.95.

The Cold War might have ended three decades ago—not through mutual understanding but in World War III. This massively detailed account explores the ways in which John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, despite a plenitude of folly and misperception, managed to prevent war and to acquire an appreciation of each other and their common responsibilities. The book is deeply researched and dramatically written.

INSIDE THE COLD WAR: LOY HENDERSON AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE, 1918–1961. By H. W. Brands. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, 337 pp. $27.95.

A model biography of a quintessentially professional American diplomat whose career flourished along with the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Loy Henderson did not attain the glamorous public recognition of a George Kennan or Charles Bohlen, but his consistent anti-Soviet outlook and extraordinary capacity for work exerted great influence in the State Department for decades. His weakness, as the author points out, was that he knew what he was against, but "was less clear what he was for."

TERRORISM AND DEMOCRACY. By Stansfield Turner. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991, 259 pp. $21.95.

Admiral Turner, director of central intelligence in the Carter administration, reviews the American response to a great variety of sub-war hostile acts from 1968 to the mid-1980s. The group of chapters on the seizure of the American embassy in Teheran is especially valuable and provides new details. Admiral Turner argues for caution but not necessarily abstinence in using military force, flexibility in making "deals," patience in applying economic sanctions, and recourse to legal options.

THE KIRKPATRICK MISSION: DIPLOMACY WITHOUT APOLOGY, AMERICA AT THE UNITED NATIONS, 1981–1985. By Allan Gerson. New York: The Free Press, 1991, 316 pp. $22.95.

The author served as legal counsel and dedicated ideological admirer of Jeane J. Kirkpatrick during her tenure as U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations. The book is a crisp, feisty account of Ambassador Kirkpatrick's defense of American interests as she understood them and of her difficulties with the State Department. Informative on the Falklands war, policy toward Nicaragua, the Grenada intervention and other episodes.

EXPORTING DEMOCRACY: FULFILLING AMERICA'S DESTINY. By Joshua Muravchik. Washington: The AEI Press, 1991, 259 pp.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This exuberantly optimistic book celebrates victory in the Cold War and calls on the United States to make "the promotion of democracy. . . the centerpiece of American foreign policy," employing peaceful, open methods without abandoning the capacity to use military force and covert action if necessary. The author warns against resurgent isolationism while hoping for "a Pax Americana unlike any previous peace, one of harmony, not of conquest."

COMING TO PUBLIC JUDGMENT: MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK IN A COMPLEX WORLD. By Daniel Yankelovich. Syracuse (NY): Syracuse University Press, 1991, 290 pp. $34.95 (paper, $16.95).

Here is a serious, reflective commentary on the failure of American political society to develop and value public judgment as distinguished from superficial public opinion. Yankelovich describes and deplores the "Culture of Technical Control" maintained by experts disdainful of the public and a public unwilling to "argue with Einstein."

THE UNITED STATES OF AMBITION: POLITICIANS, POWER, AND THE PURSUIT OF OFFICE. By Alan Ehrenhalt. New York: Times Books, 1991, 309 pp. $23.00.

The argument of this excellent analysis, based on detailed descriptions of the situation in selected localities, is that American politicians nominate themselves through a willingness to work very long hours for low compensation on something in which they believe; meanwhile the power of old-fashioned machines and party discipline has disappeared. At all elected levels below the White House, Democrats are more likely than Republicans to find the process personally satisfying.

WHY AMERICANS HATE POLITICS. By E. J. Dionne, Jr. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991, 430 pp. $22.95.

This stimulating critique argues that professional politicians, conservatives and liberals are lambasting each other with irrelevant ideological arguments from the 1960s. They are failing to respond to real problems in a serious, pragmatic way.

RIGHTEOUS REALISTS: POLITICAL REALISM, RESPONSIBLE POWER, AND AMERICAN CULTURE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE. By Joel H. Rosenthal. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991, 191 pp.

By tracing the intellectual biographies of Reinhold Niebuhr, Walter Lippmann, Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan and Dean Acheson, the author uncovers the solid moral foundations beneath the ideas of five men of influence popularly identified with the celebration of power as the central element of international relations. All five modified their thinking in response to the existence of nuclear weapons. A clear, beautifully written book.

THE AMERICAN "EMPIRE." By Geir Lundestad. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, 214 pp. $29.95.

The author, a Norwegian historian, is a perceptive analyst of American foreign policy since World War II and its historiography. This volume brings together some previously published essays and includes a new, long discussion of the generally benign nature of the American "empire." He

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

takes a middle position between triumphalists and declinists by noting that "there is still no evident successor state to the United States."

AMERICA'S PURPOSE: VISIONS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by Owen Harries. San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991, 175 pp. $19.95.

Although there are a variety of views in these 16 short essays by pundits and politicians predominantly of conservative bent, the strongest theme is for reordering priorities from international to domestic affairs. For example, Jeane Kirkpatrick: "The end of the Cold War frees time, attention and resources for American needs."

THE STAR-SPANGLED MIRROR: AMERICA'S IMAGE OF ITSELF AND THE WORLD. By Richard J. Kerry. Savage (MD): Rowman & Littlefield, 1990, 163 pp. $27.50.

A one-time Foreign Service officer bemoans the "impatience" of Americans "with the complexity of things" and a determination "to solve international national problems our own way." Although the book was written before the Cold War was clearly over, the nation's behavior in the Gulf War indicates that the message still has some validity.

The Western Hemisphere

Abraham F. Lowenthal

SHATTERED HOPE: THE GUATEMALAN REVOLUTION AND THE UNITED STATES, 1944–1954. By Piero Gleijeses. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1991, 418 pp. $29.95.

Extensively researched and written with conviction and passion, this study analyzes the history and downfall of what seems in retrospect to have been Guatemala's best government, the short-lived regime of Jacobo Arbenz, overthrown in 1954 by a CIA-orchestrated coup. By focusing primarily on the Guatemalan background of the Arbenz regime, the author paints a detailed and credible picture. He downplays the oft-discussed role of the United Fruit Company in opposing Arbenz, credits Washington with improving its intelligence and understanding over the course of the Guatemalan revolution and makes it plain that the communists did have a significant and growing influence in the Arbenz entourage, although they did not come close to taking over the country. "There is no convenient villain of the piece, but rather a complex interplay of imperial hubris, security concerns and economic interests"—all contributing to a tragic and bloody detour in Guatemala's history.

PANAMA: THE WHOLE STORY. By Kevin Buckley. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991, 304 pp. $21.95.

An experienced journalist tries to make sense of the 1989 Panama invasion by putting it into its immediate context, concentrating on the five years prior to Manuel Noriega's ouster by 24,000 U.S. troops. The intriguing links between Noriega, the drug cartel and the U.S.-supported Nicaraguan contras are explored, though many elements of "the whole story"—especially the many decades of U.S. dominance in Panama—are not adequately treated. One point emerges clearly from this account: the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Panama invasion will not look as positive in the light of history as it seemed to so many in the first days after Noriega's capture.

MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES: THE FRAGILE RELATIONSHIP. By Lester D. Langley. Boston: G. K. Hall, 1991, 138 pp. $27.95 (paper, $13.85).

An admirably concise, readable and insightful small volume on the increasingly close and important relationship between these two North American nations, integrated in some respects and yet decidedly separate and different in others. Although many have argued that Mexico and the United States are united by geography and divided by history, Langley suggests that in modern times they have been united by history and especially by the dynamics of the border region and the increasingly large and influential Mexican-American population.

LATIN AMERICA IN PERSPECTIVE. By Oxford Analytica. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991, 363 pp.

An extraordinarily useful primer on contemporary Latin America, surveying the region's demography, social structure, education, culture, politics, economics and international relations. Prepared by Malcom Deas of Oxford and a team of British researchers, the volume covers a great deal of ground in clear, straightforward and occasionally elegant prose, drawing discerningly on a generation of social science and historical research about the region.

THE COMANDANTE SPEAKS: MEMOIRS OF AN EL SALVADORAN GUERRILLA LEADER. Edited by Courtney E. Prisk. Boulder (CO): Westview, 1991, 145 pp. $25.00.

Three illuminating interviews by a former guerrilla operative in El Salvador who defected in 1985 and was assassinated in 1989. The deep local sources of the most entrenched Central American insurgency are evident.

COCAINE POLITICS: DRUGS, ARMIES, AND THE CIA IN CENTRAL AMERICA. By Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991, 279 pp. $24.95.

A muckraking account, parts of which were originally published by the Christic Institute, that argues the CIA and the Nicaraguan contras were involved together in the drug trade during the 1980s, and that this sordid alliance was not unusual, but rather reflected covert operations and political intrigues stretching back over many years. The bottom line is that the first front of the war on drugs must be in Washington, which has up to now been part of the narcotics problem, not a source of creative solutions.

Western Europe

Fritz Stern

OUR AGE. ENGLISH INTELLECTUALS BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS: A GROUP PORTRAIT. By Noel Annan. New York: Random House, 1991, 479 pp. $30.00.

Lord Annan, a formidable presence in English intellectual and public life, has written a kind of collective autobiography, a record of the beliefs

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and careers of the men and women—"the educated classes"—who were formed by the great British institutions, most notably Oxford and Cambridge, from the end of the Great War to the end of World War II. The book is indeed a group portrait, with incisive sketches of individuals and splendid summaries of attitudes on matters such as morality and homosexuality, philosophy, science and politics, placed against the background of the great historical upheavals of Britain's postwar years in decline, ending with Thatcherism as the negation of the earlier ethos of "Our Age." Only a writer with a lifetime of reading and listening could have produced a book so full of information, so forcefully erudite, with so many apt quotations, telling quips and perfect examples. It is part gossip, part history and a great mastery of so many facets of our time; altogether impressive, indispensable for a view of Britain since 1945, critical in substance—especially of the British political leadership—and assured yet measured in tone. A retrospective of the greats, written with a sense of their passing from the scene.

A WAR IMAGINED: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND ENGLISH CULTURE. By Samuel Hynes. New York: Atheneum, 1991, 512 pp. $27.50.

A well-known scholar tackles one of the major themes of the century: How was the Great War—unprecedented in its grimness—perceived, understood and remembered? Hynes has written a sensitive study of British responses to the war and presents a successful blend of literary and historical scholarship largely based on a comprehensive reading of the vast literary and artistic representations created during and after the war. The government's efforts at control and propaganda are depicted, and the significance of the monuments that commemorated the fallen are discussed as well. He richly documents what was generally known: thoughts of the war divided and transformed British culture and, by the end of the 1920s, the war's mythical memory induced a pacifistic, skeptical mood in a country deeply wounded and about to face another of the war's consequences—Hitler's determination to reverse the verdict of that war by waging yet another.

BRITAIN IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. By Michael Franklin with Marc Wilke. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1991, 144 pp. $14.95 (paper).

An excellent essay on Britain's participation in the European Community, explaining but not condoning Britain's reticent and at times recalcitrant conduct. The book reviews current EC issues against a briefly sketched historical background. The book can be read as a general analysis of the EC's prospects and as a particular study of Britain's failure to play "the leadership role which many people hoped and expected that it would. . . . The principal aim of this study is to throw light on why this should be so and to suggest ways in which Britain can play a more constructive and influential role." A good example of diagnosis and prescription, putting much emphasis on Britain's attachment to sovereignty and its "special relationship" with the United States.

BERLIN JOURNAL, 1989–1990. By Robert Darnton. New York: Norton, 1991, 352 pp. $22.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A distinguished American historian of French culture found himself in Berlin during the revolutionary year that preceded German unification. With a historian's reflectiveness and a journalist's eye he watched events in East Germany and his journal is a vivid account of the dissolution of the old regime. Anecdotal and analytical by turns, Darnton has written a readable account of the changes in the life and thought of east Germans. He records somber moments, such as the acceptance of responsibility for the crimes of the Nazi past, but he also catches in apt phrases the great cultural differences that divide the country even today: "The East Germans don't even have an expression for the 'fast lane'."

HOLOCAUST TESTIMONIES: THE RUINS OF MEMORY. By Lawrence L. Langer. New Haven (CT): Yale University Press, 1991, 216 pp. $25.00.

Langer's learned discourse, with its many allusions to esoteric literary and philosophical theory, combined with the often raw, faltering, ungrammatical discourses of concentration camp victims, is extraordinarily effective. More than 300 oral testimonies gathered at Yale were drawn on to provide this history of the experiences of these victims and their apparently irreversible feelings of doubt, doom and loss. Langer makes the observation that ordinary notions of heroism, martyrdom and morality in general cannot be applied to the concentration camp experience—no one who has read to any extent at all in survivor literature would think otherwise. This is an incomparable record of the memories of survivors and their psychic pain and confusion. Millions died in the Holocaust—how many millions more were blighted in heart and soul? Lucy Edwards Despard

THE HOLOCAUST: THE FATE OF EUROPEAN JEWRY. By Leni Yahil. New York: Oxford, 1990, 808 pp. $35.00.

An Israeli historian attempts a comprehensive survey of the horror in all its phases and places. The book, based on an impressive command of the vast secondary literature, focuses on the varied responses of the victims, and on the still-controversial and largely hopeless role of the Jewish councils organized by the Germans or their collaborators. Efforts at resistance and rescue are also detailed. The book is episodic, marred by errors and simplifications of history and by lapses in translation. It is written from the perspective of the end, thus unintentionally slighting the uncertainties of the victims. It is an avowedly Zionist interpretation, arguing implicitly that the Holocaust proves the categorical necessity for the existence of a Jewish state.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell

WHY GORBACHEV HAPPENED: HIS TRIUMPHS AND HIS FAILURE. By Robert G. Kaiser. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991, 476 pp. $24.95.

A veteran journalist of *The Washington Post* who reported from Moscow in the 1970s and has followed Soviet affairs closely gives his own account of the Gorbachev years and paints a portrait of Gorbachev himself as a product of both Russian society and the Soviet system. He sees two

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Gorbachevs—the bold reformer and the conservative apparatchik—often in conflict with each other. The failure of reform and Gorbachev's turn to the conservative line in 1990 lead Kaiser to pessimistic conclusions, although perhaps he underestimates his subject's adaptability. This book is a view of politics at the top—the succession of economic reforms, the constitutional laws, the changing roles of party and government, the struggles for power inside and outside the apparat, the aims and tactics of Gorbachev himself—rather than of forces at work at the level of the people, Russians and non-Russians.

THE END OF THE COLD WAR. Edited by David Armstrong and Erik Goldstein. London: Frank Cass, 1990, 220 pp. $35.00.
NEW THINKING AND OLD REALITIES: AMERICA, EUROPE, AND RUSSIA. Edited by Michael T. Clark and Simon Serfaty. Washington: Seven Locks Press, 1991, 232 pp. $13.95 (paper).

Two examples of "new thinking" in the West inspired by that of Mikhail Gorbachev and the sea-changes in the political map of Europe. Both books combine recital of recent events, notably in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe, with thoughts on how the problems of security, economics and international organizations have been or may be transformed. Neither has a specific overriding message—the individual authors are on their own—except perhaps the need to think historically and boldly. In the volume edited by Clark and Serfaty, Josef Joffe has a particularly penetrating essay on Germany and Russia, the two "revisionist" powers.

STEELTOWN, USSR: SOVIET SOCIETY IN THE GORBACHEV ERA. By Stephen Kotkin. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991, 269 pp. $24.95.

A half century ago Western readers were introduced to Magnitogorsk, the Soviet Pittsburgh and showpiece of Stalin's industrialization program, in John Scott's *Behind the Urals*. Now an enterprising and keenly observant American scholar gives a graphic picture of the city and its people in the era of perestroika, when the huge steel plant has become an industrial dinosaur, a symbol of the decomposition of the system that created it. Kotkin, who lived in Magnitogorsk in 1987 and again in 1989, finds sources of information everywhere: the daily press (especially letters to the editor), the theater, a hotly contested election campaign and in hundreds of conversations with ordinary and extraordinary Russians. The result is a rare and striking picture of how (badly) perestroika is working in one provincial city with a special place in Soviet history.

THE TRUTH ABOUT CHERNOBYL. By Grigori Medvedev. New York: Basic Books, 1991, 274 pp. $22.95.

This book rings with authenticity. Medvedev was chief engineer at Chernobyl in the 1970s, knew the plant well, and was sent back as a special investigator immediately after the 1986 explosion. Having interviewed all the individuals involved, he provides a great quantity of firsthand testimony showing from hour to hour and minute to minute precisely what was and was not done both before and after the explosion. He is not sparing in his judgments of those—all the way up to the ministerial level—whose ignorance, complacency, negligence or stupidity contributed to the disaster, or of the system that placed them in positions of authority. He is also

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not sparing in his tributes to those who showed courage and heroism when the disaster struck.

DANGEROUS THOUGHTS. By Yuri Orlov. New York: Morrow, 1991, 339 pp. $21.00.

Orlov was one dissident of the Brezhnev era, a leader of the Helsinki Watch Group, who became an international cause célèbre without knowing it, since he was in prison or in exile in Siberia. His life story, told frankly and without pretense, is of great interest in depicting the nature of Soviet society in the Stalin and post-Stalin years as well as Orlov's brutal encounters with the KGB, imprisonment, endless interrogations, life in the gulag and eventual expulsion from the country in exchange for a KGB agent held by the United States. A book at once depressing and stimulating.

THE IRONY TOWER: SOVIET ARTISTS IN A TIME OF GLASNOST. By Andrew Solomon. New York: Knopf, 1991, 170 pp. $25.00.

Solomon may well be the Timothy Garton Ash of the revolution in Soviet art. As a journalist arriving in Moscow to cover the landmark Sotheby sale of contemporary and avant-garde Soviet art in July 1988, he fell among Soviet "vanguard" artists who quickly took him into their studios and their confidence. The artists and their work (much of which seems closer to theater—to what used to be called "happenings" in the West 30 years ago—than to fine art) are described individually, intimately and affectionately. There follows a lengthy history of "unofficial" (proscribed) art movements in the U.S.S.R. since 1957, which has some tedious stretches. But the latter part of the book, describing the eruption of Soviet artists into the West with the easing of travel and export restrictions in 1988, is lively and often hilarious. The story, however, is not entirely upbeat. Many artists have been spoiled and corrupted by their newfound and not always well-deserved popularity and commercial success in the West. And all are aware of uncertainty and danger: artists in the Soviet Union are by no means convinced that glasnost is irreversible, that their freedom cannot be taken away overnight. Living and working in that tension is their continuing burden. Solomon has written a thought-provoking book, a homage to free spirits. Lucy Edwards Despard

CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS THE WEST. By Gerhard Wettig. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1991, 193 pp. $48.00.

Wettig is an old hand at turning the jargon of Soviet political and military writing into terms the ordinary reader can understand, while maintaining a healthy skepticism and keeping his eye on the gap between theory and practice, professed and actual policy. In this excellent study he examines how Soviet policies have changed under Gorbachev, with the vague concepts of the "common European home" and a new security system accompanied by the very practical measures of adjustment, including the acceptance of a united Germany in NATO. Ever cautious, even overcautious, Wettig concedes that the changes are real, but warns that the security problems remain.

MOSCOW, GERMANY, AND THE WEST FROM KHRUSHCHEV TO GORBACHEV. By Michael J. Sodaro. Ithaca (NY): Cornell University Press, 1991, 423 pp. $49.95 (paper, $15.95).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sodaro has his own way of interpreting Soviet foreign policy, seeing it not just as a reflection of great power interests but as a process in which domestic factors, differences among leaders and the interplay of ideas among advisers, diplomats, academics and journalists—"the secondary elite"—influence the decisions made and policies adopted. He identifies various schools of thought—maximalist, Europeanist, Americanist, Atlanticist—each of which has its innings as Soviet policy shifts over time. Whatever one thinks of this approach—and there is much to be said for it—Sodaro has explored and wisely used all relevant material published in Russian and German to follow the course of Soviet as well as G.D.R. policy on the "German question"; that is, first and foremost, relations with the Federal Republic. His book should stand for a long time as a prime source of information and reference on this central aspect of the Cold War.

BALTIC INDEPENDENCE AND RUSSIAN EMPIRE. By Walter C. Clemens, Jr. New York: St. Martin's, 1991, 346 pp. $29.95.

The author is at pains to show that the aspirations of the three Baltic peoples to independence are not just a response to present configurations of power but are rooted in history, culture and the interwar experience of independence. Thus, when Gorbachev opened the door to free expression and free elections, there was little room for compromise. This book, better than any other, tells how the local communist parties tried and failed to adapt to the growing popular demands for national self-determination, and how Moscow is now caught in an insoluble dilemma. Most of the attention is on Estonia; Lithuania (in many ways the leader) and Latvia get less attention, although their stories are not ignored. In the later chapters the author explores the question of the future of the Soviet Union and its Russian and non-Russian nationalities; he makes some good points but tends to ramble, in contrast to his rich and factual account of events in the Baltic republics themselves.

SURGE TO FREEDOM: THE END OF COMMUNIST RULE IN EASTERN EUROPE. By J. F. Brown. Durham (NC): Duke University Press, 1991, 338 pp. $45.00 (paper, $19.95).

J. F. Brown had scarcely completed a thick volume on eastern Europe (noted in *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1988) when the 1989 revolutions, which surprised him and everyone else, impelled him to write a new one. Far from repudiating the earlier work, however, he draws on it in tracing the trends leading to the revolutionary events that have transformed the east European states. He shows how Gorbachev's evolving policies combined with internal pressures in each satellite to produce the explosions of 1989, and how the contagion spread to Yugoslavia and Albania. There is no surer guide than Brown to an understanding of these events, and no one better qualified to describe the complex and daunting problems facing the new noncommunist governments.

OF WALLS AND BRIDGES: THE UNITED STATES AND EASTERN EUROPE. By Bennett Kovrig. New York: New York University Press, 1991, 425 pp. $40.00 (paper, $17.50).

Kovrig has given us an outstanding study, both scholarly and readable, on American policy toward eastern Europe from World War II to the present, likely to be the standard work on the subject. Building on his

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

earlier *The Myth of Liberation*, published in 1973, he carries on through the alternating periods of tension and détente in U.S.-Soviet relations and those of reaction, reform and crisis in the east European countries themselves. He devotes long, meaty chapters to those areas of policy—human rights, economic levers and the structure of security—by which the United States attempted to work toward its major political aim: the reduction and eventual elimination of Soviet and communist domination of eastern Europe. Despite the punctured illusions, the ineffectiveness of many policies and the limited American capabilities within the security sphere of the rival superpower, Kovrig recognizes the record as generally creditable. While the eventual liberation of the east European nations was primarily the result of their own actions and changes in the U.S.S.R., American steadfastness in maintaining its aim, and flexible practical policies in support of it, were not insignificant factors in the ultimate victory.

REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE. By Oliver Blanchard and others. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991, 124 pp. $17.95.

Five noted economists connected with the World Economic Group of the United Nations University present a terse and pointed report on what the now-free east European nations must do to make the transition to a market economy. The prescription is along the lines of stabilization, price liberalization, privatization and restructuring, with no halfhearted compromises along the way. The reasoning is sound and the advice good, but the text is very general, paying little attention to differing political and other conditions in the various countries.

POLAND INTO THE 1990s: ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION. Edited by George Glazyca and Ryszard Rapacki. New York: St. Martin's, 1991, 148 pp. $45.00.

The authors of these essays are Polish academic economists, many of whom are furnishing advice to their government in its path-breaking attempt to make the transition from a command to a market economy. They see very clearly what the problems are, as well as the formidable obstacles to coping with them. This is not so much a book on the government's reform program itself, still in its early stages, as on the basic areas—the political system, the environment, energy, agriculture, investment, foreign trade and finance—which require change but may also limit it.

THE CONVENT AT AUSCHWITZ. By Wladyslaw T. Bartoszewski. New York: Braziller, 1991, 169 pp. $17.95.

The story of the controversy, which started in 1984, over the building occupied by Carmelite nuns within the confines of the former death camp at Auschwitz, told against the background of Polish-Jewish and Catholic-Jewish relations and mutual recriminations over many years. The author, a social anthropologist and historian who is now secretary of the Institute for Polish-Jewish Studies at Oxford, treats his subject with admirable objectivity, is frank in his criticism of both sides and attributes the intensity of the dispute to the profound emotion evoked by the place itself, the symbol of both Polish and Jewish martyrdom.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I REMEMBER NOTHING MORE: THE WARSAW CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL AND THE JEWISH RESISTANCE. By Adina Blady Szwagger. New York: Pantheon, 1991, 184 pp. $20.00.

Recollections, put to paper 50 years later, of a young Jewish woman's experience as a medical worker and courier in the resistance in one of the worst areas of destruction, persecution and death in World War II—occupied Poland. It is a tale of horrors, honestly told, in which the qualities of humanity and mercy shine through.

OPEN LETTERS: SELECTED WRITINGS, 1965–1990. By Vaclav Havel. Edited by Paul Wilson. New York: Knopf, 1991, 404 pp. $22.00.

A new collection of Havel's political essays, articles and letters written prior to his becoming president of Czechoslovakia. Some have been previously published in English, such as the famous "The Power of the Powerless"; others appear in English for the first time. The editing is competent and the selection judicious.

The Middle East

John C. Campbell

MOSCOW AND THE MIDDLE EAST. By Robert O. Freedman. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991, 426 pp.

Soviet policy in the Middle East has no more indefatigable chronicler than Freedman. His latest in an impressive series of volumes provides a massive quantity of information on Soviet relations with all the countries from Morocco to Afghanistan, following Moscow's every action and reaction amid the twists and turns in local political and ethnic strife, regional conflicts and the moves of rival powers. Throughout he adds his own comments and interpretation, often speculative, always reasoned and thoughtful. In conclusion he has an ingenious listing of factors both of continuity and change since the advent of Gorbachev, with continuity winning out by a considerable margin. This kind of assessment will need periodic review as the Soviet Union's situation inexorably cuts down its capabilities and influence in the region.

THE USSR AND IRAQ: THE SOVIET QUEST FOR INFLUENCE. By Oles M. Smolansky. Durham (NC): Duke University Press, 1991, 346 pp. $55.00 (paper, $24.95).

A review of the relations between the Soviet superpower and one of its junior partners in the Middle East, in which each sought cooperation to advance its own interests but did not shrink from disagreement and conflict when interests clashed. Iraq was never a Soviet satellite. The book may seem overstuffed with detail but it is all relevant to the main themes and also beams a searchlight into insufficiently known areas of policy, such as the Kurdish question and the role of the Iraq Communist Party. The coverage is from 1958 to 1988 and thus barely gets into the Gorbachev era. But the lessons remain valid, indeed are plainer than ever in a period of diminished Soviet influence.

THE GULF, ENERGY, AND GLOBAL SECURITY. Edited by Charles F. Doran and Stephen W. Buck. Boulder (CO): Lynne Rienner, 1991, 234 pp. $35.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A central purpose of the Middle East Institute's Gulf 2000 Project, of which this book is a product, was to look at U.S. interests in the gulf through the year 2000 and try to understand how they might be affected by possible developments during the 1990s. The authors, a well-chosen group with a substantial admixture of diplomatic experience, writing at the time of Desert Storm, have obvious difficulties, especially in the chapters on Iraq and Saudi Arabia, in forecasting developments of the next few months, let alone for the year 2000. All are wise enough, however, to eschew empty predictions and concentrate on continuing realities. A solid, superior work.

INSTANT EMPIRE: SADDAM HUSSEIN'S AMBITION FOR IRAQ. By Simon Henderson. San Francisco: Mercury House, 1991, 271 pp. $21.95 (paper, $14.95).

A British journalist's portrait of Saddam Hussein, his regime and his thrust for a dominant role in the Arab world. Henderson's investigations have turned up some interesting facts, especially on Iraq's obsessive search for all manner of advanced weaponry (e.g., the enormous supergun), but the book is not the most substantial of the recent studies of Iraq in the Saddam Hussein era. One point: the author maintains that Farzad Bazoft, the journalist executed by the Iraqi government in 1990, really was a British spy.

SECRET DOSSIER: THE HIDDEN AGENDA BEHIND THE GULF WAR. By Pierre Salinger and Eric Laurent. New York: Penguin, 1991, 241 pp. $9.95 (paper).

This secret history of the diplomacy leading up to the war does not diverge radically from the known history and it is suspect in one respect: it quotes verbatim from hundreds of conversations and meetings at which the authors were not present with notebooks and tape recorders. But they have the policies and personalities right and they present a good deal of material from interviews and documents not previously published. Newsy, dramatic and crisply written in Hemingway style, the book makes good reading if not the last word as history.

ECHOES OF THE INTIFADA: REGIONAL REPERCUSSIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT. Edited by Rex Brynen. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1991, 314 pp. $36.50 (paper).

This book fills a real gap by illuminating the oft-changing policies of neighboring states toward the Palestinians and the P.L.O., especially since the start of the intifada in 1987. The chapter on the effect of the uprising on Israeli thinking is also particularly good. Those on Soviet and American policies have little that is new but they round out an excellent book.

GAZA: A YEAR IN THE INTIFADA: A PERSONAL ACCOUNT FROM AN OCCUPIED LAND. By Gloria Emerson. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1991, 244 pp. $19.95.

An American journalist tells of her experiences in the Gaza Strip, where she spent the year 1989. She devotes the entire book to describing cruelties and humiliations inflicted on the Palestinians by the Israeli occupying forces. It is a one-sided story in that no effort is made to spell out and balance the interests, ambitions and fears on both sides of the conflict. But

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this is nonetheless a horrifying account and underlines the point that there will be nothing but more violence, repression and injustice as long as the occupation continues.

ISRAEL'S SECRET WARS: THE UNTOLD HISTORY OF ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE. By Ian Black and Benny Morris. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, 608 pp. $24.95.

Israel's intelligence and security services, organizations that have made a fetish of secrecy, are now more exposed to the light of day, thanks to some missteps and failures that have led to official scrutiny and review. Black and Morris, tracking down every lead, begin with the role of secret intelligence and covert activities in the Zionist movement before independence and carry on with the history of all three major agencies—Aman, Mossad and Shin Bet. This is not the only recent book on the subject and cannot be the definitive history, but it comes as close as we are likely to get and is especially good in showing how critical to, and closely interwoven with, the fate of the nation these agencies have been.

Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

BEHIND THE TIANANMEN MASSACRE. By Chu-Yuan Cheng. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1990, 256 pp.

This volume by a prominent China scholar is the most comprehensive account yet to be published of the factors that contributed to the traumatic events of 1989. It presents the big picture in a clear and forceful fashion, strongly supported by a wealth of data. Cheng thinks it is possible that the domination of the "hard-liners" will continue for another three to five years and that the regime will take the form of a collective leadership with a strongly conservative character. An alternative scenario could emerge if the hard-line regime were replaced by a moderate one before Deng Xiaoping dies. The worst case scenario would be the disintegration of the central authority after a prolonged power struggle in the party hierarchy and a breakdown of the major military command. This could lead to a revival of the warlordism of the 1920s.

TWO SOCIETIES IN OPPOSITION: THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AFTER FORTY YEARS. Edited by Ramon H. Myers. Stanford (CA): Hoover Press, 1991, 370 pp. $38.95 (paper, $25.95).

This is a solid collection of essays on Taiwan and China resulting from a conference at the Hoover Institution in 1989. There are three perceptive and rather pessimistic essays on the People's Republic. Tom Gold of Berkeley writes about the "schizophrenic" picture of the climate for private business in China. The state has introduced a number of reforms to encourage private business but, in practice, authorities at all levels show ambivalence, if not outright hostility, toward the private sector, especially in urban areas. Harry Harding, in a useful overview of Chinese politics during the past 40 years, concludes that the immediate prospects are for a relatively weak central government alienated from large segments of society, with limited control over the provinces and deep cleavages in its

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

own ranks. Nicholas Lardy, a prominent specialist on the Chinese economy, says that China's reforms remain "partial," and "far less market-oriented" than those of other socialist states. He stresses the increasing power of provincial and local governments that, he says, is incompatible with market reform.

THE CRISIS OF MARXISM-LENINISM. By Franz Michael and others. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1990, 240 pp. $39.50.

Four remarkably prescient scholars—Franz Michael, Carl Linden, Jan Prybyla and Jurgen Domes—have combined their skills to analyze the most important issue of the twentieth century: Have the Marxist-Leninist dictatorships finally and definitively failed or will they continue in one or another guise? These men concentrate primarily on China, although they explain everything one needs to know about the crisis of many communist states that are visibly breaking up. They all agree that the statist centralized command economies cannot survive and some more democratic system will eventually emerge. They argue that dictatorship and free enterprise cannot be combined, that this combination is already thoroughly discredited in the Soviet Union and among the youth in China. Jan Prybyla says that the PRC follows "the economic philosophy and practice of Soviet-type central command planning" and concludes that "marketing reform from above (systemic change initiated by the ruling elite) is not possible." This book should be read and studied by all serious-minded Americans who care about international affairs. Ray S. Cline

POLICIES OF CHAOS. By Lynn T. White 3rd. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1989, 367 pp. $39.50.

This is an original and penetrating work of scholarship that explores the origins of China's Cultural Revolution and, in the process, casts a good deal of light on the organization of Chinese politics and society since 1949. The tumult of the Cultural Revolution is often blamed on Mao Zedong and a few leaders in Beijing, or on long-term egalitarian ideas, or communist or Chinese political culture. White shows that the chaos resulted mainly from reactions by small groups to three specific party policies. First, official good and bad labels—such as "proletarians," "rightists" or "capitalists"—made people acquire concrete interests in seeing these labels used in their favor; the labels created "status groups." Second, official support for designated bosses and monitors created individual dependence on particular leaders and forced people into clientage. Third, official campaigns reduced administrative costs for an understaffed party needing support for revolutionary social programs, but they also legitimated violence and set the stage for the Cultural Revolution, which began in 1966.

THE COMING WAR WITH JAPAN. By George Friedman and Meredith LeBard. New York: St. Martin's, 1991, 430 pp. $24.95.

This one-sided, sensational book contends that a military confrontation between the United States and Japan is likely within the next 20 years. According to the authors, the issues are the same as they were in 1941: Japan needs to control access to its mineral supplies in Southeast Asia and to have an export market it can dominate. In order to do this, Japan must force the United States out of the western Pacific. There is little effort to explore the substantial differences between the 1940s and the 1990s. One

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the authors has published several works of fiction and the other is a national security expert at the Heritage Foundation.

DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN EAST ASIA: TAIWAN, SOUTH KOREA, AND THE PHILIPPINES. Edited by Thomas W. Robinson. Washington: AEI Press, 1991, 320 pp. $32.50.

Sixteen scholars examine the relationship between economic development and the spread of political democracy in Taiwan, South Korea and the Philippines. There are two very good essays on the Philippines. Richard Hooley of the University of Pittsburgh provides evidence that Philippine living standards have been on the decline since 1968, even as per capita income has risen. There has been a persistent decline in the income of the lower classes—rural and urban workers—while the income of the middle and upper classes has steadily increased. Hooley's pessimism is shared by David Rosenberg of Middlebury College who shows that the Philippine political system is more like Latin America than Asia. In Taiwan and South Korea there has been sustained improvement in real wages, land reform and educational and other reforms to equalize the distribution of income. Domestic and foreign investment policies promoted competitiveness. Patronage networks were replaced by merit systems. This was achieved through decisive leadership by a coalition of technocrats, modern army officers, farmers and new industrial entrepreneurs.

The Philippines has few of these characteristics of the Asian model. Instead, it possesses many of the traditional Hispanic characteristics: a traditional landed elite dominating key social institutions; a patronage-oriented civil service and political parties; industrialists protected from domestic and foreign competition; massive unemployment. The result is an economy that cannot grow rapidly, cannot distribute income fairly and cannot pay its debts. Under such circumstances, prospects for democracy are bleak.

THE DAWN OF THE PACIFIC CENTURY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THREE WORLDS OF DEVELOPMENT. By William McCord. New Brunswick (NJ): Transaction, 1991, 216 pp.

The literature on the Asian development "miracle" is already quite vast. What distinguishes this volume by a professor of sociology at the City University of New York Graduate Center is the author's display of a commanding knowledge of a broad range of literature in the social sciences and a sound critique of existing theories of development. The author makes the case for a genuinely Asian model of development that must be understood on its own terms—without reference to Adam Smith, Karl Marx or Max Weber. There is an excellent annotated bibliography.

EVOLVING PACIFIC BASIN STRATEGIES. Edited by Dora Alves. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1990, 344 pp.

Among several informative articles in this conference symposium are one by Robert Scalapino on Japan's security policy and another by Charles Morrison that explores the current tendencies in Asia toward political pluralism. Scalapino offers a variety of reasons why fears of Japanese militarism are exaggerated. Morrison is cautious about the future of democracy in the Philippines, where he estimates some 60 percent of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

population is below the poverty line, and South Korea, where the democratic political system must still prove its legitimacy against strong odds.

ENCOUNTERING THE DOMINANT PLAYER: U.S. EXTENDED DETERRENCE STRATEGY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC. By William T. Tow. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991, 540 pp. $55.00.

This is a detailed, timely and stimulating reexamination of U.S. military and political policy in the Asia-Pacific region. Tow argues that the United States needs to adjust its policy rapidly and substantially to reflect the new post-Cold War world and the region's enormous economic dynamism. He appeals to the United States to explore opportunities to work with key regional actors in order to identify common approaches to maintain regional stability.

HONG KONG COUNTDOWN. By George L. Hicks. Hong Kong: Writers' & Publishers' Cooperative, 1989, 136 pp. (Detroit: The Cellar Bookshop, distributor, $12.50).

CITY ON THE ROCKS: HONG KONG'S UNCERTAIN FUTURE. By Kevin Rafferty. New York: Viking, 1990, 518 pp. $21.95.

Both these volumes by informed observers are pessimistic about the future of Hong Kong after British rule ends and the Chinese communists take over in 1997. Hicks, an Australian economist who has lived in Hong Kong for about 15 years, says that the people of Hong Kong deeply—and justifiably—distrust the communists. He is particularly harsh toward what he labels as British indifference to the fate of its Hong Kong subjects. Rafferty, a British journalist, is also wary about the future. Although more constrained than Hicks, he wonders if Beijing can be trusted to respect Hong Kong's "autonomy" after 1997 and concludes that such autonomy will exist only on Big Brother China's terms.

Africa

Gail M. Gerhart

AMERICAN INTELLECTUALS AND AFRICAN NATIONALISTS, 1955–1970. By Martin Staniland. New Haven (CT): Yale University Press, 1991, 309 pp. $30.00.

Africa was relatively uncharted territory a generation ago when American academics and journalists began trying to interpret its mysteries to wider audiences. Crude ideological maps served to impose order and meaning on facts selected from the unfamiliar political landscape. Liberals, radicals, conservatives and African-Americans all tended to shape their interpretations to align African reality with their preferred premises about such things as human nature, progress, tradition, nationalism and the lessons of American history, only to find with the passage of time that most of these cherished assumptions were poor guides to what was actually taking place. This is a penetrating and provocative study of many of the foibles and illusions that have undergirded the relationship of Americans to Africa.

GHANA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RECOVERY. Edited by Donald Rothchild. Boulder (CO): Lynne Rienner, 1991, 284 pp. $35.00 (paper, $16.95).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Asking citizens to make economic sacrifices today for the sake of economic health tomorrow is not a formula for political success in Africa any more than anywhere else. The authors assembled in this excellent collection express cautious optimism about Ghana's economic progress under the regimen of a structural-adjustment program orchestrated by the World Bank and the IMF; they see no signs, however, that Ghana's reformed economic order could survive politically were the country to move toward greater democracy in place of the present authoritarian regime of Jerry Rawlings. While macroeconomic indicators are positive, urban as well as many rural Ghanaians have experienced increasing hardship and social differentiation since the launching of the reform program in the early 1980s.

STATE POLITICS IN ZIMBABWE. By Jeffrey Herbst. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990, 283 pp. $38.00.

The government that came to power in Zimbabwe at independence in 1980 inherited a state apparatus that was relatively developed in African terms and, in turn, confronted an array of coherent interest groups capable of putting the country's new leaders under varying kinds of conflicting pressures. This informative and well-researched study focuses on the political decision-making process within the Mugabe government and the ability of national leaders to pursue goals of their own devising in the face of interest group pressures. The case studies are the book's most valuable part, and the concluding chapter, which falls into a briar patch of jargon, the least.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES. Edited by Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im and Frances M. Deng. Washington: Brookings, 1990, 399 pp. $36.95 (paper, $16.95).

How should proponents of international human rights respond to the charge frequently made in the non-Western world that the drive to apply universal standards of rights is a new form of Western cultural imperialism? This probing collection of essays tackles such contentious notions as the view that human rights are "Western," that Islamic culture should be brought in line with universal norms through a process of reform and that African cultural traditions provide little basis for a system of institutionally protected rights. The authors offer few answers, but succeed in deepening our appreciation of the problems and politics of rights questions. Readers looking for detailed discussions of individual African countries or particular rights abuses will not be satisfied; almost all the chapters address broad legal and political problems without much reference to specific cases.

THE KILLINGS IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY FORCES AND THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE. By Africa Watch. New York: Africa Watch, January 1991, 85 pp. $10.00.

SOUTH AFRICA: MY VISION OF THE FUTURE. By Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990, 147 pp. $24.95.

One of the least well-kept secrets in South Africa these days is the extent of the cooperation between the Zulu Inkatha movement and government security forces in opposing the efforts of the African National Congress to consolidate a political base. Read in juxtaposition, these two books offer a bizarre contrast in viewpoints on the ANC-Inkatha rivalry. While Africa

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Watch marshals substantial evidence on the highly partisan behavior of the state in promoting anti-ANC violence, Buthelezi thumps his usual tub of pious and exculpatory claims that Inkatha stands for conciliation and black unity. On a more candid note, however, he concedes a belief that "we have reached, to some extent, a no-holds-barred point in South African history," a blunt truth that Africa Watch's data appear to underscore.

ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN AFRICA. New York: Africa Watch, 1991, 153 pp. $15.00.

While other occupational groups worldwide—doctors and journalists, for example—regularly protest the mistreatment of professional colleagues, academics as a group rarely even take note of high-handedness and violence directed by governments at those who teach and study on some of the world's campuses. It is a sordid story that doesn't make international headlines, in part because no organization yet exists solely to monitor abuses of academic freedom. All the more reason to welcome this report, which is presented with the chapter-and-verse detail characteristic of Africa Watch. The past and present performance of 14 African countries is examined and the political intrusions of governments into university life are catalogued, from the most maliciously arbitrary to the most viciously personal.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOURCE MATERIAL

Edited by Janis A. Kreslins

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Government Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. 20402; *United Nations:* United Nations, Publications Sales Section, Room DC2-853, New York, N.Y. 10017; *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade:* UNIPUB, 4611-F Assembly Drive, Lanham, Md. 20706-4391; *European Communities:* European Community Information Service, 2100 M St., N.W., 7th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20037; *Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development:* 2001 L Street, N.W., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20036. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, and congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 101st Congress.

Africa

African refugee crisis and the U.S. response. Hearing, Subcommittees on International Operations, and on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, May 10, 1990. Washington, 1991. 116 pp.

Impending famine and recent political developments in the Sudan. Hearing, Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Oct. 25, 1990. Washington, 1991. 66 pp.

Transnational corporations in South Africa: list of companies with investments and disinvestments, 1990. New York, United Nations, 1991. 282 pp. (E.91.II.A.9.)

Asia and the Pacific Ocean

China's economic dilemmas in the 1990s: the problems of reforms, modernization, and interdependence. Study papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., April 1991. Washington, 1991. 2 vols. (S.Prt.102–21.)

Defense of Japan 1990. Tokyo, The Japan Times, Ltd. (for the Defense Agency, Japan), 1991. 346 pp.

The Elections in Pakistan and other developments in South Asia. Hearing, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Nov. 2, 1990. Washington, 1991. 57 pp.

Korea: North-South nuclear issues. Hearing, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, July 25, 1990. Washington, 1991. 93 pp.

Overview of events in the South Asian region. Hearing, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, March 6, 1990. Washington, 1990. 120 pp.

Political developments in Pakistan. Hearing, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Oct. 2, 1990. Washington, 1991. 85 pp.

The Situation in the Philippines. Hearing, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, House, Jan. 30, 1990. Washington, 1991. 139 pp.

Thailand: the constraints of success. Report of a staff study mission to Thailand, Dec. 15–23, 1990, to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Feb. 26, 1991. Washington, 1991. 16 pp. (Com.Print.)

Commercial Policy

Exchange of letters on issues concerning the negotiation of a North American Free Trade Agreement. Committee on Ways and Means, House, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., May 1, 1991. Washington, 1991. 98 pp. (WMCP: 101–10.)

Issues related to the reauthorization of Food for Peace and agricultural export promotion programs. Hearings and markup, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, on H.R.3950, March 21-July 11, 1990. Washington, 1990. 503 pp.

Reauthorization of the Export Administration Act. Hearings, Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Senate, March 7–28, 1990. Washington, 1990. 238 pp.

The Reauthorization of the Export Administration Act. Hearings and markup, Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science and on International

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Economic Policy and Trade, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, on H.R.4653, Jan. 25-May 3, 1990. Washington, 1990. 699 pp.

UNITED States and foreign commercial service strategic review. Hearing, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, April 3, 1990. Washington, 1990. 90 pp.

UNITED States–Japan trade relations. Hearing, Committee on Finance, Senate, April 25, 1990. Washington, 1990. 28 pp.

DISARMAMENT

APPROACHES to naval arms control. Hearings, Subcommitee on Projection Forces and Regional Defense, Committee on Armed Services, Senate, May 8–11, 1990. Washington, 1990. 111 pp.

FISCAL year 1991 arms control impact statements. Printed for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, and Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., May 1991. Washington, 1991. 119 pp. (Jt.Com.Print.)

IN pursuit of a nuclear test ban treaty: a guide to the debate in the Conference on Disarmament, by Thomas Schalberger. New York, United Nations, 1991. 132 pp. (GV.E.91.0.4.) $30.00.

PROLIFERATION and regional security in the 1990's. Hearing, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Senate, Oct. 9, 1990. Washington, 1991. 87 pp.

STUDY on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification. Report of the Secretary-General. New York, United Nations, 1991. 90 pp. (E.91.IX.11.)

EASTERN EUROPE

THE CHALLENGE of free economic zones in Central and Eastern Europe: international perspectives. New York, United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, 1991. 444 pp. (E.90.II.A.27.)

CIVIL strife in Yugoslavia: the United States response. Hearing, Subcommittee on European Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 21, 1991. Washington, 1991. 165 pp.

ECONOMIC and political change in Eastern Europe. Report of a staff study mission to Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the former German Democratic Republic, Aug. 1–12, 1990, to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Nov. 1990. Washington, 1990. 34 pp. (Com.Print.)

RECENT developments in the Baltics. Hearing, Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East and on Human Rights and International Organizations, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., Jan. 23, 1991. Washington, 1991. 47 pp.

REFERENDUM in the Soviet Union: a compendium of reports on the March 17, 1991 referendum on the future of the U.S.S.R., compiled by the staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Washington, 1991. 46 pp.

REFORMS in foreign economic relations of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Proceedings of a symposium conducted in association with Osteuropa-Institut and Südost-Institut, Munich. Edited by Michael Kaser and Aleksandar M. Vacic. New York, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 1991. 202 pp. (E.91.II.E.5.)

SOVIET diplomacy and negotiating behavior. Vol. III. 1988–90: Gorbachev-Reagan-Bush meetings at the Summit. Study prepared by the Senior Specialists Section, Office of Research Coordination, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., April 1991. Washington, 1991. 478 pp. (Special Studies Series on Foreign Affairs Issues.)

SOVIET disunion: the American response. Hearings, Subcommittee on European Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 28-March 6, 1991. Washington, 1991. 125 pp.

THE SOVIET economic crisis. Hearing, Joint Economic Committee, Congress, April 25, 1990. Washington, 1990. 42 pp.

A STUDY of the Soviet economy. Washington, International Monetary Fund; Washington, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank; Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; London, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1991. 3 vols. $100.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Economic Conditions

THE PEACE dividend—how to pin it down? Frankfurt, Deutsche Bank, 1991. 60 pp. (Distributed by TransAtlantic Futures, Inc., Washington.) DM.15.00.

REVIEW of the Houston Economic Summit. Hearing, Joint Economic Committee, Congress, July 25, 1990. Washington, 1991. 48 pp.

WORLD economic outlook 1991. Washington, 1991. 208 pp. (World Economic and Financial Surveys.) $30.00.

Environment

GLOBAL environment: a national energy strategy. Hearing, Subcommittee on Energy and Power, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House, on H.R.5521, Sept. 13, 1990. Washington, 1991. 257 pp. (Ser.No.101–217.)

RECENT environmental activities of the Agency for International Development. Hearing, Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Sept. 26, 1990. Washington, 1991. 64 pp.

Financial Policy

DETERMINANTS and systemic consequences of international capital flows. Washington, International Monetary Fund, 1991. 94 pp.

THE ECU Report: the single European currency—and what it means to you, by Michael Emerson and Christopher Huhne. London, Pan Books Ltd. (for The Commission of the European Communities), 1991. 216 pp. £6.99.

GEOGRAPHICAL distribution of financial flows to developing countries: disbursements, commitments, economic indicators, 1986/1989. Paris, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1991. 346 pp. $58.00.

INTERNATIONAL capital markets: developments and prospects. Washington, International Monetary Fund, 1991. 136 pp. $22.00.

INTERNATIONAL Monetary Fund annual report of the Executive Board for the financial year ended April 30, 1990. Washington, International Monetary Fund, 1991. 177 pp.

SUMMARY proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, September 25–27, 1990. Washington, International Monetary Fund, 1991. 339 pp.

TRANSNATIONAL banks and the international debt crisis. New York, United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, 1991. 148 pp. (E.90.II.A.19.)

International Relations

IMPLEMENTATION of the Helsinki Accords. Hearing, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 6, 1991, on the USSR in crisis: state of the union. Washington, 1991. 77 pp.

LESSONS of the Helsinki process for the new world order. Hearing, Subcommittee on European Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., March 14, 1991. Washington, 1991. 59 pp.

Middle East

CIVIL war in Iraq. A staff report, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., May 1991. Washington, 1991. 28 pp. (Com.Print.)

CRISIS in the Persian Gulf: sanctions, diplomacy and war. Hearings, Committee on Armed Services, House, Dec. 4–20, 1990. Washington, 1991. 920 pp. (H.A.S.C.No.101–57.)

HUMAN rights abuses in Kuwait and Iraq. Hearing, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., Jan. 8, 1991. Washington, 1991. 192 pp.

THE PERSIAN Gulf crisis. Joint hearings, Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science, Europe and the Middle East, and on International Operations, Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Joint Economic Committee, Aug. 8-Dec. 11, 1990. Washington, 1991. 576 pp.

THE PERSIAN Gulf crisis: relevant documents, correspondence, reports. Report, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., June 1991. Washington, 1991. 259 pp. (Com.Print.)

PREPAREDNESS for the Persian Gulf. Hearing, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Senate, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., Jan. 22, 1991. Washington, 1991. 61 pp.

SEIZURE of Iraqi assets. Hearing, Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Competitiviness, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 21, 1991. Washington, 1991. 45 pp. (Ser.No.102–1.)

A SURVEY of Palestine prepared in December 1945 and January 1946 for the information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. Washington, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991. 2 vols. and suppl. (Reprinted with permission from Her Majesty's Stationery Office.) $49.85.

MILITARY POLICY

DEPARTMENT of Defense authorization for appropriations for fiscal year 1991. Hearings, Committee on Armed Services, Senate, on S.2884, Feb. 1-June 20, 1990. Washington, 1990. 4 pts.

DEPARTMENT of Defense authorization for appropriations for fiscal year 1991. Hearings, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Senate, on H.R.5803/S.3189, Pt. 1, Feb. 20, 1990. Washington, 1990. 399 pp.

NATIONAL security implications of missile proliferation. Hearing, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Oct. 31, 1989. Washington, 1990. 88 pp.

PROPOSED sales and upgrades of major defense equipment to Saudi Arabia. Hearing, Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science and on Europe and the Middle East, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, June 19, 1990. Washington, 1991. 65 pp.

POPULATION

REPORT of the Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development. Hearing, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, July 24, 1990. Washington, 1990. 60 pp.

WORLD population projections, 1989–90 edition: short- and long-term estimates, by Rodolfo A. Bulatao and others. Baltimore, MD, The Johns Hopkins University Press (for The World Bank), 1990. 421 pp.

RAW MATERIALS AND ENERGY RESOURCES

DEPENDENCE on foreign oil. Hearing, Subcommittee on Energy and Agricultural Taxation, Committee on Finance, Senate, July 27, 1990. Washington, 1991. 296 pp.

ENERGY impact of the Persian Gulf crisis. Joint hearings, Subcommittee on Energy and Power and Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House, Aug. 7-Sept. 27, 1990. Washington, 1991. 338 pp. (Ser.No.101–209.)

IMPLICATIONS of world energy trends for international development trade and finance. Hearing, Subcommittee on International Development, Finance, Trade and Monetary Policy, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., March 5, 1991. Washington, 1991. 566 pp. (Ser.No.102–9.)

KEY elements of a national energy policy. Hearing, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Senate, Oct. 2, 1990. Washington, 1991. 189 pp.

NATIONAL Energy Security Act of 1991. Hearings, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Senate, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 21-March 20, 1991. Washington, 1991. 12 pts.

UNITED NATIONS

CURRENT developments in the United Nations system. Hearing, Subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations and on International Operations, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Sept. 19, 1990. Washington, 1991. 74 pp.

U.N. code of conduct on transnational corporations. Hearing, Subcommmittee on International Economic Policy, Trade, Oceans and Environment, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Oct. 11, 1990. Washington, 1990. 58 pp.

UNITED STATES

ECONOMIC adjustment after the Cold War. Hearings, Joint Economic Committee, Congress, Dec. 12, 1989-March 20, 1990. Washington, 1990. 310 pp.

POLITICAL status of Puerto Rico. Hearings, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Senate, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., on S.244, Jan. 30-Feb. 7, 1991. Washington, 1991. 332 pp.

PRESIDENT Bush's economic forecast and 1992 budget. Hearings, Committee on the Budget, House, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 6–20, 1991. Washington, 1991. 299 pp. (Ser.No.102–4.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PROPOSED legislation to authorize a political status referendum in Puerto Rico. Oversight hearing, Subcommittee on Insular and International Affairs, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House, March 2, 1990. Washington, 1991. 173 pp. (Ser.No.108–81.)

PUERTO Rico Status Referendum Act—S.712. Hearing, Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, Senate, on S.712, Nov. 9, 1989. Washington, 1991. 272 pp.

REVIEW of the War Powers Resolution. Hearings, Investigations Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services, House, May 24, 1989-Jan. 29, 1990. Washington, 1990. 335 pp. (H.A.S.C.No.101–80.)

U.S. power in a changing world: proceedings of a seminar held by the Congressional Research Service—November 19–20, 1989. Report prepared for the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, May 1990. Washington, 1990. 131 pp. (Com.Print.)

U.S. refugee program for 1991. Hearing, Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, Oct. 3, 1990. Washington, 1991. 349 pp. (Ser.No.J-101–96.)

WESTERN EUROPE

THE NEW Europe: security and political arrangements for the post-Cold War world. Hearing, Committee on Armed Services, House, Sept. 26, 1990. Washington, 1991. 22 pp. (H.A.S.C.No.101–78.)

ROUNDTABLE discussion on the future of post-war institutions in Europe. Hearings, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, March 6, 1990. Washington, 1990. 26 pp.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

BOLIVIA: a country study, ed. by Rex A. Hudson and Dennis M. Hanratty. Washington, G.P.O. (for the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress), 3rd ed., 1991. 354 pp.

THE CENTRAL American Democracy and Development Act, S.3041. Hearing, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Sept. 18, 1990. Washington, 1991. 19 pp.

THE ENTERPRISE for the Americas Initiative. Hearing, Subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations, Western Hemisphere Affairs, and International Economic Policy and Trade, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, June 28-Sept. 27, 1990. Washington, 1991. 392 pp.

ENTERPRISE for the Americas Initiative, S.3064. Hearing, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Sept. 27, 1990. Washington, 1991. 69 pp.

PROPOSED consideration of United States assistance for Panama. Hearing, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Feb. 6, 1990. Washington, 1990. 64 pp.

II. OTHER PUBLICATIONS

AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 1991. London, Europa Publications Ltd., 20th ed., 1991. 1,145 pp. (Distributed by Gale Research Inc., Detroit, MI.) $255.00.

AFTER THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: THE POTENTIAL FOR ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION, by Mehran Nakhjavani. Ottawa, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1991. 23 pp. (Working Papers, 34.)

AMERICA, GERMANY, AND THE NEW EUROPE, by Gregory F. Treverton and Barbara A. Bicksler. New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1991. 30 pp. (Critical Issues, 1991, 1.) $4.95.

THE AMERICAN-VIETNAMESE DIALOGUE, FEBRUARY 11–14, 1991, CONFERENCE REPORT, ed. by Dick Clark. Queenstown, MD, The Aspen Institute, 1991. 52 pp.

ARMS CONTROL AFTER THE GULF WAR, by Frank Barnaby. London, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1991. 27 pp. (Conflict Studies, 240.) $15.00.

ARMS CONTROL ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA: WHAT LESSONS CAN WE LEARN FROM EUROPEAN EXPERIENCES? Seoul, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, 1990. 182 pp.

ASIA YEARBOOK 1991. Hong Kong, Review Publishing Company, 1991. 220 pp. $32.50.

THE ASPIN PAPERS: SANCTIONS, DIPLOMACY, AND WAR IN THE PERSIAN GULF, by Les Aspin. Washington, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1991. 92 pp. (Significant Issues Series, Vol. XIII, No. 2.)

AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE UNITED STATES: INTERNAL CHANGE AND ALLIANCE

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Relations in the ANZUS States, ed. by Richard W. Baker. New York, Praeger (under the auspices of the East-West Center), 1991. 267 pp. $47.95.

Beijing Spring, 1989: Confrontation and Conflict. The Basic Documents, ed. by Michel Oksenberg and others. Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990. 403 pp.

Britain, Germany and 1992: The Limits of Deregulation, by Stephen Woolcock and others. London, Pinter Publishers (for The Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1991. 120 pp. (Chatham House Papers.)

Britain's Future in Europe, by Michael Franklin with Marc Wilke. London, Pinter Publishers (for The Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1990. 133 pp. (Chatham House Papers.)

Cambodia and the Dilemmas of U.S. Policy, by Frederick Z. Brown. New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1991. 55 pp. (Critical Issues 1991, 2/3.) $8.95.

The Challenge of Indochina: An Examination of the U.S. Role. Congressional Staff Conference, April 19–21, 1991. Queenstown, MD, The Aspen Institute, 1991. 40 pp.

Change and Continuity in Canada-U.S. Economic Relations, by William Diebold. Orono, ME, The Canadian-American Center, The University of Maine, 1991. 61 pp. (Canadian-American Public Policy, 5.)

Change and Continuity in Europe's Northern Region: A Conference Report, ed. by Paul J. Cook. Washington, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1991. 53 pp. (Significant Issues Series, Vol. XIII, No. 4.)

The Changing Environment of Transatlantic Relations, by Willem F. van Eekelen. Paris, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 1991. 79 pp. (A Report of the European Strategy Group.)

Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World, by Steven R. David. Baltimore, MD, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991. 247 pp. $38.50.

The Cold War and after: Prospects for Peace: An International Security Reader, ed. by Sean M. Lynn-Jones. Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 1991. $14.95.

Command Performance: The Neglected Dimension of European Security, by Paul B. Stares. Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1991. 240 pp.

Countries of the World and Their Leaders Yearbook 1991. Detroit, MI, Gale Research Inc., 1991. 2 vols. $145.00.

Crisis and Reform in Eastern Europe, ed. by Ferenc Feher and Andrew Arato. New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Publishers, 1991. 531 pp. $44.95.

Czechoslovakia: Too Velvet a Revolution? by James de Candole. London, Alliance Publishers (for the Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies), 1991. 41 pp. (European Security Studies, 11.) $9.00.

Defense and Counteroffensive under the New Soviet Military Doctrine, by John G. Hines and Donald Mahoney. Santa Monica, CA, The RAND Corporation (for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy), 1991. 125 pp.

Determinants of Emigration from Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean, ed. by Sergio Díaz-Briquets and Sidney Weintraub. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1991. 356 pp. $46.50.

Deutschlands Vereinigung: Die internationale Aspekte, by Karl Kaiser. Bergisch Gladbach, Gustav Lübbe Verlag (for the Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik), 1991. 383 pp. (Bastei-Lübbe Taschenbuch Band 65088.)

Dictionary of International Biography: A Biographical Record of Contemporary Achievement 1990/91. Cambridge, England, International Biographical Centre, 21st ed., 1990. 829 pp. $175.00.

Dismantling the Command Economy in Eastern Europe, ed. by Peter Havlik. Boulder, CO, Westview Press (in cooperation with The Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies), 1991. 280 pp. (The Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies Yearbook III.) $34.50.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the World Economy, by Susan M. Collins and Dani Rodrik. Washington, Institute for International Economics, 1991. 152 pp. (Policy Analyses in International Economics, 32.) $12.95.

The Economic Opening of Eastern Europe, by John Williamson. Washington, Institute for International Economics, 1991. 92 pp. $11.95.

Economic Transition in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union: Issues and Strategies, by David M. Kemme. New York, Praeger (for the Institute for East-West Security Studies), 1991. 56 pp. (Occasional Paper Series, 20.)

Environmental Issues in Eastern Europe: Setting an Agenda, by Jeremy Russell. London,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Royal Institute of International Affairs (for the Global Industrial and Social Progress Research Institute, Tokyo), 1990. 34 pp.

EUROPEAN GAS MARKETS: CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY IN THE 1990s, by Jonathan P. Stern. Brookfield, VT, Dartmouth Publishing Company (for The Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1990. 126 pp.

FINANCING EASTERN EUROPE, by Richard A. Debs and others. Washington, Group of Thirty (in cooperation with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 1991. 203 pp. $15.00.

FINANCING THE TRANSITION: THE SHATALIN PLAN AND THE SOVIET ECONOMY, by Marie Lavigne. New York, Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1990. 35 pp. (Public Policy Papers, 2.)

FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: POLITICAL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES 1990–1991, ed. by R. Bruce McColm. Lanham, MD, University Press of America (for Freedom House), 1991. 479 pp.

THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE, by Robert A. Scalapino, Seizaburo Sato and Thomas B. Ginsburg. San Francisco, CA, Center for Asian Pacific Affairs, The Asia Foundation, 1991. 24 pp. (CAPA Reports, 1.)

GORBACHEV AND THE FUTURE OF THE SOVIET MILITARY INSTITUTION, by Harry Gelman. Riverside, NJ, Brassey's (for The International Institute for Strategic Studies), 1991. 67 pp. (Adelphi Papers, 258.) $15.25.

THE GULF WAR READER: HISTORY, DOCUMENTS, OPINIONS, ed. by Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf. New York, Times Books, 1991. 526 pp. $15.00.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY: EUROPE ON THE EVE OF A NEW ERA, ed. by Vojtech Mastny and Jan Zielonka. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1991. 274 pp. $45.00.

HUNGER 1990: A REPORT ON THE STATE OF WORLD HUNGER. Washington, Bread for the World Institute on Hunger & Development, 1990. 134 pp.

INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA: ONE YEAR ON, by David Simon. London, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1991. 26 pp. (Conflict Studies, 239.) $15.00.

INDIA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: INDIAN PERCEPTIONS AND POLICIES, by Mohammed Ayoob. New York, Routledge (under the auspices of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore), 1990. 105 pp. $55.00.

INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1971, by Robert W. Bradnock. London, Pinter Publishers (for The Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1990. 128 pp. (Chatham House Papers.)

INTERNATIONAL MONEY & DEBT: CHALLENGES FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY, ed. by Rudiger Dornbusch and Steve Marcus. San Francisco, CA, ICS Press (for the International Center for Economic Growth), 1991. 200 pp. $12.95.

THE JAPANESE NEGOTIATOR: SUBTLETY AND STRATEGY BEYOND WESTERN LOGIC, by Robert M. March. New York, Kodansha International, 1991. 197 pp. $7.95.

JOINT VENTURES IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: THE CONTROL OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT UNDER SOCIALISM, by Margaret M. Pearson. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1991. 335 pp. $39.50.

KUWAIT AND IRAQ: HISTORICAL CLAIMS AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES, by Richard Schofield. London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991. 134 pp. $7.50.

LAOS: BEYOND THE REVOLUTION, ed. by Joseph J. Zasloff and Leonard Unger. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1991. 348 pp.

MAURITIUS: DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, by Larry W. Bowman. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1991. 208 pp.

NATIONAL INTERESTS IN AN AGE OF GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY, ed. by Thomas H. Lee and Proctor P. Reid. Washington, National Academy Press, 1991. 159 pp. (Series on Prospering in a Global Economy.) $19.95.

NATO: AN INSTITUTION UNDER THREAT? by Jan Willem Honig New York, Praeger (for the Institute for East-West Security Studies), 1991. 69 pp. (Occasional Paper Series, 22.)

NEW DIRECTIONS FOR AMERICAN POLICY IN ASIA, by Bernard K. Gordon. New York, Routledge, 1990. 170 pp. $39.95.

THE NEW EUROPE: AN A TO Z COMPENDIUM ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, by Jerry M. Rosenberg. Washington, The Bureau of National Affairs, 1991. 206 pp.

THE NEW EUROPE: REVOLUTION IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS, ed. by Nils H. Wessell. New York, The Academy of Political Science, 1991. 214 pp. (Proceedings, Vol. 38, No. 1.) $14.95.

ON DISARMAMENT: THE ROLE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, ed. by Ralph A. Hallenbeck and David E. Shaver. New York, Praeger, 1991. 229 pp. $47.95 (paper, $17.95).

ON THE INTERNATIONAL USE OF CURRENCIES: THE CASE OF THE DEUTSCHE MARK, by George S. Tavlas. Princeton, NJ, International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University, 1991. 46 pp. (Essays in International Finance, 181.) $6.50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PARTNERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: A NEW U.S. AGENDA FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY. Washington, Task Force on International Development and Environmental Security, World Resources Institute, 1991. 31 pp.

THE PRO-DEMOCRACY PROTESTS IN CHINA: REPORTS FROM THE PROVINCES, ed. by Jonathan Unger. Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, Inc. (for the Australian National University), 1991. 239 pp. (Contemporary China Papers.)

PUNDITS AND PATRIOTS: LESSONS FROM THE GULF WAR, by Philip Towle. London, Alliance Publishers Ltd. (for the Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies), 1991. 52 pp. $9.00.

RESHAPING THE NORTH AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP FOR THE 1990'S: A UNITED EUROPE AND COMPETITIVE PACIFIC RIM NECESSITATE NEW STRATEGIC POLICIES. A CANADA-UNITED STATES CONFERENCE SPONSORED BY AMERICAS SOCIETY/CANADIAN AFFAIRS, NEW YORK CITY, NOVEMBER 14–15, 1990, ed. by Lansing Lamont. New York, Americas Society, 1991. 137 pp. $6.00.

THE SOVIET CRISIS, by Dominic Lieven. London, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1991. 27 pp. (Conflict Studies, 240.) $15.00.

THE SOVIET ECONOMY 1970–1990: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, by Dmitri Steinberg. San Francisco, CA, International Trade Press, 1990. 338 pp. $115.00.

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1989 IN EASTERN EUROPE, by Ronald D. Asmus and others. Santa Monica, CA, The RAND Corporation (for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy), 1991. 177 pp.

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL UNDER GORBACHEV, by Robert O. Freedman. New York, Praeger (with The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington), 1991. 135 pp. (The Washington Papers, 150.)

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PACIFIC, by Gerald Segal. Boston, Unwin Hyman (for The Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1990. 236 pp.

THE SUN NEVER SETS...: CONFRONTING THE NETWORK OF FOREIGN U.S. MILITARY BASES, ed. by Joseph Gerson and Bruce Birchard. Boston, MA, South End Press (for the National Disarmament Program and the New England Regional Office of the American Friends Service Committee), 1991. 389 pp. $16.00.

TAIWAN: CHINA'S LAST FRONTIER, by Simon Long. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1991. 264 pp.

TOWARD COLLECTIVE SECURITY: TWO VIEWS, by Brian Urquhart and Robert S. McNamara. Providence, RI, The Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 1991. 44 pp. (Occasional Papers, 5.)

TRIPARTITE PROJECTS: PROPOSALS FOR JOINT U.S.–U.S.S.R. COOPERATION WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, by W. Donald Bowles and Elena B. Arefieva. Washington, Overseas Development Council, 1990. 33 pp.

TUNISIA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM, ed. by I. William Zartman. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991. 266 pp. (SAIS African Studies Library.)

TURKEY AND THE MIDDLE EAST, by Philip Robins. London, Pinter Publishers (for The Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1991. 130 pp.

UNITED GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES, by Michael A. Freney and Rebecca S. Hartley. Washington, NPA Committee on Changing International Realities, National Planning Association, 1991. 178 pp. (CIR Reports, 21.) $17.50.

THE U.S. ARMY IN A NEW SECURITY ERA, ed. by Sam C. Sarkesian and John Allen Williams. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990. 313 pp. $39.50.

US-JAPAN TRADE FRICTION: ITS IMPACT ON SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE PACIFIC BASIN, ed. by T. David Mason and Abdul M. Turay. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1991. 228 pp.

WHO'S WHO IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, by Wolfgang Bartke. New York, K.G. Saur, 1991. 2 vols. $325.00.

THE WIDER WESTERN EUROPE: RESHAPING THE EC/EFTA RELATIONSHIP, ed. by Helen Wallace. New York, Pinter Publishers (for The Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1991. 285 pp.

WORLD JUSTICE? U.S. COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, ed. by Mark Gibney. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1991. 178 pp. (Series on State Violence, State Terrorism, and Human Rights.) $39.95.

WORLD MILITARY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURES 1991, by Ruth Leger Sivard and others. Washington, World Priorities Inc., 14th ed., 1991. 64 pp. $6.50.

WORLD ORDER AND DOUBLE STANDARDS: PEACE AND SECURITY 1990–91, by Bernard Wood. Ottawa, Ont., Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1990. 37 pp. (Director's Annual Statement.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WORLD SECURITY: TRENDS AND CHALLENGES AT CENTURY'S END, by Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1991. 427 pp. (A Project of the Five College Program in Peace and World Security Studies.)

THE YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC: DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE IN AN ANCIENT LAND, by Manfred W. Wenner. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1991. 194 pp. (Westview Profiles/Nations of the Contemporary Middle East.) $34.95.

YEARBOOK 1990–91: TOWARDS A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER, ed. by Bo Huldt and Gunilla Herolf. Stockholm, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1991. 321 pp.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IN 1861, THE SOLDIERS MARCHED OFF TO WAR AND THE ARMED SERVICES YMCA WAS THERE WITH HELP AND SUPPORT.

HISTORY DOES INDEED REPEAT ITSELF.

The wars have had different names, different objectives, but the commitment from the YMCA to our troops has never varied.

From the Civil War to the World Wars to the Gulf War, through the years of peace in between, the Armed Services Y has been there asking, "What can we do?" and "How can we help?" The result is 130 years of experience in developing the skills, expertise and programs to provide support for the families of the men and women of the armed services.

Last year, before the crisis, they helped over 500,000 individuals, including single and married military members, spouses and children. This year, in a time of war and postwar, they expect that number to double as the Armed Services Y responds with the help of hundreds of community YMCAs.

Our active duty enlisted and their familes are under tremendous stress. There are cries for help from thousands of reservists and their families, as well. So many young families were caught unprepared. It will be a long time before their recovery is complete.

The crisis facing our young military has created a crisis for the Armed Services Y as well. And they desperately need your help.

C. J. "Pete" Silas
Chairman
Phillips Petroleum Company

I would like to ask you to join Phillips Petroleum Company in supporting this fine organization in any way you can. Throughout history, our enlisted have never delayed in their response to us. How can we delay in our response to them?

Armed Services YMCA

For more information about how you can help our U.S. military personnel and their families, please write: Armed Services YMCA of the USA, National Office, 5225 Brandon Ave., Suite 215, Springfield, Virginia 22150-2510, or call 703-866-1260.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



WE DO BUSINESS IN ONLY ONE PLACE.

With major offices in North America, Europe, Australia and Asia, we provide clients with opportunities everywhere in the world. So whether you want to raise capital, merge, acquire or divest, either domestically or internationally, keep one thought in mind.

At Salomon Brothers our willingness to go to the ends of the earth for our clients isn't simply a figure of speech.

Salomon Brothers

Salomon Brothers Inc – Member of SIPC

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED